Consideration of the counting and reidentification of particulars leads naturally enough to the orthodox doctrine that, “on pain of indefiniteness,” an identity statement in some way involves or presupposes a general term or “covering concept”: i.e., that the principium individuationis or criterion of identity implied depends upon the kind of thing in question. Thus it is said that an auditor understands the question whether A is the same as B only in so far as he knows, however informally or implicitly, (...) the answer to the supplementary question, “The same what?”. (shrink)

Tradução para o português do verbete "George Berkeley, de Michael Ayers, retirado de "A Companion to Epistemology", ed. Jonathan Dancy e Ernest Sosa (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 261–264. Criticanarede. ISSN 1749-8457.

Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categories and (...) On Interpretation and boethius'S textbook on topical inference. They comprise a freestanding Dialectica (“Logic”; probably c.1116), a set of commentaries (known as the Logica [Ingredientibus], c. 1119) and a later (c. 1125) commentary on the Isagoge (Logica Nostrorum Petititoni Sociorum or Glossulae). In a work Abelard called his Theologia, issued in three main versions (between 1120 and c.1134), he attempted a logical analysis of trinitarian relations and explored the philosophical problems surrounding God's claims to omnipotence and omniscience. The Collationes (“Debates,” also known as “Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew”; probably c.1130) present a rational investigation into the nature of the highest good, in which the Christian and the Philosopher (who seems to be modeled on a philosopher of pagan antiquity) are remarkably in agreement. The unfinished Scito teipsum (“Know thyself,” also known as the “Ethics”; c.1138) analyses moral action. (shrink)

The first edition of The Scientific Background to Modern Philosophy took the dialogue of science and philosophy from Aristotle through to Newton. This second edition adds eight chapters, taking the dialogue through the Enlightenment and up to Darwin. This anthology is an attempt to help bridge the gap between the history of science and the history of philosophy.

This chapter outlines something of Mario Bunge’s long life and career as a physicist-philosopher originally living and working in Argentina for 40 years, then in Canada for nearly 60 years. It indicates the extraordinary breadth, depth and quantity of his research publications. It deals briefly with some key components of his work, such as: systemism, causation, theory analysis, axiomatization, ontology, epistemology, physics, psychology and philosophy of mind, social science, probability and Bayesianism, defence of the Enlightenment project, and education. Finally, the (...) chapter gives an account of the structure of the festschrift, and an indication of each of the 41 contributions. (shrink)

Universals: Loux, M. J. The existence of universals. Russell, B. The world of universals. Quine, W. V. O. On what there is. Pears, D. F. Universals. Strawson, P. F. Particular and general. Wolterstorff, N. Qualities. Bambrough, R. Universals and family resemblances. Donagan, A. Universals and metaphysical realism. Sellars, W. Abstract entities. Wolterstorff, N. On the nature of universals.--Particulars: Loux, M. J. Particulars and their individuation. Black. M. The identity of indiscernibles. Ayer, A. J. The identity of indiscernibles. O'Connor, D. J. (...) The identity of indiscernibles. Allaire, E. B. Bare particulars. Chappell, V. C. Particulars re-clothed. Allaire, E. B. Another look at bare particulars. Meiland, J. W. Do relations individuate? Long, D. C. Particulars and their qualities. Copi, I. Essence and accident. Chandler, H. S. Essence and accident. Plantinga, A. World and essence. (shrink)

Knowing as having the right to be sure, by A. J. Ayer.--Knowledge and belief, by N. Malcolm.--Is justified true belief knowledge? By E. L. Gettier.--The foundation of empirical statements, by R. M. Chisholm.--Knowledge, truth, and evidence, by K. Lehrer.--A causal theory of knowing, by A. I. Goldman.--The explication of 'X knows that p', by B. Skyrms.--An analysis of factual knowledge, by P. Unger.--Why I know so much more than you do, by W. W. Rozeboom.--Does knowing imply believing? By J. Harrison.--Knowledge, (...) by examples, by C. Radford.--The logic of knowing, by R. M. Chisholm.--Bibliography (p. 221-224). (shrink)

