Abstract

A welcome reprint of an important work of Hutcheson with an excellent philosophical and scholarly study of the issues between Hutcheson and the rationalist Gilbert Burnet in respect to the former's contributions to metaethics. The study, modestly entitled "Editor's Introduction" is a philosophical contribution to the study of the Moral Sense Theory which argues forcibly for the plausibility of Hutcheson's epistemology of morals as a form of non-cognitivism that recognizes the proper role of reason. Peach adopts a defeasibility interpretation of Hutcheson's Moral Theory. Unlike the principle of Benevolence, which is a moral principle, "the principle of approval is primarily descriptive and psychological." It is maintained that the vindication of Hutcheson's theory appeals to "the concept of a way of life in which the satisfaction of examined desires is maximized, to the concept of the kind of person, all things considered, one wants to be." Professor Peach's challenging interpretation is worthy of careful study. The appendix reprints the correspondence between Gilbert Burnet and Francis Hutcheson.--A. S. C.