Alexander Raven Thomson was a British fascist philosopher, active from 1932 to 1955. I outline Thomson’s Spenglerian views on civilization and decline. I argue that Thomson in his first book is an orthodox Spenglerian who accepts that decline is inevitable and thinks that it is morally required to destroy civilization in its final stages. I argue that this suffers from conceptual issues which may have caused Thomson’s change to a revised form of Spenglerianism, which is more authentically fascist. This authentically (...) fascist view is then seen to fall prey into the problem inherent in the very idea of permanent rebirth. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore the relationship between naturalism and transcendental idealism in Fichte. I conclude that Fichte is a near-naturalist, akin to Baker, Lynne Rudder (2017). “Naturalism and the idea of nature,” Philosophy 92 (3): 333–349. A near-naturalist is one whose position looks akin to the naturalist in some ways but the near-naturalist can radically differ in metaphilosophical orientation and substantial commitment. This paper is composed of three sections. In the first, I outline briefly what I take transcendental idealism (...) to be, as well as some differences in types of naturalism, and how this maps on to Fichte. In the second, I give an exegesis of Fichte’s key arguments in the Later Jena period, which are important for the question of his relationship to naturalism. In the third, I continue the exegesis with a discussion of Fichte’s conception of God, and conclude that these arguments support a near-naturalist reading of Fichte. (shrink)

“I am only what I make myself to be”, Fichte tells us. In this paper, I outline Fichte’s views on sex, marriage and gender, with two aims. Firstly, to elucidate an aspect of his moral theory which has received little attention, and secondly to argue that Fichte’s distinctive stance on selfhood, freedom, and normativity lead to a revisionary account of gender expression and identity, where people can freely carve out their own identity, irrespective of “nature”. In this paper, I therefore (...) outline Fichte’s own views, highlighting what I see as a tension in the texts between essentialism and antiessentialism about gender, before reconstructing a neo-Fichtean view which foregrounds the anti-essentialist aspect. (shrink)

It is well-known that Kant defends a conception of God and the final end of our moral striving, called the highest good. In this article, I outline Kant's argument for why we ought to have faith in God and hope for the highest good, and argue that the Kantian argument can be extended in such a way as to show the unity of the theological virtues. This feature of the Kantian account can then have ramifications in further questions regarding the (...) relationship of faith and moral action. (shrink)

In this paper, I will investigate the early work of William Temple (1881–1944). My contention is that Temple’s systematic philosophy contains resources for an interesting variant of a desire argument for God’s existence and for the truth of Christianity. This desire argument moves from claims about the nature of human reason to the conditions for its satisfaction and how that satisfaction might be achieved. In constructing this argument, Temple confronts the problem of evil, and so I will also outline his (...) response to the problem here. Temple is often overlooked in histories of philosophy, though he was conversant with philosophical classics, including Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and Lotze, and, to list a few of the contemporaries or near-contemporaries: Balfour, Haldane, F. H. Bradley, A. C. Bradley, Moore, Bosanquet, Joachim, and Croce. He also acknowledges, in the preface to his main philosophical work Mens Creatrix, a special debt to Bergson, but also signals distance from him in the same place. Temple presents an interesting case of a philosopher and theologian (most of his books are a mixture of the two, some being more predominantly one or the other) because of his commitment to philosophical system in the midst of early analytic philosophy. (shrink)

The Argument Web is maturing as both a platform built upon a synthesis of many contemporary theories of argumentation in philosophy and also as an ecosystem in which various applications and application components are contributed by different research groups around the world. It already hosts the largest publicly accessible corpora of argumentation and has the largest number of interoperable and cross compatible tools for the analysis, navigation and evaluation of arguments across a broad range of domains, languages and activity types. (...) Such interoperability is key in allowing innovative combinations of tool and data reuse that can further catalyse the development of the field of computational argumentation. The aim of this paper is to summarise the key foundations, the recent advances and the goals of the Argument Web, with a particular focus on demonstrating the relevance to, and roots in, philosophical argumentation theory. (shrink)

