In consciousness studies there is a growing tendency to consider experience as (i) fundamentally affective and (ii) deeply interlinked with interoceptive and homeostatic bodily processes. However, this view still needs further development to be part of any rigorous theory of consciousness. To advance in this direction, we ask: (1) is there any affective type that is always present in consciousness?, (2) is it related to interoception and homeostasis?, and (3) what are its properties? Here we analyse and compare Jim Russell's (...) core affect and Thomas Fuchs' concept of vitality, and propose a more encompassing notion that subsumes both: continuous organismic sentience. It provides affirmative answers to questions 1 and 2, and, regarding question 3, a preliminary list of thirteen properties divided into ontological, phenomenological, and functional categories. This is the first of a series of studies that will systematically address different notions of a fundamental, homeostatically-rooted affective type, to achieve a rigorous, unified concept for consciousness science. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness has an underlying emergentist metaphysics, specifically of a kind that has received minimal attention and we may call functionalist emergentism. I will try to show that in this scientific theory conscious experience is a functional-role property possessed by the whole system, not by their parts, which is dependent on, but also (purportedly) causally powerful over and above, the properties of the parts. However, I will argue that depicting conscious (...) experience as a functional-role emergent property threatens the whole coherence of the theory because, by definition, functional-realizers do all the causal work associated with the instantiation of any functional-role property on any occasion. Hence, to preserve the causal power of consciousness, which, as we will see, is one of the fundamental building blocks of the theory, linked to the assertion of the very existence of consciousness, phenomenal properties should be re-thought as realizers of the relevant informationally integrated causal-roles. (shrink)

The relevance of inner speech for human psychology, especially for higher-order cognitive functions, is widely recognized. However, the study of the phenomenology of inner speech, that is, what it is like for a subject to experience internally speaking his/her voice, has received much less attention. This study explores the subjective experience of inner speech through empathy for pain paradigm. To this end, an experimental phenomenological method was implemented. Sixteen healthy subjects were exposed to videos of sportswomen/sportsmen having physical accidents practicing (...) extreme sports. Immediately after the exposure to the stimuli, a phenomenological interview was conducted to gather data about bodily sensations, emotions, motivations, and inner speech of watching other people’s accidents. Participant’s inner speech expresses concern about the consequences the accident could generate to the sportswomen/sportsmen or about the participants themselves. Simultaneously, participants’ inner speech happened with negative emotional feelings, many sensations distributed throughout their bodies, and a felt knowledge coming from a meaningful but pre-reflective and pre-verbal bodily dimension. Our findings show that inner speech in empathy is not merely a psycholinguistic process or high-order cognitive function, but rather it is a complex experience that occurs deeply related to meaningful emotions, bodily sensations, and an implicit, somatically felt knowledge. (shrink)

In a recent remarkable article, Froese (2023) presents his Irruption Theory to explain how motivations can make a behavioral difference in motivated activity. In this opinion article, we review the main tenets of Froese’s theory, and highlight its difficulty in overcoming the randomness challenge it supposedly solves, that is, the issue of how adaptive behavior can arise in the face of material underdetermination. To advance our understanding of motivated behavior in line with Froese’s approach, we recommend that future work should (...) endorse a multilevel pluralistic approach to causation and explanation in which motivations could genuinely play an irreducible role. Additionally, in line with the life-mind continuity thesis, we suggest that the best place to look for the interplay between motivations and nonmotivational physical, biological, and dynamical factors, may be at the level of the continuous feeling of being an embodied, living organism. (shrink)

