Prioritarianism: A response to critics

Politics, Philosophy and Economics 18 (2):101-144 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Prioritarianism is a moral view that ranks outcomes according to the sum of a strictly increasing and strictly concave transformation of individual well-being. Prioritarianism is ‘welfarist’ (namel...

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,829

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

In Defence of the Priority View.Thomas Porter - 2012 - Utilitas 24 (3):349-364.
Prioritarianism and the Measure of Utility.Michael Otsuka - 2015 - Journal of Political Philosophy 23 (1):1-22.
Utilitarianism and prioritarianism II.David McCarthy - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (1):1-33.
Equality, priority and global justice.Nils Holtug - 2009 - Journal of Global Ethics 5 (3):173 – 179.
Utilitarianism and prioritarianism I.David Mccarthy - 2006 - Economics and Philosophy 22 (3):335-363.
Utilitarianism and Prioritarianism II.David McCarthy - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (1):1-33.
A New Counterexample to Prioritarianism.Toby Ord - 2015 - Utilitas 27 (3):298-302.
Prioritarianism and Population Ethics.Nils Holtug - 2012 - Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 25 (1):45-56.
Prioritarianism for Variable Populations.Campbell Brown - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (3):325-361.
Prioritarianism, Levelling Down and Welfare Diffusion.Ingmar Persson - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (3):307-311.
Equality-tempered prioritarianism.Dale Dorsey - 2014 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 13 (1):45-61.
Prioritarianism and the Levelling Down Objection.Thomas Porter - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2):197-206.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-02-21

Downloads
131 (#139,680)

6 months
41 (#96,180)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Nils Holtug
University of Copenhagen
Matthew D. Adler
Duke University

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Risk and Rationality.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.

View all 74 references / Add more references