This short piece is collected in the complete edition of Fichte's works published by the Bavarian Academy of Sciences (1964-2012), IV/1, pp. 153-167. According to the editors' foreword, it first appeared anonymously as part of a pamphlet titled "Something from Professor Fichte and for him. Published by a veracious schoolmaster" in 1799 in Bayreuth as a response to the so-called atheism dispute, which eventually cost Fichte his chair in Jena. This translation concerns a part appended to the pamphlet which is (...) titled "Professor Fichte's Ideas on God and Immortality. Published from lecture notes". The schoolmaster who published the pamphlet was Christian Wilhelm Friedrich Penzenkuffer, who had studied theology and was at that time teaching biblical exegesis at high school. It was found that among the students who attended Fichte's lectures in the winter semester 1794 there was a Johann Friedrich Penzenkuffer, probably a brother of the pamphlet author. It seems most plausible that the content of the pamphlet came from a student transcript of Fichte's lectures on logic and metaphysics in Jena and the anonymous publication was intended as a defence for Fichte that what he taught was not atheism but rather theism. This pamphlet has importance not only as part of its immediate context - the atheism dispute - but also for Fichte's philosophy of religion more generally. (shrink)

The informativity of a computational model of language acquisition is directly related to how closely it approximates the actual acquisition task, sometimes referred to as the model's cognitive plausibility. We suggest that though every computational model necessarily idealizes the modeled task, an informative language acquisition model can aim to be cognitively plausible in multiple ways. We discuss these cognitive plausibility checkpoints generally and then apply them to a case study in word segmentation, investigating a promising Bayesian segmentation strategy. We incorporate (...) cognitive plausibility by using an age-appropriate unit of perceptual representation, evaluating the model output in terms of its utility, and incorporating cognitive constraints into the inference process. Our more cognitively plausible model shows a beneficial effect of cognitive constraints on segmentation performance. One interpretation of this effect is as a synergy between the naive theories of language structure that infants may have and the cognitive constraints that limit the fidelity of their inference processes, where less accurate inference approximations are better when the underlying assumptions about how words are generated are less accurate. More generally, these results highlight the utility of incorporating cognitive plausibility more fully into computational models of language acquisition. (shrink)

Many are calling for transformative food systems changes to promote population and planetary health. Yet there is a lack of research that considers whether current food policy frameworks and regulatory approaches are suited to tackle whole of food systems challenges. One such challenge is responding to the rise of ultra-processed foods (UPF) in human diets, and the related harms to population and planetary health. This paper presents a narrative review and synthesis of academic articles and international reports to critically examine (...) whether current food policy frameworks and regulatory approaches are sufficiently equipped to drive the transformative food systems changes needed to halt the rise of UPFs, reduce consumption and minimise harm. We draw on systems science approaches to conceptualise the UPF problem as an emergent property of complex adaptive food systems shaped by capitalist values and logics. Our findings reveal that current food policy frameworks often adjust or reform isolated aspects of food systems (e.g., prices, labels, food composition), but under-emphasise the deeper paradigms, goals and structures that underlie the rise of UPFs as a systems phenomenon, and its socio-ecological implications. We propose that a ‘leverage points’ framework illuminates where to intervene in food systems to generate multi-level changes, while the theory of ecological regulation highlights how to respond to complex multi-factorial problems, like the rise of UPFs, in diverse ways that respect planetary boundaries. More research is needed to better understand the transformative potential of ecological regulation to advance food systems transformation and attenuate whole of food systems challenges. (shrink)

Public health ethics, like the field of public health it addresses, traditionally has focused more on practice and particular cases than on theory, with the result that some concepts, methods, and boundaries remain largely undefined. This paper attempts to provide a rough conceptual map of the terrain of public health ethics. We begin by briefly defining public health and identifying general features of the field that are particularly relevant for a discussion of public health ethics.Public health is primarily concerned with (...) the health of the entire population, rather than the health of individuals. Its features include an emphasis on the promotion of health and the prevention of disease and disability; the collection and use of epidemiological data, population surveillance, and other forms of empirical quantitative assessment; a recognition of the multidimensional nature of the determinants of health; and a focus on the complex interactions of many factors—biological, behavioral, social, and environmental—in developing effective interventions. (shrink)

An attempt to clarify how the problem of absolute time and the problem of absolute motion relate to one another, especially with respect to causal attributions involving time and motion.

