Evolutionary approach to the development of science

Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 52 (2):201-214 (2017)
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Abstract

The author considers the evolutionary approach to the development of the scientific knowledge in framework of the Niklas Luhmann's system-communicative theory and presents a thesis that in respect to the final evolutional state (state of stabilization of new form of knowledge) the organization of the Russian science has not yet achieved the world-level of sufficient autonomy because there was not yet been established the self-substitutive order of the knowledge accumulation which is inherent to the autopoiesis of the contemporary science i.e. the process of continued change of some ones truths by some others. The factors impeding to establish such a self-substitutive order are to be connected by the author with the impact on the scientific discourse from some external communicative forms (the theological, financial, economical, political ones) and with the continuous change of some selective criterions that have to define what has to be accumulated as a memory of the science as a communicative system.

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