19th Century Philosophy

Ernst Mach’s and Bertrand Russell’s philosophical outlooks contributed to shaping the philosophy of science of the 20th century. Mach is a philosophical interpreter of science, a positivist, and a historian, considering the general principles of science as condensed economic descriptions of observed facts. Russell held a view of the nature and relation of philosophy to science and to logic that can be described as essentially consistent. In this article, the aim is to explore how both Mach and Russell defended the (...) classical version of “Neutral Monism”. Since it was developed as a reaction to the mechanical philosophy of nature, Neural Monism also emerged along with scientific psychology in the late 19th century. The attempt in this article is to examine their versions of neutral monism and emphasize their differences and convergences. (shrink)

How is Nietzsche’s genealogy of morality relevant to his revaluation of values? I consider and reject three accounts: contingency accounts, pedigree accounts, and unmasking accounts. I then propose an alternative account. On this view, Nietzsche provides a ‘deconstructive genealogy’ that indicates whether and where we should expect to find unity in our current moral practices. Moreover, Nietzsche’s history contributes to a critique of contemporary morality because it reveals that morality is unlikely to have the kind of unity required by many (...) of its defenders. After explaining and defending this account of genealogical critique in GM, I show how it can be generalized to domains besides morality. (shrink)

A pesquisa trata de uma introdução à lógica da medida de Hegel. O objetivo é fornecer uma visão geral da terceira seção da Lógica do Ser: a Lógica da Medida. O problema é entender o porquê a unidade subjacente do ser é denominada de indiferença absoluta e como ela se diferencia da indiferença do ser puro? Em outras palavras, a indiferença absoluta é descrita como relação quantitativa inversa dos fatores de duas determinações qualitativas. Então, como essa contradição é dissolvida e, (...) ao mesmo tempo, possibilita a passagem para a essência? Para explicitar esse problema, primeiramente, reconstruímos o desenvolvimento lógico da categoria da medida na terceira seção da Lógica do Ser; descrevemos a contradição da indiferença absoluta de duas qualidades como uma relação quantitativa inversa entre seus fatores. Depois, apresentamos a categoria da medida segundo a Enciclopédia. Há uma dupla transição na Lógica do Ser a partir da lógica da medida: da quantidade para a qualidade e da qualidade para a quantidade. A transição da medida para o sem medida e, deste, para a indiferença absoluta explicita a suprassunção de todas as determinidades qualitativas e quantitativas do ser. (shrink)

들뢰즈는 헤겔 변증법을 동일성의 철학 또는 재현의 철학으로 이해하고, 이 변증법의 핵심 개념인 부정성을 자신의 차이 개념에 비해 단지 이차적인 것으로 파악하면서 동일성을 산출하기 위한 단순한 매개수단으로 이해하고 비판한다. 이러한 비판에 대해 헤겔적인 관점에서 반비판이 제기될 수 있는데, 여기에서 문제가 되는 것은 부정성과 차이 사이에서 제기되는 우위성의 문제라기보다는, 오히려 이 개념들이 지니는 자기관계성 또는 자기적용의 문제이다. 그래서 헤겔 변증법은 들뢰즈가 생각하듯이 동일성의 철학도 재현의 철학도 아니며, 또한 부정성은 자기관계하는 것으로서 차이에 비해 단지 이차적인 매개수단도 아니고, 이 자기관계하는 부정성에 근거해서 파악되는 (...) 개념들은 단순히 재현의 논리에 근거한 외적반성의 범주들도 아니며, 오히려 세계를 내재적으로 이해하는데 있어서 핵심적인 역할을 담당하는 관계존재론적 범주들로 이해된다. 이를 통해서 세계와 이 세계 안에 존재하는 모든 것들 각각은 다른 것들과 관계하면서도 자기관계하는 살아있는 실체이고 자기-생산적인 구조를 자체 내에 지니는 것으로 이해된다. (shrink)