Often neglected as an influence on phenomenology, Bergson's thought has resurfaced and brought challenges to phenomenology. In a series of original essays and translations, leading scholars of contemporary continental philosophy seek to redress this oversight and inaugurate a long over due dialogue and yet pertinent to the future of continental philosophy. This thematically focused collection reintroduces Bergson to the dominant discourse in continental philosophy (phenomenology), reevaluates phenomenologists' readings of Bergson (e.g., Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, and Henry), and examines Bergsonian challenges (...) to phenomenological methods and issues. What emerges is not only a revitalized Bergson read on his own terms, but also a view of the vibrance of Bergson's thought and its central contributions to perennial issues in phenomenology and contemporary continental philosophy: including dualism, intentionality, subjectivity and selfhood, science, time, ethics, freedom, life and affectivity. -- Product Description. (shrink)

This chapter begins by noting the importance of debates in science education that hinge upon support for or rejection of the Enlightenment project. It then distinguishes the historic eighteenth-century Enlightenment from its articulation and working out in the Enlightenment project; details Mario Bunge’s and others’ summation of the core principles of the Enlightenment; and fleshes out the educational project of the Enlightenment by reference to the works of John Locke, Joseph Priestley, Ernst Mach, Philipp Frank and Herbert Feigl. It indicates (...) commonalities between the Enlightenment education project and that of the liberal education movement, and for both projects it points to the need to appreciate history and philosophy of science. (shrink)

One aim philosophers have in constructing moral theories is to identify the natural or non-Moral characteristics that make actions right or obligatory, Things good, Or persons virtuous. Yet we have no clear understanding of what it is for certain of a thing's non-Moral properties to be responsible for its moral properties. Given the recent interest in the concept of supervenience one might think that the dependence of moral on natural properties could be explained in terms of it. Unfortunately, None of (...) the definitions of supervenience offered so far is adequate to this task, And indeed, There is some reason to think that this dependence relation is ultimately mysterious. (shrink)

In this book, Rhodes provides a nonevaluative account of coercion. He begins with a thorough discussion of the charge that coercion is an essentially contested concept. He argues that effective communication of regulations pertaining to human conduct requires a basic level of clarity as to the kind of conduct being regulated. Accordingly, he argues that before we prescribe or proscribe conduct, we should describe it. In short, he maintains that wherever possible description should precede prescription and proscription. Rhodes begins his (...) descriptive project by providing a fundamental account of human motivation. Upon this foundation he supports his distinctions between threats, offers, throffers, and neutral proposals. He argues that all coercion claims can be understood in light of these components. He applies this analysis to three prominent accounts of coercion as advanced by F.A. Hayek, Harry Frankfurt, and Robert Nozick. After comparing and contrasting these views, Rhodes provides his own account. Rhodes's account is based upon the identification of what he refers to as perceived-threat-avoidance-behavior as a necessary condition for coercion. As a descriptive, or nonevaluative, account, Rhodes is able to identify coercion independent from normative judgments. He argues that it is not the wrongfulness of some conduct that makes it coercion, instead, it is the coerciveness of some conduct that makes it wrong. Unique to Rhodes's account, coercion is not necessarily wrong. As a descriptive account, his view permits an independent analysis of the moral status of an act of coercion. The book concludes with a discussion of the normatively significant variables of a coercion claim. (shrink)

What aspects and features of events impel people to label them as miraculous? Three studies examined people's miracle conceptions and the factors that lead them to designate an event as a miracle. Study 1 identified the basic elements of laypersons’ miracle beliefs by instructing participants to define a miracle, to list five events that they considered miraculous, and to state what they believed to be the purpose of miracles. Results showed that individuals tend to view miracles as highly improbable and (...) beneficial occurrences that instill hope and faith in people. Studies 2 and 3 investigated people's intuitive miracle theories. Findings demonstrated that people tend to label events as miracles when the events in question were of high magnitude, were obtained in an unusual manner, resulted in a beneficial health outcome, personally affected the participant, involved a person of worthy character, and depicted a low-probability event. (shrink)

