本书从《荀子》一书中选取名言,分治国、治学、人生、修养、教育、谋事、郊乐、人才、文学、伦理等十几类,每条名言均由原文、注释、译文和点题组成。.

本书收录《荀子》中经典语句,并配有中英译文,包括“劝学篇”、“修身篇”、“不苟篇”、“荣辱篇”、“非相篇”、“仲尼篇”等。.

Ce volume rassemble les textes majeurs du confucianisme : " Les entretiens " de Confucius, " La grande étude " de Daxue et " Le classique de la Piété filiale " de Xiaojing.

맹자(孟子)와 순자(荀子)는 그들의 상반된 왕도(王道)와 패도(覇道)에 대한 입장과 연관하여 종종 대조된다. 거의 정설이다시피 한 기존 이해들에 따르면, 맹자는 패도를 완강하게 반대한 반면, 순자는 다소 타협적으로 패도를 용인한다. 심지어 순자는 패도의 도덕성을 인정한 것으로 이해되기도 한다. 본고는 과연 순자가 현실과 타협한 사상가인지 따져본다. 비록 순자는 맹자와 달리 패도의 긍정적 측면에 대하여 적극적으로 평가하지만, 이는 다만 비유가적 혹은 심지어 반유가적 통치 방식이 어떻게 역사적으로 성공하였는지에 대한 분석일 뿐이다. 이러한 역사 인식과 분석이 패도에 대한 도덕적 용인으로 연결된다는 기존의 결론은 성급한 추론이다. 이러한 견지에서 (...) 본고는 기존 정설이 오해임을 밝힌다. (shrink)

Coming at the end of the great flowering of philosophical inquiry in Warring States China, when the foundations for traditional Chinese thought were laid, Xunzi occupies a place analogous to that of Aristotle in the West. The collection of works bearing his name contains not only the most systematic philosophical exposition by any early Confucian thinker, but also account of virtually every aspect of the intellectual, cultural, and social life of his time. Xunzi was a social critic and (...) intellectual historian as well as a philosopher. He was also extremely active in the political and academic circles of his day, and his teaching had a great influence on the initial institutional organization of a unified China under the first Qin emperor, an influence that continued through later centuries. This is the first of three volumes that will constitute the first complete translation of Xunzi into English. The present volume consists of a general introduction and Books 1-6, dealing with self-cultivation, learning, and education. The translation is accompanied by substantial explanatory material identifying technical terms, persons, and events; detailed introductions to each book; and extensive annotation, with characters when desirable, indicating the basis of the translations. The general introduction recounts the biography of Xunzi, his later influence, the intellectual world in which he lived, and the basic terms that the ancient Chinese used to conceptualize nature and society. (shrink)

This is the first complete, one-volume English translation of the ancient Chinese text Xunzi, one of the most extensive, sophisticated, and elegant works in the tradition of Confucian thought. Through essays, poetry, dialogues, and anecdotes, the Xunzi articulates a Confucian perspective on ethics, politics, warfare, language, psychology, human nature, ritual, and music, among other topics. Aimed at general readers and students of Chinese thought, Eric Hutton's translation makes the full text of this important work more accessible in English (...) than ever before. Named for its purported author, the Xunzi has long been neglected compared to works such as the Analects of Confucius and the Mencius. Yet interest in the Xunzi has grown in recent decades, and the text presents a much more systematic vision of the Confucian ideal than the fragmented sayings of Confucius and Mencius. In one famous, explicit contrast to them, the Xunzi argues that human nature is bad. However, it also allows that people can become good through rituals and institutions established by earlier sages. Indeed, the main purpose of the Xunzi is to urge people to become as good as possible, both for their own sakes and for the sake of peace and order in the world. In this edition, key terms are consistently translated to aid understanding and line numbers are provided for easy reference. Other features include a concise introduction, a timeline of early Chinese history, a list of important names and terms, cross-references, brief explanatory notes, a bibliography, and an index. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn Chinese scholarship, Xunzi is often regarded as an eclectic Confucian master who accepted some form of utilitarian thoughts. This characteristic was also observed by some western scholars such as Benjamin I. Schwartz. In a recent study, I argued that the basic character of Xunzi’s philosophy is utilitarianism in a broad sense based on an examination on his intellectual criticism and political criticism. Xunzi asserts that humans are innately driven by self-interested desires, and he evaluates all intellectual (...) works and political behaviours by their utility. However, he does not limit utility to only basic animal desires such as food and sex. In Xunzi’s view, humans also have innate emotions; hence, these emotions should also be accounted for in their utility. This is similar to John Stuart Mill’s redefinition of Bentham’s concept of utility. Are Xunzi’s and Mill’s concepts of utility exactly the same? This question has yet to be examined. This article is a comparative study between utilitarianism and Xunzi’s philosophy which especially explores the compatibility of these two philosophies. (shrink)

