Never not the best: LoT and the explanation of person-level psychology

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 46:e262 (2023)
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Abstract

As Quilty-Dunn et al. observe, the language-of-thought hypothesis (LoTH) has fallen out of favor in philosophy. I will support the arguments made for its rehabilitation by Quilty-Dunn et al. by reviewing old, but still potent arguments for LoTH, and briefly criticizing recent proposed alternatives to LoT, such as Frances Egan's deflationism and Eric Schwitzgebel's dispositionalism, revealing inadequacies in such antirepresentational, antisyntactic theories.

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10.1017/s0140525x23001929

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Louise Antony
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

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References found in this work

How to think about mental content.Frances Egan - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):115-135.
Propositional attitudes.Jerry Fodor - 1978 - The Monist 61 (October):501-23.
Propositional Attitudes.J. A. Fodor - 1978 - The Monist 61 (4):501-523.
Attributions of intentional action.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 51 (3):311 - 323.

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