The deep influence of affectivity on learning is now widely acknowledged (Keefer et al., 2018; Sánchez-Álvarez et al., 2021). For instance, it has been shown that affect influences key learning-relevant processes, such as motivation, perception, behavior, and critical thinking (Izard, 2002; Mayer & Salovey, 1997). Evidence also shows that emotion and mood strongly influence attention, which in turn drives learning and memory (Elbertson et al., 2010; Elias et al., 1997). Intersubjective phenomena, such as the degree of affection and respect between (...) child and teacher, also affect the child’s learning processes, academic outcomes, and brain development (Kusché & Greenberg, 2006; Ryan & Patrick, 2001). However, the relevant literature is not paying attention to increasing evidence showing that affective phenomena are rooted in interoceptive and homeostatic self- and co-regulatory processes within and between people’s living bodies (Barrett, 2017; Carvalho & Damasio, 2021; Craig, 2015, 2018; Fotopoulou et al., 2022; Fotopoulou & Tsakiris, 2017; Seth & Friston, 2016). In this theoretical chapter, we explore this connection and its importance for learning. We argue that affective experience plays a fundamental role in learning, and that affective experience is rooted in the homeostatic self-/co-regulation of living bodies. Therefore, the homeostatic self-/co-regulation of living bodies plays a fundamental role in learning. In other words, there is an intra- and interpersonal somatic dimension of learning that demands explicit consideration in educational contexts. In this way, we aim to contribute to an understanding of learning and education that moves away from an individualistic, brain-centered information-processing conception toward one centered on sentient, interdependent living bodies. (shrink)

I welcome with great enthusiasm Meling and Scheidegger’s (2023; henceforth “M&S”) timely contribution to advance an enactive approach to psychedelic therapy, especially to the complex causality involved. Their two main research questions concerned:(i) the causal interaction between the psychedelic molecule and brain activity; and (ii) the causal interaction between brain activity and the psychedelic experience. While I largely agree with and celebrate much of what is proposed by M&S, especially their employment of key enactive concepts to advance our understanding of (...) the first research question, in the following, I will present some worries regarding their answers to the second. Although I agree that there is probably a two-way reciprocal relationship between neural activity and experience, I have several points of contention regarding M&S’s proposal. My hope is to stimulate discussion on M&S’s important contribution, and to help advance a much-needed enactive science of psychedelics. (shrink)

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is currently one of the most influential scientific theories of consciousness. Here, we focus specifically on a metaphysical aspect of the theory’s most recent version (IIT 4.0), what we may call its idealistic ontology, and its tension with a kind of realism about the external world that IIT also endorses. IIT 4.0 openly rejects the mainstream view that consciousness is generated by the brain, positing instead that consciousness is ontologically primary while the physical domain is just (...) “operational”. However, this philosophical position is presently underdeveloped and is not rigorously formulated in IIT, potentially leading to many misinterpretations and undermining its overall explanatory power. In the present paper we aim to address this issue. We argue that IIT’s idealistic ontology should be understood as a specific combination of phenomenal primitivism, reductionism regarding Φ-structures and complexes, and eliminativism about non-conscious physical entities. Having clarified this, we then focus on the problematic tension between IIT’s idealistic ontology and its simultaneous endorsement of realism, according to which there is some kind of external reality independent of our minds. After refuting three potential solutions to this theoretical tension, we propose the most plausible alternative: understanding IIT’s realism as an assertion of the existence of other experiences beyond one’s own, what we call a non-solipsistic idealist realism. We end with concluding remarks and future research avenues. (shrink)

En este artículo abordo críticamente la aseveración de David Papineau según la cual la evidencia fisiológica acumulada es suficiente para adoptar razonablemente el Principio del Cierre Causal de lo Físico y la vía negativa, viz. entender físico como no mental, como solución al dilema de Hempel. Comenzaremos restando fuerza a tal afirmación revisando el trabajo de W. Penfield y J. Eccles, dos importantes neurocientíficos y declarados dualistas. No obstante, luego nos centraremos en el trabajo de B. Libet en el que (...) se demostraría que los movimientos voluntarios están realmente determinados por causas enteramente fisiológicas, lo cual constituiría una pieza fundamental de evidencia a favor de Papineau. Nuestro análisis mostrará que no se siguen tales conclusiones. Esto tendrá consecuencias negativas para el Cierre Causal de lo Físico y con ello para el Argumento Causal para el Fisicalismo del cual el mencionado principio es premisa clave. (shrink)