It is commonly accepted that Han Fei studied under Xunzi sometime during the late third century BCE. However, there is surprisingly little dedicated to the in-depth study of the relationship between Xunzi’s ideas and one of his best-known followers. In this essay I argue that Han Fei’s notion of xing, commonly translated as human nature, was not only influenced by Xunzi but also that it is an important feature of his political philosophy.

Xunzi asserted that the original nature of man is evil, differing on this point from Mencius, his famous predecessor in the Confucian school. In the most complete, well-ordered philosophical system of his day, Xunzi advocated the counteraction of man's evil through self-improvement, the pursuit of learning, the avoidance of obsession, and observance of ritual in life. Readers familiar with Xunzi's work will find that Burton Watson's lucid translation breathes new life into this classic. Those new to (...) class='Hi'>Xunzi will find his ideas on government, language, and order and safety in society surprisingly close to concerns of our own age. (shrink)

Abstract The early Ru or ?Confucian? figure Xunzi (?Master Xun,? c. 310?c. 220 BCE) gives a sophisticated analysis of war, which he develops on the basis of a larger social and political vision that he works out in considerable detail. This larger vision of human society is thoroughly normative in the sense that Xunzi both argues for the value of his ideal conception of society, and relates these moral arguments for the Confucian Dao or Way to what I (...) take to be fairly hardheaded assessments of the dynamics of international relations in his late Warring States historical context. This combination of moral vision and political realism, combined with his advocacy of strong political authorities that nevertheless rule justly in service to the common good, makes his thought arguably more relevant to the contemporary world of contending nation-states, and a rising, undemocratic China, than any other pre-modern Confucian. Xunzi's own context, both intellectual and political/military, led him to argue about war in ways that look distinctive to contemporary Western ethicists ? and yet his preferred issues are revealing in themselves and are suggestive in relation to current debates in military ethics. In the first part of this paper I analyze Xunzi's argumentative strategy in debate about war, where he chooses to attack his adversaries on the question of how to cultivate true loyalty and obedience in subordinates. The second part briefly explores Xunzi's vision of the good society and how it fits into a multi-state world, which undergirds his critique of alternate discourses about war and government. The third examines the Xunzian vision of politics and war as a source for a contemporary Confucian theory of civilian-military relations. The fourth section explores some implications of a Xunzian account for international relations, through a brief comparison with the Kantian notion of ?perpetual peace? among liberal states, and whether such ?zones of peace? might be conceivable on Confucian grounds. The conclusion reflects on the ambiguous legacy of Xunzi's moralism in his analysis of war and statecraft, and the possible light this shines on contemporary Chinese political culture. (shrink)