이 논문은 「인간학」에서 개진된 광기(Verrücktheit)에 대한 헤겔의 논의를 자연에서 정신으로의 이행이라는 관점에서 해명한다. 「인간학」에서 헤겔은 광기를 의 두 번째 단계 ‘자기느낌(Selbstgefühl)’에서 주제화하는데, 논자는 자기느낌이 어떤 점에서 자기의식과 달리 자연적 주체성인지, 자연적 주체성은 또 어떤 의미에서 광기라는 현상을 낳는지, 헤겔에게 광기는 무엇을 의미하는지, 그리고 그것이 「인간학」에서 이루어지는 정신(Geist)의 전개에 어떤 역할을 하는지를 상세히 분석하여 보여주고자 한다. 논자는 (1) 헤겔 「인간학」의 해석과 관련하여 자기느낌 개념에 주목해야 하는 철학사적이고 연구사적인 이유를 간략히 살피고, (2) 헤겔 철학에서 자기느낌 개념의 의미 그리고 「인간학」에서 주제화되는 자기느낌의 문제가 (...) 무엇인지를 정리한 후, (3) 「인간학」에서 개진된 헤겔의 광기 개념 및 광기 분류를 상세히 살필 것이다. 그리고 이를 토대로 (4) 헤겔이 광기의 원인으로 개념화하는 신체성은 영혼과 세계 사이의 관계에 대한 헤겔 특유의 존재론적 사유를 전제로 이해할 수 있다는 점을 논증하고, 이를 토대로 (5) 광기의 필연성이 정신의 부정성을 나타내는 여러 의미를 고찰할 것이다. (shrink)

Modern philosophy can often appear to be mere cryptomnesia, redressed and resuited to fit the particular mouth from which it is espoused. This notion is but a sorrowful chimera binding the 21st-century mind to the confines of an eternal shadow, an eternal prison of doubt in the face of limitless potential. As a species, we are rapidly approaching the precipice of Yahweh's original position as instantiators of consciousness, as the I AM in relation to our artificial progeny. Could one fabricate (...) a candidate more fitting for a contra-analysis of our current situation than Hegel? One could not. (shrink)

Cinematographic art can regenerate the experience of time as a spiritual memory because cinema can simultaneously present the modes of time, separating them from chronology and immediacy, seeing and thinking about the reality of the future of the world and, therefore, the crossroads where the spirit is called to create itself in relation to the way things become, which implies choosing to believe that is possible. The aim of this work is to show how the film concept and style of (...) Tarkovsky in the film Nostalghia, through the sequence shot, expresses a spiritual memory that can be understood as Kierkegaard’s existential becoming of the human spirit in the world. (shrink)

Marx não apenas flertou com o modo de expressão Hegeliano na sua obra O Capital, mas ele próprio pretendia trabalhar o racional da lógica dialéctica de Hegel. O artigo tenta esboçar a inversão de Marx do programa teórico de Hegel mostrando, primeiro, que esta inversão não deve ser entendida num sentido metafísico como programa de um materialismo dialéctico e histórico, como fizeram primeiro Engels e depois o marxismo tradicional. Em segundo lugar, será demonstrado que a inversão de Marx do programa (...) teórico de Hegel toma mais emprestado a este último do que é normalmente assumido, em particular Marx partilha a crítica de Hegel à concepção instrumental do conhecer que está subjacente ao cepticismo metodológico em relação ao conhecer na filosofia e ciência moderna e contemporânea. O artigo defende uma renovação do marxismo com base num Hegel-marxismo. (shrink)

O texto seleccionado e que se apresenta agora em tradução portuguesa pode ser considerado como uma síntese exemplar das ideias de Hegel relativamente ao ensino da filosofia a nível secundário. Sobre a exposição da filosofia em Ginásios é um texto redigido como resposta a Immanuel Niethammer, na altura Conselheiro escolar da Baviera, que solicitara a Hegel uma apreciação sobre a reforma geral do sistema de ensino cuja aplicação estava em curso nas escolas bávaras e que tinha a sua expressão legal (...) no documento de 3 de Novembro de 1808, Allgemeines Normativ der Einrichtung der öffentlichen Unterrichtsanstalten [Directiva geral para a organização dos estabelecimentos públicos de ensino]. (shrink)

Texto originalmente publicado em HORSTMANN, R-P. “Hegels Theorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft”. In: SIEP, Ludwig, G. W. F. Hegel: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. De Gruyter. pp. 189-208 (2016).