In this article, we address the problem of the potential crisis in people’s life’s meaning due to massive automation-driven technological unemployment. Assuming that the problem of (re)distribution of economic resources to the whole of society in such a scenario will be solved (e.g. through provision of a Universal Basic Income), the question arises concerning the meaning of people’s lives in a world in which almost everyone does not have to (or even could not) work in order to live. Here, we (...) side with many current proposals that paid work is not the only possible source of meaning and hence, that a meaningful life could indeed be led in a post-work society. We especially focus on one of the most developed accounts, Danaher’s Virtual Utopia (Danaher, 2016, 2019, 2022). According to him, living immersed in playful virtual worlds where new, expanded and personalized possibilities of personal and collective experiences and actions, could not only be perfectly meaningful lives, but furthermore, “be the utopia we are looking for” (Danaher, 2019, p. 270). However, our analysis will suggest that although it is a very well thought and carefully articulated position, it suffers from various important problems. Our criticism will be based on an alternative framework to think about life’s meaning and the conditions for leading a good life in general. This alternative is based on the philosophy of buen vivir (“good living”). This notion has its roots in common aspects of various Latin American indigenous cultures regarding a community-centered way of life where humans, society and nature are taken to be deeply interconnected and interdependent, and where the notions of respect, harmony and balance are at the core of this interrelationship (Gudynas, 2011; Acosta, 2008; Beling et al., 2021). Buen vivir has many facets, but we will focus on three: the importance of healthy human communities, the human-nature relationship, and the intrinsic value of nature. Based on these, we argue that the Virtual Utopia is not a good candidate for human’s post-work utopia because i) it unnecessarily augments the environmental damage that is already involved in massive labor automation; ii) it entails an unnecessary and detrimental dependence on technology for human relationships; and iii) increases the severance of the link between humanity and nature. We conclude that the buen vivir approach is a promising candidate for an alternative utopian project, but one that needs further construction. (shrink)

Introduction: Traditionally, empathy has been studied from two main perspectives: the theory-theory approach and the simulation theory approach. These theories claim that social emotions are fundamentally constituted by mind states in the brain. In contrast, classical phenomenology and recent research based on enactive theories consider empathy as the basic process of contacting others’ emotional experiences through direct bodily perception and sensation. Objective: This study aims to enrich knowledge of the empathic experience of pain by using an experimental phenomenological method. Method: (...) Implementing an experimental paradigm used in affective neuroscience, we exposed 28 healthy adults to a video of sportspersons suffering physical accidents while practicing extreme sports. Immediately after watching the video, each participant underwent a phenomenological interview to gather data on embodied, multi-layered dimensions (bodily sensations, emotions, and motivations) and temporal aspects of empathic experience. We also performed quantitative analyses of the phenomenological categories. Results: Experiential access to the other person’s painful experience involves four main-themes. Bodily resonance: participants felt a multiplicity of bodily, affective, and kinesthetic sensations. Attentional focus: some participants centered their attention more on their own personal discomfort and sensations of rejection, while others on the pain and suffering experienced by the sportspersons. Kinesthetic motivation: some participants experienced the feeling in their bodies to avoid or escape from watching the video, while others experienced the need to help the sportspersons avoid suffering any injury while practicing extreme sports. Temporality of experience: participants witnessed temporal fluctuations in their experiences, bringing intensity changes in their bodily resonance, attentional focus, and kinesthetic motivation. Finally, two experiential structures were found: one structure is self-centered empathic experience, characterized by bodily resonance, attentional focus centered on the participant’s own experience of seeing the sportsperson suffering, and self-protective kinesthetic motivation; the other structure is other-centered empathic experience, characterized by bodily resonance, attentional focus centered on the sportsperson, and prosocial kinesthetic motivation to help them. Discussion: We show how phenomenological data may contribute to comprehending empathy for pain in social neuroscience. In addition, we address the phenomenological aspect of the enactive approach to the three dimensions of embodiment of human consciousness, especially the intersubjective dimension. Also, based on our results, we suggest an extension of the enactive theory for non-interactive social experience. (shrink)

