German: Unter den nichtlogischen Konstanten der Wissenschaftssprache werden zwei Arten unterschieden, die Beobachtungsterme (z. B. « blau ») und die theoretischen Terme (z. B. « elektrisches Feld »). Die letzteren werden nicht durch Definitionen eingeführt, sondern durch Postulate zweier Arten, nämlich theoretische Postulate, zum Beispiel Grundgesetze der Physik, und Korrespondenzpostulate, die die theoretischen Terme mit Beobachtungstermen verbinden. Wie schon Hilbert gezeigt hat, können in dieser Weise sowohl die Mathematik als auch die theoretische Physik als ungedeutete Kalküle aufgestellt werden. Es wird (...) hier kurz erklärt, dass durch diesen Aufbau auch den mathematischen Termen eine Bedeutung (in einem weiteren Sinne) beigelegt wird. Die theoretischen Terme erhalten durch die Korrespondenzpostulate wenigstens eine unvollständige Deutung. Es wird gezeigt, wie die Unterscheidung von analytischen und synthetischen Sätzen auch für die theoretische Sprache definiert werden kann. -/- English: Among the non‐logical constants of the language of science two kinds are distinguished, the observation terms (e.g., « blue ») and the theoretical terms (e.g., « electric field »). The latter terms are introduced, not by definitions, but by postulates of two kinds, theoretical postulates, e.g., basic laws of physics, and correspondence postulates which connect the theoretical terms with observation terms. As Hilbert has explained, both mathematics and theoretical physics can in this way be constructed in the form of uninterpreted calculi. It is here briefly indicated that by this method of construction also the mathematical terms have meanings (in a wider sense) assigned to them. The theoretical terms obtain at least an incomplete interpretation by means of the correspondence postulates. It is shown how the distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences can be defined also for the theoretical language. (shrink)

APA PsycNET abstract: This is the first volume of a two-volume work on Probability and Induction. Because the writer holds that probability logic is identical with inductive logic, this work is devoted to philosophical problems concerning the nature of probability and inductive reasoning. The author rejects a statistical frequency basis for probability in favor of a logical relation between two statements or propositions. Probability "is the degree of confirmation of a hypothesis (or conclusion) on the basis of some given evidence (...) (or premises)." Furthermore, all principles and theorems of inductive logic are analytic, and the entire system is to be constructed by means of symbolic logic and semantic methods. This means that the author confines himself to the formalistic procedures of word and symbol systems. The resulting sentence or language structures are presumed to separate off logic from all subjectivist or psychological elements. Despite the abstractionism, the claim is made that if an inductive probability system of logic can be constructed it will have its practical application in mathematical statistics, and in various sciences. 16-page bibliography. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Available for the first time in 20 years, here is the Rudolf Carnap's famous principle of tolerance by which everyone is free to mix and match the rules of ...

This is identical with the first edition (see 21: 2716) except for the addition of a Supplement containing 5 previously published articles and the bringing of the bibliography (now 73 items) up to date. The 5 added articles present clarifications or modifications of views expressed in the first edition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved).

Two chief problems of the theory of knowledge are the question of meaning and the question of verification. The first question asks under what conditions a sentence has meaning, in the sense of cognitive, factual meaning. The second one asks how we get to know something, how we can find out whether a given sentence is true or false. The second question presupposes the first one. Obviously we must understand a sentence, i.e. we must know its meaning, before we can (...) try to find out whether it is true or not. But, from the point of view of empiricism, there is a still closer connection between the two problems. In a certain sense, there is only one answer to the two questions. If we knew what it would be for a given sentence to be found true then we would know what its meaning is. And if for two sentences the conditions under which we would have to take them as true are the same, then they have the same meaning. Thus the meaning of a sentence is in a certain sense identical with the way we determine its truth or falsehood; and a sentence has meaning only if such a determination is possible. (shrink)

"This book is valuable as expounding in full a theory of meaning that has its roots in the work of Frege and has been of the widest influence.

