Abstract

Roderick Chisholm has recently developed a view that can be regarded as in large part a modern version of the rational psychology attacked by Kant in his critique of the “paralogisms of pure reason.” Chisholm argues that the self is a substance, that it is not “annexed to” or “placed in” any other being, that it has a certain numerical identity, and that it is directly known in itself—four claims that map fairly easily onto the main themes of Kant’s Paralogisms. At various points Chisholm directs himself against what he takes to be skeptical Kantian considerations against these claims. I happen to believe most of these claims are true and that even Kant was ultimately committed to them, but what I shall advance here is simply the interpretive thesis that Chisholm’s arguments for these claims are weak and their weakness is well exposed precisely by considerations encouraged by Kant’s discussion of the paralogisms. In other words, there is still more work to be done if one desires a contemporary defense of rational psychology.