What aspects and features of events impel people to label them as miraculous? Three studies examined people’s miracle conceptions and the factors that lead them to designate an event as a miracle. Study 1 identified the basic elements of laypersons’ miracle beliefs by instructing participants to define a miracle, to list five events that they considered miraculous, and to state what they believed to be the purpose of miracles. Results showed that individuals tend to view miracles as highly improbable and (...) beneficial occurrences that instill hope and faith in people. Studies 2 and 3 investigated people’s intuitive miracle theories. Findings demonstrated that people tend to label events as miracles when the events in question were of high magnitude, were obtained in an unusual manner, resulted in a beneficial health outcome, personally affected the participant, involved a person of worthy character, and depicted a low-probability event. (shrink)

This paper critically examines the claim that parallel distributed processing (PDP) networks are autonomous learning systems. A PDP model of a simple distributed associative memory is considered. It is shown that the 'generic' PDP architecture cannot implement the computations required by this memory system without the aid of external control. In other words, the model is not autonomous. Two specific problems are highlighted: (i) simultaneous learning and recall are not permitted to occur as would be required of an autonomous system; (...) (ii) connections between processing units cannot simultaneously represent current and previous network activation as would be required if learning is to occur. Similar problems exist for more sophisticated networks constructed from the generic PDP architecture. We argue that this is because these models are not adequately constrained by the properties of the functional architecture assumed by PDP modelers. It is also argued that without such constraints, PDP researchers cannot claim to have developed an architecture radically different from that proposed by the Classical approach in cognitive science. (shrink)

There is widespread belief that connectionist networks are dramatically different from classical or symbolic models. However, connectionists rarely test this belief by interpreting the internal structure of their nets. A new approach to interpreting networks was recently introduced by Berkeley et al. (1995). The current paper examines two implications of applying this method: (1) that the internal structure of a connectionist network can have a very classical appearance, and (2) that this interpretation can provide a cognitive theory that cannot be (...) dismissed as a mere implementation. (shrink)

We all have moral beliefs. But what if one beleif conflicts with another? DePaul argues that we have to make our beliefs cohere, but that the current coherence methods are seriously flawed. It is not just the arguments that need to be considered in moral enquiry. DePaul asserts that the ability to make sensitive moral judgements is vital to any philosophical inquiry into morality. The inquirer must consider how her life experiences and experiences with literature, film and theatre have influenced (...) her capacity for making moral judgments and attempt to ensure that this capacity is neither naive nor corrupted. (shrink)

History, Philosophy and Science Teaching argues that science teaching and science teacher education can be improved if teachers know something of the history and philosophy of science and if these topics are included in the science curriculum. The history and philosophy of science have important roles in many of the theoretical issues that science educators need to address: the goals of science education; what constitutes an appropriate science curriculum for all students; how science should be taught in traditional cultures; what (...) integrated science is; how scientific literacy can be promoted; and the conflict which can occur between science curriculum and deep-seated religious or cultural values and knowledge. In part, answers to these questions hinge on views about the nature of science, views that are best informed by historical and philosophical study. Outlining the history of liberal, or contextual, approaches to the teaching of science, Michael Matthews elaborates contemporary curriculum developments that explicitly address questions about the nature and the history of science. He provides examples of classroom teaching and develops useful arguments on constructivism, multicultural science education and teacher education. The book will appeal to school and university science teachers, educators of science teachers, and historians and philosophers of science. (shrink)

Certain versions of liberalism exclude from public political discussions the reasons some citizens regard as most fundamental, reasons having to do with their deepest religious, philosophical, moral or political views. This liberal exclusion of deep and deeply held reasons from political discussions has been controversial. In this article I will point out a way in which the discussion seems to presuppose a foundationalist conception of human reasoning. This is rather surprising, inasmuch as one of the foremost advocates of liberalism, John (...) Rawls, is also known for being one of the first advocates of reflective equilibrium, which is clearly a coherentist approach to theory construction and justification. I will begin in Park I by making my charge against an almost embarrassingly crude presentation of the liberal position. Then in Part II I will leap to Rawls' version of liberalism, obviously by far the most sophisticated working out of the position, and try to see whether anything remains of my criticism. (shrink)

