What conception of knowledge does the epistemic version of deliberative democracy require? A classification proposal

Ideas Y Valores 68 (171):161-184 (2019)
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Abstract

RESUMEN El presente artículo intenta desarrollar los elementos de una concepción del conocimiento que resulte operativa para una versión epistémica de la democracia deliberativa. Se intenta superar algunas limitaciones de los modelos epistémico-deliberativos actuales y profundizar la relación entre conocimiento, deliberación y legitimidad. ABSTRACT The article develops the elements of a conception of knowledge that turns out to be operative for an epistemic version of deliberative democracy. It attempts to overcome some of the limitations of current deliberative-epistemic models and carry out an in-depth study of the relation among knowledge, deliberation, and legitimacy.

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