The introduction of mindfulness in the West was carried out through theories and research methods based on the effects that mindfulness practices produce in the brain (information processing and neurobiological activity). Nevertheless, these approaches elude any reference to the core feature of mindfulness, that is, its subjective and intersubjective conscious nature. With the aim of providing a viable scientific proposal to fill this gap, we present the enactive approach as a naturally well-suited explanatory framework to study mindfulness in its full (...) experiential richness, both in its physical and phenomenological attributes. This chapter is organized as follows. First, we argue that the scientific approach to mindfulness has not explained its phenomenological nature, and consider how mainstream cognitive science understands attention and awareness in non-experiential functional terms. In the following section, we dwell with more detail on the meaning and nature of mindfulness and argue for its essentially phenomenological nature. Furthermore, we contend that it comprises not only a subjective dimension but also a relational intersubjective domain. Finally, we present the enactive approach and the neurophenomenological method as a scientific framework to investigate mindfulness as an experiential relational phenomenon constituted by both physical and phenomenological attributes. (shrink)

Joseph Hannon has expressed a most surprising objection to Aquinas scholar Prof William E. Carroll in his latest paper “Theological Objections to a Metaphysicalist Interpretation of Creation.” The main claim is that Prof. Carroll misunderstands Aquinas' doctrine of creatio ex nihilo by reducing it to a metaphysical notion, rather than considering it in its full theological sense. In this paper I show Hannon's misinterpretation of Carroll's and Thomas Aquinas' thought, particularly by stressing the dependence that the doctrine of providence through (...) secondary causes has on the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. (shrink)

El budismo. Peter Harvey. Cambridge University Press, Madrid 1998. 468 pp. Ptas 2,995. ISBN 84-8323-014-3.

This essay attempts to clarify the position of Nāgārjuna in the history of Buddhist philosophy by comparing the concept of emptiness in the Pāli Nikāyas and the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. It is argued that the identity of samsāra with nirvāna, the emptiness of svabhāva of all dharmas, and the equating of emptiness and dependent arising are not revolutionary innovations of Nāgārjuna or the second turning of the wheel of Dharma, but orthodox philosophical moves entailed by the teachings of early Buddhism.

En este trabajo propongo una definición pragmática de la falacia de petición de principio. En la primera parte considero y rechazo la sugerencia de Frank Jackson de que la argumentación posee otro fin además del de convencer racionalmente a nuestro interlocutor de que algo es el caso. En la segunda parte ofrezco la definición. En la tercera parte hablo brevemente acerca de la representación de argumentos por medio de grafos. Finalmente, en la cuarta parte aplico la definición propuesta a algunos (...) ejemplos de argumentos.---“A Pragmatic Definition of the Begging the Question Fallacy”. A pragmatic definition of the Begging the question fallacy is presented in this paper. In the first part of it I consider and reject Frank Jackson’s suggestion according to which argumentation possesses a different end than rationally persuading an audience that something is the case. The definition is presented in part II. Part III refers briefly to the representation of arguments through graphs. Finally, in part IV, the proposed definition is applied to some argument examples. (shrink)

This article develops a new and expanded interpretation of the typology exclusivism, inclusivism, pluralism. The proposal refines the categories of what was originally a Christian typology in order to provide a truly cross-cultural and interreligious framework to better understand and compare the most common views of religious diversity found not only in Christianity, but also in Buddhism and other religions. Although building upon Schmidt-Leukel's logical reinterpretation of the typology, the article substantially modifies his framework and understands the typology, not as (...) a comprehensive classification of possible attitudes toward other religions, but rather as an open-ended framework to clarify the nature of the most common theologies of religions that exist in reality. The new interpretation provides a more precise definition of inclusivism that does not conflate inclusivism with the affirmation of a singular maximum, thus distinguishing between absolutistic and non-absolutistic forms of inclusivism. The new interpretation introduces an intermediate position between inclusivism and pluralism called pluralistic inclusivism. The article challenges David Ray Griffin's concept of generic pluralism and proposes a new understanding of pluralism indebted to Raimundo Panikkar. (shrink)

El siguiente artículo intenta reflexionar acerca de los límites de la Filosofía de la Historia en el pensamiento de Hegel. Con este propósito, el esfuerzo se concentra en la interpretación de una cierta experiencia de lo histórico que nos presenta Hegel en su "Introducción a la Filosofía de La Historia". La exposición que hace el autor exhibe ciertos elementos que están vinculados al tratamiento filosófico Del asunto. Por otra parte, se muestra que la misma justificación de la Filosofía de la (...) Historia aparece bosquejada en este pasaje. Por último se introduce la discusión acerca de algunos aspectos problemáticos en el planteamiento hegeliano tomando en cuenta los resultados de esta interpretación. (shrink)

