A challenge to positive relevance theorists: Reply to Roush

Philosophy of Science 71 (4):521-524 (2004)
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Abstract

Recently in this journal Sherrilyn Roush (2004) defends positive relevance as a necessary (albeit not a sufficient) condition for evidence by rejecting two of the counterexamples from my earlier (2001) work. In this reply I argue that Roush's critique is not successful

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10.1086/423629

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Peter Achinstein
Johns Hopkins University

Citations of this work

Reasons and evidence one ought.John Brunero - 2009 - Ethics 119 (3):538-545.
Is Evidential Support the Same as Increase-in-Probability?Tamaz Tokhadze - 2022 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 99 (2):135–158.

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