This chapter explains how Xunzi's text and views helped shape the thought of the Neo-Confucian philosophers, noting and explicating some areas of influence long overlooked in modern scholarship. It begins with a general overview of Xunzi’s changing position in the tradition (“Xunzi’s Status in Neo-Confucian Thought”), in which I discuss Xunzi’s status in three general periods of Neo-Confucian era: the early period, in which Neo-Confucian views of Xunzi were varied and somewhat ambiguous, the “mature” period, (...) in which a broad consensus formed and then became orthodoxy for several centuries, and a late and often overlooked reassessment of Xunzi that took place in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the second section (“Debating Human Nature on Xunzi’s Terms”), I discuss in greater detail Neo-Confucian criticisms of Xunzi’s views on human nature, noting that in key respects the Neo-Confucians accepted Xunzi’s somewhat uncharitable characterization of the doctrine that human nature is good, thereby taking on a considerably greater burden of proof than necessary. In the third section (“Virtue without Roots”), I attempt to explicate what is perhaps the most prominent but also the most laconic Neo-Confucian criticism of Xunzi, which is that Xunzi misunderstands the “great root” or “great foundation” of cosmic and social order, finding it in conventional human relationships rather than in the deeper, purer and more powerful inner workings of human nature. In the final section (“The Accretional Theory of Knowledge Acquisition”), I explain how the major differences between Xunzi and his Neo-Confucian critics can be cast as a dispute about how moral knowledge is acquired, where Xunzi’s critics assume that acquiring moral knowledge of any meaningful kind is impossible without a natural base or foundation of moral knowledge to begin with. (shrink)

In recent years, there have been debates surrounding various aspects of the early Confucian philosopher Xunzi's view on ritual as a specific core element of his ethical thought.1 One of the main questions concerns the source of ritual. Is ritual something that humans discover in the world, or is it instead something they create? That is, does Xunzi offer a realist or a conventionalist view of ritual? The answer to this question is of great import for understanding the (...) thought of Xunzi in general, as it will suggest certain readings of his views on language, human nature, and moral self-cultivation. Part of the problem, however, is that although Xunzi says quite a bit about the... (shrink)

This paper is about two proposals endorsed by Xunzi. The first is that there is such a thing as a moral expert, whose moral advice we should adopt even when we cannot appreciate for ourselves the considerations in favor of it. The second is that certain political authorities should be treated as moral experts. I identify three fundamental questions about moral expertise that contemporary philosophy has yet to address in depth, explicate Xunzi’s answers to them, and then give (...) an account of politically authorized moral expertise as Xunzi understands it. The three questions at the heart of this study are these: how should we distinguish between knowing the correct course of action on another’s authority and knowing it for oneself? What exactly are the underlying considerations that the expert grasps and the novice does not? Who are the experts and in what spheres of life can they legitimately claim expertise? (shrink)

Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 ironically once wrote that Zhu Xi 朱熹 could be considered Xunzi's 荀子 philosophical revenge on Mengzi 孟子. Mou implied that when you retreat from Zhu's staunch rhetorical support of Mengzi philosophy, what you discover are all kinds of significant analogies between the philosophical lexicon as well as deeper structural affinities between Xunzi and Zhu Xi. We discover, ironically, that there is a great deal of merit in Mou's offhanded suggestion of the comparison of two of (...) the greatest Confucian masters. (shrink)

The transmitted Xunzi consists of thirty-two chapters. The book criticizes all philosophers of the pre-Qin era, but thereby it also assimilates their thought. The Xunzi is eclectic, to the extent that there was no school of thought that it does not include. In scholarly circles, it is generally believed that Xunzi was the most prominent Confucian scholar of the final years of the Warring States period. At the same time, it is commonly acknowledged that the Confucianism of (...) Xunzi was different from that of Confucius or Mencius. What brought about this change in Confucianism? When we analyze Xunzi from the viewpoint of the Daoist philosophy of Huang-Lao, it is not difficult to notice that a large part of Xunzi's thought originates in Huang-Lao—that is, in the philosophy of the silk manuscript Four Canons of the Yellow Emperor. The discovery of this manuscript thus helped to find the sequence of ideas leading to the change in Confucianism. (shrink)

The classical Confucian philosopher Xunzi proposed a naturalistic virtue ethics account of ritual: rituals are practices that channel human emotion and desire so that one develops virtues. In this paper I show that William of Auxerre’s Summa de Officiis Ecclesiasticis can be understood as presenting a similar account of ritual. William places great emphasis on the emotional power of the liturgy, which makes participants like the blessed in heaven by developing virtue. In other words, he has a virtue ethics (...) of ritual closely aligned with that of Xunzi. Xunzi’s writings on ritual illuminate and enrich one’s reading of the Summa de Officiis. But unlike Xunzi, William is not a naturalist with regard to ritual: although much of William’s language about the causal power of liturgy can be explained in Xunzian terms, Christian liturgy has an irreducible supernatural element. (shrink)