One new tradition that has emerged from early research on autonomous robots is embodied cognitive science. This paper describes the relationship between embodied cognitive science and a related tradition, synthetic psychology. It is argued that while both are synthetic, embodied cognitive science is antirepresentational while synthetic psychology still appeals to representations. It is further argued that modern connectionism offers a medium for conducting synthetic psychology, provided that researchers analyze the internal representations that their networks develop. The paper then provides a (...) detailed example of the synthetic approach by showing how the construction (and subsequent analysis) of a connectionist network can be used to contribute to a theory of how humans solve Piaget's classic balance scale task. (shrink)

The first edition of The Scientific Background to Modern Philosophy took the dialogue of science and philosophy from Aristotle through to Newton. This second edition adds eight chapters, taking the dialogue through the Enlightenment and up to Darwin. This anthology is an attempt to help bridge the gap between the history of science and the history of philosophy.

One merit claimed for john rawls's coherence method, Wide reflective equilibrium, Is that it transcends the traditional two tiered approach to moral inquiry according to which one must choose as one's starting points either particular moral judgments or general moral principles. The two tiered conception of philosophical method is not limited to ethics. The most detailed exposition of the conception can be found in r m chisholm's various discussions of the problem of the criterion. While chisholm's work has played a (...) major role in structuring the way epistemologists think about method, It has not similarly influenced the deliberations of moral theorists. But moral philosophers are not the only ones with myopia, For neither rawls's coherentist method nor classical moral intuitionism figure in chisholm's taxonomy. One aim is to correct the vision of both parties by expanding chisholm's taxonomy in order to make clear how intuitionism and rawls's coherentist method are related to the methods identified by chisholm. My other aim is to argue for coherentism of the sort defended by rawls against the other non-Skeptical methods I consider. (shrink)

One new tradition that has emerged from early research on autonomous robots is embodied cognitive science. This paper describes the relationship between embodied cognitive science and a related tradition, synthetic psychology. It is argued that while both are synthetic, embodied cognitive science is antirepresentational while synthetic psychology still appeals to representations. It is further argued that modern connectionism offers a medium for conducting synthetic psychology, provided that researchers analyze the internal representations that their networks develop. The paper then provides a (...) detailed example of the synthetic approach by showing how the construction of a connectionist network can be used to contribute to a theory of how humans solve Piaget's classic balance scale task. (shrink)

In the introduction to his account of the debate concerning religion between Cleanthes, Philo and Demea, Pamphilus remarks that ‘reasonable men may be allowed to differ where no one can reasonably be positive’. Pamphilus goes on to suggest that natural theology is an area that abounds with issues about which ‘no one can reasonably be positive’. Assuming that the beliefs of reasonable men are themselves reasonable, Pamphilus can be interpreted as holding that If no one is reasonably positive that the (...) proposition p is true or that it is false, a man might reasonably believe that p or might reasonably believe that not p. (shrink)

The past decade has seen a renewed interest in moral psychology. A unique feature of the present endeavor is its unprecedented interdisciplinarity. For the first time, cognitive, social, and developmental psychologists, neuroscientists, experimental philosophers, evolutionary biologists, and anthropologists collaborate to study the same or overlapping phenomena. This review focuses on moral judgments and is written from the perspective of cognitive psychologists interested in theories of the cognitive and affective processes underlying judgments in moral domains. The review will first present and (...) discuss a variety of different theoretical and empirical approaches, including both behavioral and neuroscientific studies. We will then show how these theories can be applied to a selected number of specific research topics that have attracted particular interest in recent years, including the distinction between moral and conventional rules, moral dilemmas, the role of intention, and sacred/protected values. One overarching question we will address throughout the chapter is whether moral cognitions are distinct and special, or whether they can be subsumed under more domain-general mechanisms. (shrink)