This book describes a relativistic quantum theory developed by the author starting from the E.C.G. Stueckelberg approach proposed in the early 40s. In this framework a universal invariant evolution parameter (corresponding to the time originally postulated by Newton) is introduced to describe dynamical evolution. This theory is able to provide solutions for some of the fundamental problems encountered in early attempts to construct a relativistic quantum theory. A relativistically covariant construction is given for which particle spins and angular momenta can (...) be combined through the usual rotation group Clebsch-Gordan coefficients. Solutions are defined for both the classical and quantum two body bound state and scattering problems. The recently developed quantum Lax-Phillips theory of semigroup evolution of resonant states is described. The experiment of Lindner and coworkers on interference in time is discussed showing how the property of coherence in time provides a simple understanding of the results. The full gauge invariance of the Stueckelberg-Schroedinger equation results in a 5D generalization of the usual gauge theories. A description of this structure and some of its consequences for both Abelian and non-Abelian fields are discussed. A review of the basic foundations of relativistic classical and quantum statistical mechanics is also given. The Bekenstein-Sanders construction for imbedding Milgrom's theory of modified spacetime structure into general relativity as an alternative to dark matter is also studied. (shrink)

Laymen and philosophers alike find it counterintuitive to consent to the assertion that “it is sometimes right not to follow the requirements of morality”. This may be because the conventions of ordinary language do much to encourage the view that “morally ought to do” functions as an equivalent for “what one ought to do all things considered”. In this paper I will argue against such an equivalence and attempt to shake the holders of the prevailing view, that moral reasons are (...) always overriding, from their dogmatism. The primary theses of this paper are (1) there is no acceptable ordering of reasons for acting--not between types of reasons nor within the category of moral reasons, and (2) moral reasons are not unconditional or unexceptionable.The body of this paper will include a discussion of various versions of the prevailing view (that reasons do have an order with moral reasons as overriding all reasons). I will make some brief remarks about several forms of simplification or reductionism which provide fertile ground for the prevailing view, specifically (a) efforts to transform ‘the all things considered ought’ into a ‘moral ought’ and (b) three efforts to offer a single principle as the basis of moral reasoning. Then I will attempt to reveal flaws in two contemporary expressions of the prevailing view; those of D.Z. Phillips and Kurt Baier. The bulk of my efforts will be directed at demonstrating the conditionality and overrideability of moral reasons. In the process I will also attempt to illuminate the attractiveness of the, if I am correct, mistaken but prevailing view. And finally a moral will be drawn. (shrink)

Laymen and philosophers alike find it counterintuitive to consent to the assertion that “it is sometimes right not to follow the requirements of morality”. This may be because the conventions of ordinary language do much to encourage the view that “morally ought to do” functions as an equivalent for “what one ought to do all things considered”. In this paper I will argue against such an equivalence and attempt to shake the holders of the prevailing view, that moral reasons are (...) always overriding, from their dogmatism. The primary theses of this paper are (1) there is no acceptable ordering of reasons for acting--not between types of reasons nor within the category of moral reasons, and (2) moral reasons are not unconditional or unexceptionable.The body of this paper will include a discussion of various versions of the prevailing view (that reasons do have an order with moral reasons as overriding all reasons). I will make some brief remarks about several forms of simplification or reductionism which provide fertile ground for the prevailing view, specifically (a) efforts to transform ‘the all things considered ought’ into a ‘moral ought’ and (b) three efforts to offer a single principle as the basis of moral reasoning. Then I will attempt to reveal flaws in two contemporary expressions of the prevailing view; those of D.Z. Phillips and Kurt Baier. The bulk of my efforts will be directed at demonstrating the conditionality and overrideability of moral reasons. In the process I will also attempt to illuminate the attractiveness of the, if I am correct, mistaken but prevailing view. And finally a moral will be drawn. (shrink)

Much ink has already been spilled on the relationship of constitutional originalism to precedent. The debate includes contributions from Randy Barnett, Steven Calabresi, Kurt Lash, Gary Lawson, John McGinnis with Michael Rappaport, Michael Paulsen, and Lee Strang, not to mention Justice Antonin Scalia—all representing originalism in some form. Living constitutionalism has also been represented both implicitly and explicitly, with important contributions from Phillip Bobbitt, Ronald Dworkin, Michael Gerhardt, Randy Kozel, and David Strauss. Some writers are more difficult to classify; Akhil (...) Amar comes to mind. And there are many other contributions to the debate. Opinions range from the view that precedent should invariably prevail over the original public meaning of the constitutional text to the polar opposite view, that precedent must give way to original meaning in almost every case. Here is the roadmap. Part I provides a brief introduction to contemporary originalism. Part II describes the problem of precedent for originalism, emphasizing that the nature of the problem depends in part on our understanding of precedent. Part III offers some reflections on the question as to the constitutional status of the doctrine of horizontal stare decisis in the United States Supreme Court. (shrink)