Chapter 15 of the Xunzi stands as the most comprehensive account of the early Confucian analysis of warfare. Unlike a range of other early, non-Confucian discussions on warfare, particular strategies and tactics are taken to be of secondary importance. Thus, Xunzi refuses to discuss practical military strategy without framing it within a much broader ethical, social, and political context. On his account, a well-ordered, flourishing state necessarily rests upon a particular set of rituals and social norms in which (...) people can cultivate themselves morally. Such a state has nothing to fear from any enemy, no matter how tactically sophisticated or militarily skilled. -/- To many, such a view seems overly. However, given that Xunzi is anything but Pollyannaish in other parts of the text and is quite pessimistic about human nature in general, it behooves us to dig a bit more deeply into his ideas about military affairs and examine whether they can be understood in a more plausible light. This article provides a reading of Xunzi’s views on military affairs that is internally consistent and corresponds with Xunzi’s broader ethical and political views, while also showing why someone of Xunzi’s obvious intellectual acumen might hold such a view. (shrink)

Broadly speaking, language is part of a social activity in both Wittgenstein and Xunzi 荀子, and for both clarification of language is central to their philosophical projects; the goal of this article is to explore the extent of resonance and discord that may be found when comparing these two philosophers. While for Xunzi, the rectification of names (zhengming 正名) is anchored in a regard for establishing, propagating, and/or restoring a harmonious social system, perspicuity is for Wittgenstein represented as (...) a philosophical end in itself. The article ventures study in particular the themes of perspicuity and aspect-perception in Wittgenstein together with the topics of correcting names and the cultivation of the heart-mind (xin 心) in the Xunzi. The aspiration of this project is to gain an overview of the role(s) of clarification projects in different philosophical traditions, all while not overlooking the different historical contexts and philosophical ends of these two philosophers. (shrink)

No Matter What the original meaning of "Ru" was, looking at it from the perspective of the history of philosophy, the image of "Ru" as portrayed by other schools in the Warring States period was infused with the characteristics of Confucianism of that time. The self-understanding of Warring States Confucians expressed by their employment of the character "Ru" clearly displayed Ru's character as well as the main points of the Ru school, namely Confucianism. In particular, the words and thoughts of (...) Xunzi, the great Confucian master, on "Ru", epitomize Pre-Qin Confucian's understanding and expectations of themselves, and also reflect the Confucian new pursuit in facing the age of the uniflcation of Qin. /// 不管"儒"字在宇源上的原始意义如何，从学术史的观点来看，战国时代的 其他学派对"儒"的思想刻画，己经鲜明地呈现出儒家的思想特质:而战国儒学在 运用"儒"字上所表达的自我理解，更突出显现了"何为儒之人格，何为儒家的学 说宗旨"在当时的通行理解。尤其是，战国末期的儒学大师苟子对"儒"的理解， 作为战国时代评论各家"儒"的总结性代表，集中体现了先秦儒家的自我理解和自 我期许，同时也反映了儒家因应秦的统4 的时代即将到来的新的追求。. (shrink)

This essay is a comparison between two ancient theories of language—the 5th century BCE Indian etymologist Yāska and the 4th century BCE Chinese philosopher Xunzi 荀子. Specifically, it is a reading of the theory of “the rectification of names” in Xunzi through the lens of Yāska. Xunzi is known for his view that humanity’s innate tendencies need to be shaped through education and ritual. Similarly, ancient Indian authors like Yāska understand that a person is created, or made, (...) through the performance of Vedic sacrifice. Both thinkers’ constructivist theories of language and meaning proceed from these ritual assumptions. However, Yāska would query Xunzi’s inherent distrust of multiple meanings of words and their negative effects on a functional state. Guided instead by a theory of the transcendence of Vedic language, Yāska would argue that the more one can proliferate possible meanings the more powerful a word becomes. (shrink)