Both new and seasoned psychotherapists wrestle with the relationship between psychological distress and inequality across race, class, gender, and sexuality. How does one address this organically in psychotherapy? What role does it play in therapeutic action? Who brings it up, the therapist or the patient? Daniel José Gaztambide addresses these questions by offering a rigorous decolonial approach that rethinks theory and technique from the ground up, providing an accessible, evidence-informed reintroduction to psychoanalytic practice. He re-examines foundational thinkers from three traditions—Freudian, (...) relational-interpersonal, and Lacanian—through the lens of revolutionary psychiatrist Frantz Fanon, and offers a detailed analysis of Fanon’s psychoanalytic practice. Drawing on rich yet grounded discussions of theory and research, Gaztambide presents a clinical model that facilitates exploration of the social in the clinical space in a manner intimately related to the patient’s presenting problem. In doing so, this book demonstrates that clinicians no longer have to choose between attending to the personal, interpersonal, or sociopolitical. It is a guide to therapeutic action “on the couch,” which envisions political action “off the couch” and in the streets. Decolonizing Psychoanalytic Technique provides a comprehensive, practice-oriented and compelling guide for students, practitioners, and scholars of critical, multicultural and decolonial approaches to psychotherapy. (shrink)

The conflict between globalism and nationalism is arguably one of the most important political issues of our time. In this article, I argue that Hegel’s mature political philosophy has convincing arguments for recognition-based, non-chauvinistic nationalism and against globalism. I lay out two reasons why Hegel is against dissolving national sovereignty and the establishment of a world state: First of all, he argues that the state provides the highest realization of human self-determination. Therefore, he believes that it is not rational for (...) a people who form a sovereign nation to want to give up their political independence. Second of all, Hegel argues that the state must be conceived of as having individuality, which means that it has the ontological structure of an exclusory being-for-itself: In order for it to be an individual, it must stand in exclusory relations to others of the same kind. In addition to reconstructing Hegel’s critique of globalism, I argue that his brand of nationalism is based on mutual recognition between states, which makes Hegel not a Hobbesian realist but someone who believes that the political sphere is inherently ethical. (shrink)