Hegelians and those scholars concerned with the history of idealism owe Lawrence Stepelevich a vote of thanks for this useful, clearly presented collection of texts from the Young Hegelian philosophers who extended Hegel’s philosophy according to their own lights in the first two decades following Hegel’s death. Hegel died in 1831. Stepelevich understands Young Hegelianism as an identifiable philosophical movement to have existed from 1830 to 1848. It begins with Feuerbach’s work, Gedanken über Tod und Unsterblichkeit of 1830, and (...) finds its last real expression in Karl Schmidt’s Das Verstandestum und das Individuum in 1846. In addition to selections from these two figures, the volume contains selections from the works of Strauss, von Cieszkowski, Bruno and Edgar Bauer, Ruge, Engels, Marx, Stirner, and Hess. Much of the work presented appears for the first time in English translation, and the volume itself is the first English language text devoted to the writings of this movement. Although most Hegelian scholars know German, and thus these texts are available to them in the original, it is a great advantage to have such texts available in competent translations. Hegel himself recognized this in his well-known letter to Voss of May 1805, where he compares translations into a people’s own language to a gift and expresses his wish to have philosophy speak German. (shrink)

Hegelians and those scholars concerned with the history of idealism owe Lawrence Stepelevich a vote of thanks for this useful, clearly presented collection of texts from the Young Hegelian philosophers who extended Hegel’s philosophy according to their own lights in the first two decades following Hegel’s death. Hegel died in 1831. Stepelevich understands Young Hegelianism as an identifiable philosophical movement to have existed from 1830 to 1848. It begins with Feuerbach’s work, Gedanken über Tod und Unsterblichkeit of 1830, and (...) finds its last real expression in Karl Schmidt’s Das Verstandestum und das Individuum in 1846. In addition to selections from these two figures, the volume contains selections from the works of Strauss, von Cieszkowski, Bruno and Edgar Bauer, Ruge, Engels, Marx, Stirner, and Hess. Much of the work presented appears for the first time in English translation, and the volume itself is the first English language text devoted to the writings of this movement. Although most Hegelian scholars know German, and thus these texts are available to them in the original, it is a great advantage to have such texts available in competent translations. Hegel himself recognized this in his well-known letter to Voss of May 1805, where he compares translations into a people’s own language to a gift and expresses his wish to have philosophy speak German. (shrink)

Joint attention occurs when two (or more) individuals attend together to some object. It has been identified by psychologists as an early form of our joint engagement, and is thought to provide us with an understanding of other minds that is basic in that sophisticated conceptual resources are not involved. Accordingly, it has also attracted the interest of philosophers. Moreover, a very recent trend in the psychological and philosophical literature on joint attention consists of developing the suggestion that it holds (...) partially in virtue of communication: it is because we share our thoughts or feelings about an object that our individual attention becomes joint. This paper unpacks the communicative suggestion in a way that accounts for joint attention's basicness. (shrink)

A systematic theory of naturalism, bridging metaphysics and the science of complexity and emergence.

Abstract:This paper is a preliminary attempt to better understand the concept of legitimacy in stakeholder theory. The normative component of stakeholder theory plays a central role in the concept of legitimacy. Though the elaboration of legitimacy contained herein applies generally to all “normative cores” this paper relies on Phillips’s principle of stakeholder fairness and therefore begins with a brief description of this work. This is followed by a discussion of the importance of legitimacy to stakeholder theory as well as (...) the general ambiguity of the term. A distinction is then drawn between normative and derivative legitimacy. Reference to this distinction helps distinguish between a relationship with the organization based on direct moral obligation and one based on the power to help or harm the organization. It is concluded that stakeholders who retain the ability to affect the organization arelegitimate(derivatively), but that this legitimacy is derived from the moral obligation owed other (normative) stakeholders and that the two sorts of legitimacy are importantly different from one another. An example of the normative/derivative distinction at work in managerial decision making is elaborated upon and managerial and research implications are then suggested. (shrink)

Examination of the many factors that have shaped ecological thought over the ages and in challenging the basic assumptions of the Western worldview, exposes the fundamental flaws in a system that believes in unlimited economic growth within a finite world and has confused financial worth with the real wealth of the natural systems upon which we are all dependent. [book jacket].

