Abstract

It is contended that the Kantian Interpretation has failed. It is nothing but pseudo-Kantianism. As a result of the failure of the Kantian Interpretation, Rawls' criticism against utilitarianism is ineffective with the consequence that Rawls is unable to make a radical break with utilitarianism. Furthermore, it makes possible the contention that Rawls' theory is strictly speaking not deonotological. That underlying Rawls' theory is the notion of consequences. And thus the contention that Rawls is a non-Kantian consequentialist. ;The original position acts as a justificatory device for Rawls in that if the parties to the contract would unanimously choose the principles than the said principles are justified. In opposition to Rawls' premise, it is contended that something's being chosen in the original position would definitely not of itself be an ultimate moral principle and would not of itself guarantee that the thing chosen would be just or justified. It is further contended that the coherence argument leads to ethical relativism; leaves so much to intuition; and does not favor Rawls' principle over the principle of utility. ;It is contended that Rawls' theory is utilitarian in nature in its relation to Hume. It is utilitarian in nature or consistent with it in that Rawls shares with the utilitarian the basic concepts or notions that define utilitarianism. Such concepts or notions include maximization, useful, and averaging. The most telling reason that Rawls' theory is a form of utilitarianism is the fact that he is driven back to the necessity of some calculus of consequences, and the fact that the two principles of justice can be fitted together with rule-utilitarianism through the practice conception of rules which Rawls delineated in the article "Two Concepts of Rules." ;It is contended that if average utilitarianism is considered under the favorable conditions assumed for Rawls' special conception, its assumed compatibility with slavery or serfdom would not appear. Therefore, the parties in the original position might as well choose the average principle since it is now with the special conditions equivalent to Rawls' special conception of justice. It is argued that the general conception of justice is compatible with slavery. And Rawls acknowledges that his theory might approve of slavery in some actual circumstances. It is contended that if it is rational to reject average utilitarianism for the reason that it can justify slavery, and slavery constitutes equally good reason for rejecting Rawls' general conception because such conception justifies slavery, then it is also rational to reject the general conception. ;In A Theory of Justice, Rawls in order to espouse and defend his contract theory of justice as a systematic moral alternative to utilitarianism has taken issue with utilitarianism. The first object of this study is to investigate Rawl's claims and objections against utilitarianism and then argue that Rawls is a utilitarian, or at least that his views defend and are consistent with utilitarian thinking of a sort. In this process, I shall attempt to defend the principle of utility against these Rawlsian charges. The second object of the dissertation is to discuss Rawls' claim that his theory is highly Kantian in nature, which discussion terminates in the contention that the contract theory is strictly speaking not deontolgoical and that Rawls is a non-Kantian consequentialist. ;Rawls attacks utilitarianism because it may justify harsh repressive measures against actions such as certain religious or sexual practices that cause no social injury. It is contended in answer to Rawls that since these actions cause no social injury, taking harsh repressive measures against them will inevitably yield greater disutility.