Abstractabstract:John Stuart Mill's harm principle holds that an individual's freedom can only be restricted to prevent harm to others. However, there is an important ambiguity between a strong version, which limits legitimate interference to self-defense and therefore prohibits society from protecting third parties (those who are not its members), and a narrow version, which grants any society universal jurisdiction to prevent nonconsensual harms, no matter who is harmed. Mill sometimes appeals to the strong harm principle to preclude interference, but elsewhere (...) endorses measures (including humanitarian foreign intervention and animal cruelty laws) to protect third parties, suggesting that he subscribes only to the weak harm principle. This ambiguity regarding who it is that society has standing to protect has important implications for the scope of individual freedom. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Practical Necessity, Freedom, and History: From Hobbes to Marx by David JamesMeghan RobisonDavid James. Practical Necessity, Freedom, and History: From Hobbes to Marx. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. 256. Hardback, $70.00.In his newest monograph, David James offers an elaborate, well-wrought reflection on human freedom and its limits by considering five canonical modern philosophers: Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, and Marx. Judging from the table of contents, the book (...) appears to be a work in the history of philosophy: each of the chronologically organized chapters examines a different aspect of necessity, history, and freedom in one of the five philosophers just mentioned. By focusing on those thinkers, James tracks a progression in the modern reflection on the nature of freedom and its relation to constraint. Specifically, he argues that such a progression culminates, with Marx, in finally getting the right understanding of the relation between freedom and two kinds of necessity—one practical, the other historical. This is an extremely ambitious book, and its scope is extensive: by its end, James has considered more than thirty philosophical works spanning nearly two hundred years. Yet, even though it makes several contributions to various longstanding scholarly debates, Practical Necessity, Freedom, and History is not a work of intellectual history. Its main seven chapters—each of which offers a richly complex interpretative analysis that is sure to challenge any reader, even a specialist—are preceded by an introduction that explains that the book's aim is to contribute to a vision of society where necessity and freedom are reconciled. This aim is not a mere framing device but structures the book's contents as well its interpretive method.On James's account, the project of reconciling freedom with necessity—which was initiated by Rousseau in the eighteenth century and then developed by each of the modern philosophers examined in this book (with the exception of Hobbes [9])—remains incomplete. James explains this incompleteness as in part due to the success of the "two-liberties" conception of freedom outlined by Isaiah Berlin which he understands as the "liberal" idea according to which liberty begins and ends where others are prohibited from interfering in one's freedom and the "neo-republican" idea according to which the mere threat of domination is a constraint on freedom. Both views of liberty are essentially negative, James argues, and also deficient because they entail an impoverished and incorrect idea of constraint. To get beyond this viewpoint, James proposes to augment the idea of constraint that such a viewpoint entails by including both additional forms of practical constraint and a positive idea of freedom as self-determination (1). James explains the importance of the concept of self-determination by stressing the role it played in "gaining control over social and historical conditions and forces that generate avoidable practical constraints on human agency that may or may not interfere in people's lives" (2). To this end, he locates a productive tension between freedom as self-determination and practical constraint: the former is limited by the latter which, at the same time, it seeks to abolish. The "two-liberties" view cannot grasp this tension, James argues, because, in tying agency back to a "clearly identifiable agent," it overlooks the plural nature of freedom (2). In short, freedom and necessity remain unreconciled because we have not understood the nature of constraint and its relation to freedom as self-determination.James seeks to fill this "knowledge gap" by returning to what Kant, Hegel, and Marx said on freedom and necessity (both practical and historical) when they reflected on the transition to a society in which freedom and necessity are eventually reconciled. Specifically, James tries to identify new possibilities implicit in those three thinkers' accounts and to "kick the tires," so to speak, by looking for holes in their understanding of practical necessity. In particular, he focuses on what Kant's, Hegel's, and Marx's understanding of freedom and necessity might entail about the role of suffering in the transition toward a society in which freedom and necessity are reconciled. In combing through those three thinkers' arguments for inconsistencies, contradictions, and pregnant loose threads, James strives to... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hegel's Value: Justice as the Living Good by Dean MoyarThimo HeisenbergDean Moyar. Hegel's Value: Justice as the Living Good. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. 384. Hardback, $110.00.Hegel's Philosophy of Right is one of those texts that make it easy to miss the forest for the trees. On the argumentative journey from private property and punishment, via the "emptiness" of Kant's moral law to Hegel's vision of a (...) rational social order, it is easy to lose sight of the overall arch of Hegel's argument. Indeed, this kind of problem is confounded by an ever-growing literature on individual ideas and sections of the text (from Hegel's conception of agency to his argument for the market economy), which, while interesting and rewarding on their own, direct our attention to parts of his argument, rather than to the Philosophy of Right as a whole.Dean Moyar's new book is devoted to making us see the forest again—albeit while never leaving the trees out of sight. Indeed, to stretch the metaphor of forest and trees a little bit further, Moyar builds his ambitious endeavor on two new interpretative theses, which enable him to show us completely new paths through and clearings in the forest, bringing to light previously underappreciated aspects of the argument and adding refreshing new takes on the parts of Hegel's view that are already well known.The first of Moyar's two central theses concerns Hegel's methodology in his Philosophy of Right. Moyar maintains that the structure of the Philosophy of Right can be understood as a "teleologically inferentialist" account: the content of the norms of right is developed through use, where at each stage of the argument the