Peirce's Critique of Psychological Hedonism

British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (2):349-367 (2015)
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Abstract

Psychological hedonism is the theory that all of our actions are ultimately motivated by a desire for our own pleasure or an aversion to our own pain. Peirce offers a unique critique of PH based on a descriptive analysis of self-controlled action. This essay examines Peirce's critique and his accounts of self-controlled action and of desire

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Citations of this work

Peirce on facts and true propositions.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2016 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (6):1176-1192.

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References found in this work

Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
The methods of ethics.Henry Sidgwick - 1874 - Bristol, U.K.: Thoemmes Press. Edited by Emily Elizabeth Constance Jones.
Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry Frankfurt - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. Oxford University Press UK.
Peirce's Theory of Signs.T. L. Short - 2007 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

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