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Russell on particulars

Philosophical Review 56 (1):59-72 (1947)

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  1. The Adverbial Theory of Properties.Andrea Borghini - 2012 - Metaphysica 13 (2):107-123.
    The paper presents a novel version of universalism—the thesis according to which there are only universals, no individuals—which is cashed out in terms of an adverbial analysis of predication. According to the theory, every spatiotemporal occurrence of a universal U can be expressed by a sentence which asserts the existence of U adverbially modified by the spatiotemporal region at which it exists. After some preliminary remarks on the interpretation of natural language, a formal semantics for the theory is first provided, (...)
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  • No bare particulars.Andrew M. Bailey - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (1):31-41.
    There are predicates and subjects. It is thus tempting to think that there are properties on the one hand, and things that have them on the other. I have no quarrel with this thought; it is a fine place to begin a theory of properties and property-having. But in this paper, I argue that one such theory—bare particularism—is false. I pose a dilemma. Either bare particulars instantiate the properties of their host substances or they do not. If they do not, (...)
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  • Object.Henry Laycock - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    In The Principles of Mathematics, Russell writes: Whatever may be an object of thought, or may occur in any true or false proposition, or can be counted as one, I call a term. This, then, is the widest word in the philosophical vocabulary. I shall use as synonymous with it the words unit, individual and entity. The first two emphasize the fact that every term is one, while the third is derived from the fact that every term has being, i.e. (...)
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  • Hume's Scepticism and Realism - His Two Profound Arguments against the Senses in An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding.Jani Hakkarainen - 2007 - Tampere, Finland: University of Tampere.
    The main problem of this study is David Hume’s (1711-76) view on Metaphysical Realism (there are mind-independent, external, and continuous entities). This specific problem is part of two more general questions in Hume scholarship: his attitude to scepticism and the relation between naturalism and skepticism in his thinking. A novel interpretation of these problems is defended in this work. The chief thesis is that Hume is both a sceptic and a Metaphysical Realist. His philosophical attitude is to suspend his judgment (...)
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  • Do we need visual subjects?Błażej Skrzypulec - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (4):574-594.
    It is widely accepted within contemporary philosophy of perception that the content of visual states cannot be characterized simply as a list of represented features. This is because such characterization leads to the so-called, “Many Properties problem”, i.e. it does not allow us to explain how the visual system is able to distinguish between scenes containing different arrangements of the same features. The usual solution to the Many Properties problem is to characterize some elements of content as subjects, to which (...)
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  • Tropes variations: the topic of particulars beyond Sellars’s myth of the given.Antonio M. Nunziante - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12019-12043.
    The aim of this paper is twofold. First, I would like to bring into the light the almost unexplored Sellars’s theory of particulars. Second, I would like to show its surprising degree of compatibility with the thesis supported by some contemporary tropists, Tropes, Universals and the Philosophy of Mind, Ontos Verlag, 2008; Moltmann, Mind 113:1–41, 2004 and Moltmann, Noûs 47:346–370, 2013). It is difficult to establish whether Sellars possessed an own theory of tropes, developed independently by the classical form it (...)
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  • Sensory intuition and the dogma of localization.Reinhardt Grossmann - 1962 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 5 (1-4):238 – 251.
    Conceptualism, like any other philosophical doctrine of comparable scope, has both ontological and epistemological aspects. Ontologically, however, conceptualism does not differ significantly from certain forms of nominalism. 1 At its root lies an epistemological thesis: All objects of sensory intuition are localized in space and time. 2 In this paper, I wish to explore some of the consequences of this thesis.
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  • Object.Bradley Rettler & Andrew M. Bailey - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1.
    One might well wonder—is there a category under which every thing falls? Offering an informative account of such a category is no easy task. For nothing would distinguish things that fall under it from those that don’t—there being, after all, none of the latter. It seems hard, then, to say much about any fully general category; and it would appear to do no carving or categorizing or dividing at all. Nonetheless there are candidates for such a fully general office, including (...)
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