This article attempts to show the methodic scope of the well know connection of priority between temporality and historicity in the Frühe Freiburger Vorlesungen. Although this connection is explicit from a systematic point of view in Sein und Zeit, nevertheless it is already anticipated in these lectures and had here a methodic primacy. Therefore, the claim of the article is that the connection in this frame of priority between temporality and historicity implies a regulative ideal of self-determination that includes temporal (...) aspects of the existence. This regulative ideal of existence is the base of an analysis which distinguish the degree of originality in several forms of perform history. (shrink)

This article develops a new and expanded interpretation of the typology exclusivism, inclusivism, pluralism. The proposal refines the categories of what was originally a Christian typology in order to provide a truly cross-cultural and interreligious framework to better understand and compare the most common views of religious diversity found not only in Christianity, but also in Buddhism and other religions. Although building upon Schmidt-Leukel's logical reinterpretation of the typology, the article substantially modifies his framework and understands the typology, not as (...) a comprehensive classification of possible attitudes toward other religions, but rather as an open-ended framework to clarify the nature of the most common theologies of religions that exist in reality. The new interpretation provides a more precise definition of inclusivism that does not conflate inclusivism with the affirmation of a singular maximum, thus distinguishing between absolutistic and non-absolutistic forms of inclusivism. The new interpretation introduces an intermediate position between inclusivism and pluralism called pluralistic inclusivism. The article challenges David Ray Griffin's concept of generic pluralism and proposes a new understanding of pluralism indebted to Raimundo Panikkar. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Raimon Panikkar (1918-2010):Life and LegacyJ. Abraham Vélez de CeaThe interreligious theologian, intercultural philosopher, and pluralist mystic Raimon Panikkar died in Tavertet, Barcelona, on 26 August 2010. He was ninety-one. A pioneer of interreligious dialogue and comparative theology, Panikkar claimed to be at the same time yet without contradiction a Christian, a Buddhist, a Hindu, and a secular man.Panikkar's multiple religious belonging was not a matter of choice and shallow (...) eclecticism but rather a matter of personal experience and profound spiritual growth. His distinction between eclecticism and syncretism might be helpful to understand the complex nature of his religious identity. Eclecticism "is an uncritical mixture of religious traditions and an agreement among them obtained by chopping off all possible discrepancies in favor of an amorphous common denominator." On the contrary, syncretism "is allowing for a possible assimilation of elements by virtue of which these elements cease to be foreign bodies so that organic growth within each tradition is possible, and the mutual fecundation of religious traditions becomes a genuine option."1Another point I would like to clarify is that Panikkar's multiple religious belonging was not a question of being primarily Christian and secondarily something else, as if truth could be quantified. Panikkar objected to this "modern" way of thinking. I remember a conversation with him about this issue in which he compared these attempts to quantify religious identity to those who try to understand the Trinity as being either one or three. He said that if you begin counting you miss the point, and then he added in a defiant tone: "I am 100 percent Christian, 100 percent Hindu, 100 percent Buddhist, and 100 percent secular." When I insisted and told him that for many people multiple religious belonging is just not possible, Panikkar replied: "Well, it is my experience; I cannot help it."Panikkar's multiple religious belonging was often misunderstood and cost him the distrust of both Christians and Hindus. For instance, in 1966, Panikkar applied for a chair in Hindu philosophy at the prestigious Banaras Hindu University. Though [End Page 215] everybody agreed he was by far the most competent candidate, he was not offered the position because for many conservative Hindus Panikkar was not Hindu enough.Similarly, many conservative Catholics today would say that Panikkar went too far with his distinction between Christ and the historical Jesus; for them Panikkar was not Christian enough. However, this would be unfair. As I understand Panikkar, he was not trying to undermine any Christian claim. Quite the contrary, he was challenging what he perceived as a tribal Christology and a reduction of Christianity to a two-thousand-year-old sect. Time will tell, like it did with great thinkers such as Nāgārjuna (ca. 150-250), Śaṅ-kara (788-820), Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), and Meister Eckhart (ca. 1260-1327), who were also criticized at first by their respective traditions. Perhaps Panikkar was simply ahead of his time, and what today seems controversial to some will become the norm in the future; it would not be the first time.Panikkar was an embodiment of interreligious dialogue, and his theology was the result of such dialogue. He was born in Barcelona on 3 November 1918. His mother was a Catholic from Catalonia, and his father was a Hindu from Kerala, India. After studying philosophy and natural sciences in Barcelona, Madrid, and Bonn, he joined the recently created Opus Dei in 1940. It should be clarified that in the aftermath of the Spanish civil war and compared to the pre-Vatican II National Catholicism of Franco's regime, Opus Dei was a progressive Catholic organization for laypeople interested in sanctifying their professional work.Panikkar was ordained a Catholic priest in 1946 and became the chaplain of a student dormitory in Madrid (Colegio Mayor la Moncloa). That very year he earned his first doctorate, in philosophy, with a dissertation titled El concepto de naturaleza: Análisis histórico y metafísico de un concepto (Complutense University of Madrid, 1946, published in 1951). He was offered a position at the Complutense University but decided to continue with his pastoral work in Madrid, Barcelona... (shrink)

