Abstract
This is perhaps the most original and important treatise on moral philosophy since the publication of Rawls’s Theory of Justice. It commands attention both in terms of its comprehensive scope and argumentative rigor in attempting to offer a theory of moral justification by way of establishing a supreme principle of morality through an analysis of the concept of action and the application of reason to action. The main thesis is "that every agent by the fact of engaging in action, is logically committed to the acceptance of certain evaluative and deontic judgments and ultimately of a supreme moral principle, the Principle of Generic Consistency, which requires that he respect his recipients’ necessary conditions of action. To prove this thesis, I have argued that the very possibility of rational interpersonal action depends upon the adherence to the morality that is grounded in this principle." The book contains five lengthy chapters. The first three chapters set forth the theoretical phase of the work; the last two concern the direct and indirect applications of the Principle of Generic Consistency.