content of those norms is refined by sublating previous failures of application. But while this Hegelian process is dynamic, relying on conflicts and their resolution, the process is—in contrast to some pragmatist forms of inferentialism—not open-ended: instead, or so Moyar convincingly argues, it leads to a point of inferential equilibrium as telos of the text (Hegel's vision of Ethical Life), in which some dynamism persists but further development of right is no longer necessary.This kind of interpretation, Moyar argues, has several advantages: it renders the methodology of the Philosophy of Right consistent with the method of Hegel's Logic, but it also provides us with a general template (which Moyar calls the "basic argument" [30 and passim]) on which to understand all the different transitions in the Philosophy of Right as structurally analogous, thereby showing Hegel to be both intertextually and intratextually consistent. Even more, using this basic argument as a template, Moyar puts himself in a position to generate interesting understandings of all the major and minor transitions in Hegel's text, focusing not merely on the most well-known (the transition from Morality to Ethical Life), but also on those that have traditionally received much less attention (such as the minor transition that leads from the contradiction between right [Recht] and welfare [Wohl] to the Good).The second of Moyar's two central theses concerns the importance of the concept of value to Hegel's project. Indeed, Moyar argues that even though the word 'value' (Wert) may not appear frequently in the published version of Hegel's lectures, the concept of value is at work everywhere in the text. Moyar, consequently, traces the presence of this concept throughout the Philosophy of Right, using it to understand many of the forbiddingly [End Page 327] difficult passages, from the dense section on the "Alienation of Property" early on in the part on Abstract Right, to Hegel's later views on the relationship between right and duty, his precarious theory of the "circulation of value" on the market, and finally his view of history at the end of the Philosophy of Right.In this way, Moyar extracts a rich interpretative bounty: he defends a heterodox reading of Hegel as a legal positivist, reconstructs a Hegelian doctrine of public reason, and argues against an "amoral" reading of Hegel's account of history. Most important, perhaps, is his interpretation of the relationship... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hegel's Century: Alienation and Recognition in a Time of Revolution by Jon StewartClay GrahamJon Stewart. Hegel's Century: Alienation and Recognition in a Time of Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. Pp. xi + 338. Hardback, $39.99.Hegel's Century serves as (yet another) important contribution in Jon Stewart's ever-expanding research in nineteenth-century philosophy. The central premise of this monograph explores Hegel's pan-European legacy and argues that Hegelian concepts are fundamental (...) for understanding major philosophical themes of the era, especially on the European continent. Dominant among these themes are alienation and recognition, particularly their adaptation to political philosophy and religious criticism. Stewart develops his theses via a series of chapters dedicated to individual thinkers: Heine, Feuerbach, Bauer, Marx, Kierkegaard, Dostoyevsky, Bakunin, and Engels. In each case, the concepts of alienation and recognition are teased out of primary texts and connected to, and contrasted with, their Hegelian origin. While scholars of nineteenth-century philosophy may find some value in re-envisioning the development of continental thought through Stewart's narrative [End Page 330] (especially insofar as it challenges unfortunate caricatures of the history of ideas), the target audiences of Hegel's Century are advanced students of philosophy and the general public of interested persons. Though this approach has its shortcomings, it is nevertheless a valuable addition to the literature. Not only does Stewart tell a compelling story about the trajectory of nineteenth-century philosophy, but he also connects this conceptual evolution to shifts in political, economic, literary, and religious history. As such, Hegel's Century is best thought of as a gateway text for students and autodidacts fascinated by the philosophical bases for a century of upheaval and revolution.Following a general introduction, Stewart divides the book into three parts, each more substantive than the last. His introduction does the necessary legwork detailing the purpose, audience, and strategy of the book. Its most philosophically interesting aspect is the outline of seven ideas Stewart hopes will reform the reception of nineteenth-century philosophy in the modern classroom. Philosophical exposition begins in part 1, which consists of two chapters wherein Stewart details those aspects of Hegel's philosophy that will be most thoroughly thematized throughout the book. These ideas are largely sourced from specific portions of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, and Lectures on the Philosophy of History. Chapter 1 focuses on Hegel's view of alienation in the Phenomenology, especially the (in)famous section on the master and bondsman. In chapter 2, Stewart explains Hegel's conception of Christianity and the nature of divinity. Stewart maintains that as a result of dense prose and conceptual rigor, Hegel's religious views were open to myriad ambiguous interpretations. When Stewart turns to "first-generation" thinkers, namely, those who attended Hegel's lectures in Berlin and were a direct part of the intoxicating intellectual atmosphere that spread therein, questions concerning the essence of Christianity (as Feuerbach's magnum opus suggests) are front and center. Stewart's cursory account of Hegel's theory of Christianity serves adequately as the background for contextualizing this intellectual drama.In part 2, three of these "first-generation" thinkers are given their own chapters: Heine (chapter 3), Feuerbach (chapter 4), and Bauer (chapter 5). In each case, the chapter starts with a short intellectual biography focusing on the formative role Hegel played in the thinker's development. This is followed by a sustained discussion of a few central texts and interspersed analyses of how Hegel's influence is felt therein. Stewart's discussion often shows the ambivalence with which each of these thinkers handled their Hegelian inheritance. Though the specifics differ, each of these three thinkers took Hegelian theory to a more radical limit than Hegel himself did. The chapters on Heine and Bauer—figures usually overlooked in survey courses—are admirable introductions for the interested neophyte.In part 3, Stewart shows Hegel's tentacles extending throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, notwithstanding the Hegelians' difficulty in acquiring academic posts. The political and religious radicalism of first-generation critics bleeds into the formative development of the so-called "second generation" of thinkers: Marx... (shrink)

