Philosophical Disagreement and the Value-Laden Nature of Philosophy

Contemporary Pragmatism 16 (4):396-413 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Disagreement in philosophy is all-pervasive and irresolvable. There is almost no thesis in philosophy about which philosophers agree. In contrast to most contemporary accounts of philosophical disagreement, I argue that a significant proportion of philosophical disagreements are rooted in differences regarding values. A second thesis that I shall defend in this paper is that disagreements regarding values are not resolvable by argumentative means.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,674

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Verbal Disagreements and Philosophical Scepticism.Nathan Ballantyne - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):752-765.
Philosophical Peer Disagreement.Nicolás Lo Guercio - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (3):459-467.
Wittgenstein and Deep Disagreement.Ranalli Chris - 2017 - The Philosophers' Magazine 79:50-55.
An Alternative to Relativism.John K. Davis - 2010 - Philosophical Topics 38 (2):17-37.
What is Deep Disagreement?Chris Ranalli - 2018 - Topoi 40 (5):983-998.
Disagreements, Philosophical and Otherwise.Brian Weatherson - 2013 - In Jennifer Lackey & David Christensen (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 54.
The role of disagreement in semantic theory.Carl Baker - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (1):1-18.
Self-Exempting Conciliationism is Arbitrary.Simon Blessenohl - 2015 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):1-22.
Conceptual Disagreement.Sarah Stroud - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (1):15-28.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-11-30

Downloads
25 (#648,427)

6 months
5 (#694,978)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Viewpoint Convergence as a Philosophical Defect.Grace Helton - forthcoming - In Sanford C. Goldberg & Mark Walker (eds.), Attitude in Philosophy. Oxford University Press.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references