Research on the capacity to understand others' minds has tended to focus on representations ofbeliefs,which are widely taken to be among the most central and basic theory of mind representations. Representations ofknowledge, by contrast, have received comparatively little attention and have often been understood as depending on prior representations of belief. After all, how could one represent someone as knowing something if one does not even represent them as believing it? Drawing on a wide range of methods across cognitive science, (...) we ask whether belief or knowledge is the more basic kind of representation. The evidence indicates that nonhuman primates attribute knowledge but not belief, that knowledge representations arise earlier in human development than belief representations, that the capacity to represent knowledge may remain intact in patient populations even when belief representation is disrupted, that knowledge (but not belief) attributions are likely automatic, and that explicit knowledge attributions are made more quickly than equivalent belief attributions. Critically, the theory of mind representations uncovered by these various methods exhibits a set of signature features clearly indicative of knowledge: they are not modality-specific, they are factive, they are not just true belief, and they allow for representations of egocentric ignorance. We argue that these signature features elucidate the primary function of knowledge representation: facilitating learning from others about the external world. This suggests a new way of understanding theory of mind – one that is focused on understanding others' minds in relation to the actual world, rather than independent from it. (shrink)

_A systematic theory of naturalism, bridging metaphysics and the science of complexity and emergence._.

Recent research into the evolution of higher cognition has piqued an interest in the effect of natural selection on the ability of creatures to respond to their environment (behavioral plasticity). It is believed that environmental variation is required for plasticity to evolve in cases where the ability to be plastic is costly. We investigate one form of environmental variation: frequency dependent selection. Using tools in game theory, we investigate a few models of plasticity and outline the cases where selection would (...) be expected to maintain it. Ultimately we conclude that frequency dependent selection is likely insufficient to maintain plasticity given reasonable assumptions about its costs. This result is very similar to one aspect of the well-discussed Baldwin effect, where plasticity is first selected for and then later selected against. We show how in these models one would expect plasticity to grow in the population and then be later reduced. Ultimately we conclude that if one is to account for the evolution of behavioral plasticity in this way, one must appeal to a very particular sort of external environmental variation. (shrink)

Companies are increasingly singing up to a range of corporate responsibility codes and other voluntary commitments. Using evidence from the mining industry’s experience with the Australian Greenhouse Challenge, the Minerals Council’s Code for Environmental Management and the ISO14001 Specification for Environmental Management Systems, this article examines whether the outcomes from the adoption of multiple voluntary approaches differ from those outcomes that would be expected if each voluntary approach was adopted in isolation. The article demonstrates that it is feasible for companies (...) to participate in multiple voluntary approaches and to derive benefits such as reduced transaction costs, improved data quality and enhanced implementation. However, there is limited evidence that the voluntary approaches in combination have enhanced environmental performance, economic efficiency, innovation or competitiveness beyond that which would be achieved from each of the approaches in isolation. Furthermore, many of the limitations of voluntary approaches (in particular, environmental performance, acceptability to NGOs) remain. (shrink)

This chapter presents Connecting Scotland as a case study, highlighting the correlation between current research into digital inequality to identify those most in need of support, and the practical application of work to address this at scale through third sector organisations working directly with those at greatest risk of digital exclusion. The chapter also considers the vital role of the ‘trusted intermediary’ acting as digital champion for device recipients, and, using the data gathered via sessions with hundreds of frontline staff, (...) explore immediate challenges and opportunities for engagement. It will also reflect on the application of research in the creation of training and resources to support the programme. Finally, the chapter will reflect on some of the many lessons learned, and consider implications for both policy-makers and fieldworkers seeking to address digital inequality at scale. All three authors were involved extensively in the development and delivery of this work. (shrink)

Shadmehr and Ahmed cogently argue that vigor of appetitive movements is positively correlated with their value, and that value can therefore be inferred by measuring vigor. Here, we highlight three points to consider when interpreting this account: (1) The correlation between vigor and value is not obligatory, (2) the vigor effect also arises in frameworks other than optimal foraging, and (3) the term vigor can be misinterpreted, thereby affecting rigor.

Both advocates and opponents of the animalist view that we are fundamentally biological organisms have typically assumed that animalism is incompatible with intuitive verdicts about cerebrum isolation and transplantation. It is argued here that this assumption is a mistake. Animalism, developed in a natural way, in fact strongly supports these intuitive verdicts. The availability of this attractive resolution of a central puzzle in the personal identity debate has been obscured by a range of factors, including the prevalence in contemporary metaphysics (...) of a certain conception of the nature of organisms. I end by explaining how the animalist can use intuitive verdicts, usually thought to present a difficulty for the view, as positive evidence for claims about the persistence conditions of the relevant kind of organism. (shrink)