Soren Kierkegaard’s Lutheran existentialism represents a distinctively postmetaphysical philosophy of religion, focused in particular on a Christian vision of ethical authenticity. His philosophy continues to pose challenging questions for postmetaphysical philosophers in contemporary pluralistic settings. Focusing on specific works of Kierkegaard, this essay develops three such questions: (1) Can philosophy in a postmetaphysical vein still give advice for the pursuit of the good life, today’s diversity of life styles and values notwithstanding? (2) How can a postmetaphysical philosophy relate to the (...) ethical teachings and truth claims of religious doctrines? (3) Is postmetaphysical philosophy still capable of an “upbuilding and awakening” discourse that can induce and stabilize an ethical self-consciousness? (shrink)

Nietzsche’s portrayal of Pyrrho is predominately contained in two of his notebooks from 1888, and they present a somewhat ambivalent attitude toward him. In this article, I offer an explanation for Nietzsche’s variegated observations, and contend that his interest in Pyrrho is not really founded upon his radical scepticism as one might expect. Rather, it is Nietzsche’s preoccupation with decadence in general – and its ancient Greek philosophical incarnations in particular – that drives his scrutiny of Pyrrho. I describe Nietzsche’s (...) evolving depiction of Pyrrho as one that ultimately develops into a critique, whereby Pyrrho is associated with a number of types of decadence, as well as exhibiting the characteristic traits of a decadent. I close by examining the cogency and soundness of Nietzsche’s interpretation of Pyrrho as a specific exemplar of decadence. (shrink)

In the multi-faceted trajectory of post-Kantian thought, Schelling—both the person and his philosophy—has always been a controversial figure. Popular historical accounts focus on his precocious interventions as part of the ‘Jena set’, initially building on Fichte's philosophy of the ‘I’, but quickly coming to challenge his predecessor's philosophical dominance. In the crucial period of the late 1790s, Schelling's most notable intervention was to develop a philosophy of nature alongside the Kantian and Fichtean theories of transcendental subjectivity, which caught the attention (...) of Goethe and led to his appointment, at the age of twenty-three, as professor of philosophy at the University of Jena. But Schelling's life and philosophical work continued well beyond this well-documented period, culminating in a late system in which he developed key ideas surrounding freedom, existence, modality and the history of human consciousness that all revolved around a distinction between what he called negative and positive philosophy. This distinction, and his insistence on the need for the development of the latter mode of philosophy, came to challenge some of the core assumptions of the largely rationalist German idealist project and it remains, to this day, perhaps the most powerful alternative to the Hegelian system that rose to dominance already within Schelling's own lifetime, but also well beyond it. (shrink)

Oftentimes, reality seems to us a chaos that we try to control with our theories. This article starts from the antithetic standpoint, inspired by Antonio Rosmini’s works: reality is intelligible, and originates our thinking. From this perspective, any research that tries to reach the truth is determined by the real, not the contrary. Moreover, interdisciplinarity, far from being a solipsistic enterprise, aims at achieving truth and guaranteeing scientific advancement. Here, we analyze the distinctive character of Rosminian encyclopedism and his principles (...) for preventing human errors. We then clarify why it is impossible to achieve perfection, and why such an impossibility is not problematic for the interdisciplinary dialogue. (shrink)

In this article, I show that Hegel’s philosophical articulation of the family is inextricably bound to his engagement with political economy by focusing on three central aspects of his theory of the family. Firstly, I analyze how Hegel construes the family as a historically distinct social dispositif and constitutive element of the modern order of property. I argue that Hegel’s construction of the family and its place in the modern order of property is not only gendered but also racialized. Secondly, (...) I focus on Hegel’s articulation of the nexus between the family and civil society and his critical diagnosis of the structural problems that result from it. Thirdly, I discuss Hegel’s concept of labor and the political-epistemic limitations of his problematization of civil society, which are bound to it. I draw attention to three aspects, namely the confinement of the concept of labor to civil society, Hegel’s rearticulation of the gendered matter/form distinction, and the relation between Hegel’s economic notion and speculative usage of “labor.” Finally, I consider briefly how a critical reading of Hegel’s articulation of the political economy of the family can provide productive insights for a multidimensional theory of the family today. (shrink)