I wish to express, first of all, my profound gratitude to Professor J. M. Bochenski, without whose assistance the present work would have not been possible. To be concise, I would like to state that his contribution to this book may be viewed at three levels: (1) that of the general spirit, (2) that of the specific ideas, theses or approaches which are expressed in its pages, (3) that of this work qua doctoral dissertation. The general spirit which has guided (...) my research coincides with that underlying Professor :Oochenski's own works, in particular his Formale Logik (Munchen 1956). Moreover, the particular occasion which suggested my investigation was a statement included in that book according to which the literature in the field still lacked a detailed work on Frege (p. 317). I wish, likewise, to express my gratitude to other professors of the University of Fribourg for their generous help. I mention especially Professors P. Wyser, M. D. Philippe, N. Luyten, and V. Kuiper. I have also benefited from Professor E. Specker's lectures at the Eidge nossische Technische Hochschule (ZUrich) and from Professor Olof Gigon's lectures at the University of Bern. From an earlier period I wish to express my gratitude to the professors of the philosophy department of the Universidad Nacional de Buenos Aires, especially the late Professor Francisco Romero. The Swiss National Library (Bern) has greatly facilitated access to bibliographical sources, and the library of the University of Munster (Westphalien) has kindly provided microfilms of Frege's Nachlap. (shrink)

El problema de la libertad es uno de los más áridos de la filosofía. Paul Ricoeur intenta reconstruir el problema tomando el eje del análisis: la naturaleza dicotómica de los discursos sostenidos sobre la cuestión. De un lado, tenemos la “perspectiva de la tercera persona”. Desde esta mirada, cada acto que realizamos está causalmente determinada. Por el otro lado, tenemos la “perspectiva de la tercera persona”, en la que todas nuestras acciones libres parecieran brotar del “yo”. El problema comienza cuando (...) intentamos reconciliar ambas perspectivas. Este trabajo revisará algunos de los argumentos presentados por ambos lados, y el posicionamiento de Ricoeur en el debate. (shrink)

La viabilidad del modelo de la sociedad de bienestar se encuentra en entredicho. El argumento de la insostenibilidad económica de su realización ha propiciado una versión muy limitada de su efecto redistributivo y transformador que limita su radio de acción a la satisfacción de las necesidades más perentorias del individuo. La rehabilitación del modelo reclama la ponderación razonada de la densidad normativa de los bienes en juego que en ningún caso pudiera derivar en la discriminación en el disfrute de los (...) derechos concernidos. Se impone al respecto el cumplimiento irrestricto de los deberes generales positivos enderezados a la eliminación de los condicionamientos de las voluntades individuales que conforman el consenso definiendo el sentido democrático de las políticas de bienestar. (shrink)

