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  1. Attitudes toward risk are complicated: experimental evidence for the re-individuation approach to risk-attitudes.Haim Cohen, Anat Maril, Sun Bleicher & Ittay Nissan-Rozen - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (8):2553-2577.
    We present experimental evidence that supports the thesis :602–625, 2015, Br J Philos Sci 70:77–102, 2019; Bradley in Decisions theory with a human face, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017; Goldschmidt and Nissan-Rozen in Synthese 198:7553–7575, 2021) that people might positively or negatively desire risky prospects conditional on only some of the prospects’ outcomes obtaining. We argue that this evidence has important normative implications for the central debate in normative decision theory between two general approaches on how to rationalize several common (...)
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  • Attitudes, deliberation and decisions.Richard Bradley - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-18.
    In this paper I discuss the challenges of several authors to the claims I make in Decision Theory with a Human Face regarding the relation between preference and choice, the nature of conditional desire, the semantics of conditionals, attitudes to chances and their role in individuating prospects, belief change under growing awareness and choice under ambiguity.
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  • The Value of Risk in Transformative Experience.Petronella Randell - forthcoming - Episteme:1-13.
    Risk is inherent to many, if not all, transformative decisions. The risk of regret, of turning into a person you presently consider to be morally objectionable, or of value change are all risks of choosing to transform. This aspect of transformative decision-making has thus far been ignored, but carries important consequences to those wishing to defend decision theory from the challenge posed by transformative decision-making. I contend that a problem lies in a common method used to cardinalise utilities – the (...)
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  • Taking Risks on Behalf of Another.Johanna Thoma - 2023 - Philosophy Compass 18 (3):e12898.
    A growing number of decision theorists have, in recent years, defended the view that rationality is permissive under risk: Different rational agents may be more or less risk-averse or risk-inclined. This can result in them making different choices under risk even if they value outcomes in exactly the same way. One pressing question that arises once we grant such permissiveness is what attitude to risk we should implement when choosing on behalf of other people. Are we permitted to implement any (...)
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  • Weighing and aggregating reasons under uncertainty: a trilemma.Ittay Nissan-Rozen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (9):2853-2871.
    I discuss the trilemma that consists of the following three principles being inconsistent: 1. The Common Principle: if one distribution, A, necessarily brings a higher total sum of personal value that is distributed in a more egalitarian way than another distribution, B, A is more valuable than B. 2. (Weak) ex-ante Pareto: if one uncertain distribution, A, is more valuable than another uncertain distribution, B, for each patient, A is more valuable than B. 3. Pluralism about attitudes to risk (Pluralism): (...)
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  • Rational Responses to Risk, Paul Weirich. Oxford University Press, 2020, xi + 269 pages. [REVIEW]Ittay Nissan-Rozen - 2022 - Economics and Philosophy 38 (2):309-314.
  • We Should Not Use Randomization Procedures to Allocate Scarce Life-Saving Resources.Roberto Fumagalli - 2022 - Public Health Ethics 15 (1):87-103.
    In the recent literature across philosophy, medicine and public health policy, many influential arguments have been put forward to support the use of randomization procedures to allocate scarce life-saving resources. In this paper, I provide a systematic categorization and a critical evaluation of these arguments. I shall argue that those arguments justify using RAND to allocate SLSR in fewer cases than their proponents maintain and that the relevant decision-makers should typically allocate SLSR directly to the individuals with the strongest claims (...)
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