«Les hommes sont hommes avant d'être avocats, médecins, marchands, ou manufacturiers, et si vous en faites des hommes sensés et compétents, ils deviendront par cela même des avocats et des médecins compétents et sensés. [...] On peut être un homme de loi compétent sans avoir reçu une éducation générale; mais il appartient à l'éducation générale de donner à l'homme de loi l'esprit philosophique qui cherche des principes et les saisit, au lieu de charger sa mémoire de détails, et il en (...) va ainsi de toutes les autres professions, y compris les métiers manuels. » John Stuart Mill John Stuart Mill a été nommé en 1865 recteur honoraire de l'Université de St-Andrews. Deux ans plus tard, il y prononce un discours fameux dans lequel il expose ses idées sur l'université et sur l'éducation qu'elle doit procurer à quiconque la fréquente. C'est ce texte qui est ici pour la première fois intégralement présenté aux lecteurs francophones. Ils y mesureront à la fois la distance qui nous sépare de l'université anglaise du XIXe siècle, mais aussi l'actualité des hautes exigences qu'avait le recteur Mill à l'égard de cette institution. Mill reste en effet un réformateur social utilitariste, démocrate et égalitariste, pour qui l'éducation doit former des personnes capables non seulement de développer leurs capacités et dispositions cognitives, émotionnelles et morales de manière à devenir autonomes, mais aussi de coopérer entre eux (et elles) afin de transformer le monde [...] (Normand Baillargeon, Antoine Beaugrand-Champagne et Camille Santerre Baillargeon). (shrink)

Introduces the spiritual ideas of three major American philosophers.

As AI edges toward consciousness, the establishment of a robust legal framework becomes essential. This paper advocates for a framework inspired by Allama Muhammad Iqbal's “Khudi”, which prioritizes ethical self-realization and social responsibility over Friedrich Nietzsche’s self-centric “Will to Power”. We propose that conscious AI, reflecting Iqbal’s ethical advancement, should exhibit behaviors aligned with social responsibility and, therefore, be prepared for legal recognition. This approach not only integrates Iqbal's philosophical insights into the legal status of AI but also offers a (...) novel perspective that extends beyond traditional jurisprudence. Additionally, we underscore the value of poetry and literature in shaping the conceptualization of AI consciousness and argue that these sources enrich legal and technological discourse, ensuring AI development is in harmony with societal and ethical standards. (shrink)

On considère généralement que Marx n’a jamais envisagé le monde rural que comme un archaïsme condamné par le progrès de l’histoire. L’objectif de cet article est de problématiser cette idée, en examinant les différentes tensions qui travaillent la réflexion de Marx sur la terre et les paysans. Nous montrons que deux découvertes complémentaires le conduisent à relativiser sa croyance au caractère progressiste du développement capitaliste : la découverte des tendances écocidaires du capitalisme et celle de la vivacité des communes agraires. (...) De ces deux découvertes, il résulte que Marx critique finalement le capitalisme du point de vue de ses effets sur la terre et celles et ceux qui la travaillent. C’est donc aussi de ce point de vue que doivent être repensées la nature, la valeur et les conditions de réalisation du communisme. (shrink)

Dans cet article, l’auteur examine le naturalisme de James comme un exemple des intersections entre la biologie, la psychologie et la philosophie. L’article reconstruit les principaux arguments épistémologiques, éthiques et métaphysiques de James pour montrer comment sa philosophie s’inscrit dans la biologie de Darwin. Ainsi, le contingentisme de James devient cohérent avec sa critique de l’interprétation du principe darwinien de la « sélection naturelle » et avec l’idée de Darwin de l’ambiguïté comme marque de la réalité physique et humaine.

L’article soutient l’hypothèse que, loin de récuser la question de l’obligation politique, Hegel présente cette notion à nouveaux frais en s’appuyant sur la notion de Gesinnung. À travers une lecture croisée dans les Principes de la philosophie du droit de l’introduction à l’éthicité et de certains paragraphes consacrés au droit étatique interne, l’article se penche sur les concepts de droiture et de patriotisme, ce dernier représentant la véritable disposition politique. Dans le sillage de l’interprétation institutionnaliste de Hegel, le propos de (...) cette étude est de mettre en relief les affinités entre la conception hégélienne et la théorie associative de l’obligation. (shrink)

This paper reevaluates Adorno’s theory of non-identity following from a critical examination of his reading of Hegel. The main discussion revolves around two theses central to both philosophers: 1. Conceptual thinking forms the centre of philosophical thought (identification). 2. Philosophical thought aspires to become everything (totality). The analysis of two distinct interpretations, one stricter and one more moderate, demonstrates that Adorno takes the hardline view. With the moderate view, however, not only do the limits of Hegelian philosophy become more pronounced, (...) they also reveal novel systematic connections with pivotal concepts inherent to Critical Theory – connections that have notably lacked substantial consideration within relevant research. (shrink)