En este breve comentario discuto algunos aspectos de la interpretación de la epistemología de Davidson que sugiere Willian Duica en su reciente libro. Luego de una presentación somera del libro me centro en tres asuntos centrales de la interpretación de Duica. En primer lugar, argumento que su lectura de la crítica de Davidson al dualismo esquema/contenido es muy restrictiva y deja abierta la posibilidad de un realismo directo empirista. En segundo lugar, argumento que en su lectura el propio Duica se (...) compromete inadvertidamente con un empirismo de este tipo y, de este modo, su interpretación entra en tensión con el coherentismo de Davidson. Finalmente, discuto algunos aspectos de la interpretación que hace Duica de la tesis davidsoniana de la triangulación. (shrink)

We extend the languages of both basic and graded modal logic with the infinity diamond, a modality that expresses the existence of infinitely many successors having a certain property. In both cases we define a natural notion of bisimilarity for the resulting formalisms, that we dub $\mathtt {ML}^{\infty }$ and $\mathtt {GML}^{\infty }$, respectively. We then characterise these logics as the bisimulation-invariant fragments of the naturally corresponding predicate logic, viz., the extension of first-order logic with the infinity quantifier. Furthermore, for (...) both $\mathtt {ML}^{\infty }$ and $\mathtt {GML}^{\infty }$ we provide a sound and complete axiomatisation for the set of formulas that are valid in every Kripke frame, we prove a small model property with respect to a widened class of weighted models, and we establish decidability of the satisfiability problem. (shrink)

En la actualidad el pensamiento de Maquiavelo ha estado ligado a una praxis política que se juzga como mala desde el punto de vista ético. El secretario florentino, alejándose de la tradición estoica que marcó la filosofía política de la antigüedad y gran parte del medioevo, separa la política de la moral planteando un realismo político que evalúa los actos como eficientes o ineficientes, útiles o inútiles, fructíferos o infructíferos, tomando distancia de aquella calificación de bueno o malo. Sin embargo, (...) este simple acto, que no es más que la teorización y la explicitación de algo que se ha hecho desde siempre en la historia política, le valió ser tildado de hereje o que incluso su apellido se transformase en un término que hasta el día de hoy tiene una carga negativa en términos morales. Este artículo se adentra en aquellas interpretaciones, elementos históricos, teológicos y filosóficos del pensamiento de Maquiavelo, que con o sin intención, llevaron a que el secretario florentino fuera entendido como un pensador que hace apología de las malas praxis, acercándolo incluso a ideas heréticas. Palabras clave_: _Maquiavelo– Antimaquiavelismo - Realismo político – Herejía. (shrink)

This paper examines the value awarded by Duns Escoto to the defence of god -understood as Lave- who acts in a completely free mannner and is omnipotent. I also studies the implications of his philosophical position when confrontingthe relationships between faith and reason, theology and philosophy, intellect and will, necessity and contingency. His analysis of The Philosopher, Aristotle, is also discussed.

Thomas Bradwardine fue, con Guillermo de Ockham, tal vez el pensador más destacado del siglo XIV Influyó en los terrenos de la lógica, la ciencia (matemáticas y física) y la teología. Su obra más importante fue: De Causa Dei con fra Pellagium et D e virtute causarum. En ella aborda profundamente un problema fundamental, discutido antes y después (sobre todo en los siglos XVI, XVII y XVIII): el de la libertad del hombre, el de la posible concordia entre necesidad y (...) libertad. (shrink)

De acuerdo con la fenomenología husserliana la experiencia primordial del valor descansa en vivencias emotivas. Para sostener esta idea Husserl sugiere el paralelismo entre la percepción externa y la percepción de los valores. El objetivo de este trabajo es clarificar tal paralelismo enfatizando un problema particular del análisis husserliano: la tonalidad afectiva del objeto de valor y su relación con la apercepción sentimental involucrada en la experiencia de los valores.According to husserlian phenomenology the primordial experience of value lays in emotive (...) lived-experiences. In order to sustain his Idea Husserl suggest a parallelism between the external perception and the perception of values. The aim of this work is to clarify such parallelism stressing a particular problem of husserlian analysis: the affective tonality of the object of value and its relation to the feeling apperception involved in the experience of values. (shrink)

A systematic effort to rethink Freud's theory of the unconscious, aiming to separate out the different forms of unconsciousness.