Slippery platform: The role of automatic and intentional processes in testing the effect of notation

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (3-4):328-329 (2009)
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Abstract

The type of processing of numerical dimensions varies greatly and is governed by context. Considering this flexibility in tandem with a fuzzy demarcation line between automatic and intentional processes, it is suggested that testing the effect of notation should not be confined to automatic processing, in particular to passive viewing. Recent behavioral data satisfying the authors' stipulations reveal a considerable, though perhaps not exclusive, core of common abstract processing.

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10.1017/s0140525x09990501

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Handbook of Experimental Psychology.S. S. Stevens - 1953 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 15 (4):679-681.

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