Abstract
Concepts and methods coming from the formal logic of science have played only a very subordinated role in the philosophical analysis of thought experiments so far. The present article, therefore, takes a look at thought experimenting from the perspective of the logic of science in a Carnapian spirit. To this end, the widely discussed refutation of Aristotle′s theory of free falling bodies by Galilei will be investigated. Further, two prominent approaches to thought experimenting are subjected to a closer investigation: first, the empiricist interpretation by John D. Norton , and second, the use of mental models by Nancy J. Nersessian . The existence of creative abductions, which introduce theoretical concepts, will be found to pose a seemingly insurmountable problem for the empiricist approach. The use of mental models, by contrast, proves to exhibit very interesting connections to the semantics of theoretical concepts. Such models can be shown to determine, in part, the meaning of theoretical concepts in cases where the understanding of such concepts is not entirely founded on explicit axioms