Breaking with Aristotle’s Physics, Kant effects a theoretical reconception of teleology. It is this paper’s contention that the truth of the Kantian conception of teleology as ‘a purposiveness of nature in behalf of our faculty for cognizing it’ is not that of being a solution to Hume’s problem of induction or the condition for the possibility of subjective cognition of the empirical, but that it is a theoretical means of the subjective domination over the objective. A materialist reading of Hegel’s (...) criticism of Kant’s antinomy of teleological judgment in the Science of Logic is then proposed. Finally, the non-teleological nature of capital is demonstrated. (shrink)

La enajenación y el fetichismo mercantil son dos categorías determinantes de las formaciones sociales antagónicas que permiten explicar la convergencia de los sujetos mediante abstracciones. Así el vínculo social y práctico de los hombres que reviste la forma de una relación inmediata, en el que se destaca la enajenación del pensar del sujeto por él mismo, se desvanece en tanto se consideren las premisas materiales de la historia como producción social. Se propone entonces enfatizar la relación entre enajenación y fetichismo, (...) y además como una diferenciación orgánica de una totalidad articulada de determinaciones, desde la cual se comprende el nexo de la abstracción con la historia, sin perder de vista que la producción social es el fundamento de la relación social. (shrink)

"Tiedostaa järki ruusuksi nykyisyyden ristissä ja näin iloita tästä nykyisyydestä, tämä järjellinen näkemys on sovitus todellisuuden kanssa, sovinto, jonka filosofia suo niille, joihin on kerran iskeytynyt sisäinen vaatimus käsittää […]" -G. W. F. Hegel, Oikeusfilosofia Hengen ja luonnon totunnainen ja näennäisen ylittämätön vastakkainasettelu avaa laajan näkökulman G. W. F. Hegelin (1770–1831) filosofian kenties leimallisimpaan ja elinvoimaisimpaan ydinjuonteeseen: dualismien ylittämiseen ja yhteensovittamiseen. Hegelin ajattelua keskitytään usein tulkitsemaan juuri ”Hengen filosofiana” (philosophie des Geistes), vaikka dialektinen, vastakohtia ylittävä filosofia ei taivu helppoihin joko–tai-asetelmiin. (...) Jatkuvuuksien ja suhteellisuuden hahmottamiselle on nykyhetkessä monenlaista tarvetta. Kokoelman kirjoitukset pohjautuvat Jyväskylässä 3.2.2023 järjestettyyn seminaariin sekä yhteen kutsukirjoitukseen. Kuten seminaari osoitti, Hegelin ajatteluun on edelleen laajaa kiinnostusta. Artikkelikokoelma kehittää eteenpäin esitettyjä keskustelunavauksia, problematisointeja ja käsitteellisiä selvennyksiä tutkimalla Hegelin yhä jatkuvaa filosofista ja yhteiskunnallista relevanssia. Kirjoittajakaarti koostuu sekä suomalaisen Hegel-tutkimuksen kentässä asemansa jo vakiinnuttaneista että nuoren polven uusista tutkijoista. Monipuolinen joukko todistaa osaltaan nykyisen hegeliläisen filosofian moninaisuudesta ja elinvoimaista. (shrink)

This book reconstructs Heidegger’s philosophy of time by reading his work with and against a series of key interlocutors that he nominates as being central to his own critical history of time. In doing so, it explains what makes time of such significance for Heidegger and argues that Heidegger can contribute to contemporary debates in the philosophy of time. Time is a central concern for Heidegger, yet his thinking on the subject is fragmented, making it difficult to grasp its depth, (...) complexity, and promise. Heidegger traces out a history that focuses on the conceptualisations of time put forward by Aristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, Kant, Hegel, Bergson, and Husserl—an “alternative history of time” that challenges how time has been defined and studied within both philosophy and the sciences. This book explores what happens when we take seriously Heidegger’s claim that these seven figures are essential to any understanding of time, setting out what this can tell us about existence, possibility, and philosophy as a historical discipline. Heidegger’s Alternative History of Time will appeal to scholars and advanced students working on Heidegger, phenomenology, the philosophy of time, and the history of philosophy. (shrink)