Available for the first time in 20 years, here are two important works from the 1920s by the best-known representative of the Vienna Circle.

A basic system of inductive logic; An axiomatic foundation for the logic of inductive generalization; A survey of inductive systems; On the condition of partial exchangeability; Representation theorems of the de finetti type; De finetti's generalizations of excahngeability; The structure of probabilities defined on first-order languages; A subjectivit's guide to objective chance.

Clear, comprehensive, intermediate introduction to logical languages, applications of symbolic logic to physics, mathematics, biology.

Das Ziel: Konstitutionssystem der Begriffe Das Ziel der vorliegenden Untersuchungen ist die Aufstellung eines erkenntnismäßig-logischen Systems der ...

Dieses Buch stellt eine neue, von CARNAP entwickelte Theorie der Induktion und Wahrscheinlichkeit dar, die durch die folgenden grund legenden Auffassungen charakterisiert ist. 1. Jedes induktive Schließen, im weiten Sinne des nichtdeduktiven oder nichtdemonstrativen Schlu߭ folgerns, ist ein Schließen auf Grund von Wahrscheinlichkeit. 2. Daher ist die induktive Logik als Theorie von den Prinzipien des induktiven Schließens dasselbe wie Wahrscheinlichkeitslogik. 3. Der Begriff der Wahrscheinlichkeit, der als Grundbegriff der induktiven Logik dienen soll, ist eine logische Relation zwischen zwei Aussagen (...) oder Sätzen, näm lich der Grad der Bestätigung einer Hypothese auf der Grundlage gegebe ner Prämissen. 4. Der sogenannte Häufigkeitsbegriff der Wahrschein lichkeit, wie er in statistischen Untersuchungen verwendet wird, ist zwar an und für sich ein wichtiger wissenschaftlicher Begriff, als Grundbegriff der induktiven Logik jedoch unbrauchbar. 5. Alle Prinzipien und Lehr sätze der induktiven Logik sind analytisch. 6. Daher hängt die Gültig keit des induktiven Schließens nicht von irgendwelchen synthetischen Voraussetzungen ab, wie etwa dem vielumstrittenen Prinzip der Gleich förmigkeit der Welt. Die erste Aufgabe dieses Buches ist die Erörterung der allgemeinen philosophischen Probleme betreffend die Natur der Wahrscheinlichkeit und des induktiven Schließens, die uns zu den eben erwähnten Auffassun gen führen wird. Das zweite Ziel ist der tatsächliche Aufbau eines Systems der induktiven Logik, einer Theorie, die auf den angeführten Prinzipien beruht. Ein besonderes Augenmerk wurde in diesem Buch darauf gelegt, die intuitive philosophische Grundlegung klar von dem technischen Aufbau des Systems der induktiven Logik zu trennen. (shrink)

'My endeavour in these pages is to explain the main features of the method of philosophizing which we, the Vienna Circle, use, and by using try to develop further. It is the method of the logical analysis of science, or more precisely, of the syntactical analysis of scientific language.... The purpose of the book -- as of the lectures -- is to give a first impression of our method and of the direction of our questions and investigations to those who (...) are not yet acquainted with them.' -- From the Preface. (shrink)

Two chief problems of the theory of knowledge are the question of meaning and the question of verification. The first question asks under what conditions a sentence has meaning, in the sense of cognitive, factual meaning. The second one asks how we get to know something, how we can find out whether a given sentence is true or false. The second question presupposes the first one. Obviously we must understand a sentence, i.e. we must know its meaning, before we can (...) try to find out whether it is true or not. But, from the point of view of empiricism, there is a still closer connection between the two problems. In a certain sense, there is only one answer to the two questions. If we knew what it would be for a given sentence to be found true then we would know what its meaning is. And if for two sentences the conditions under which we would have to take them as true are the same, then they have the same meaning. Thus the meaning of a sentence is in a certain sense identical with the way we determine its truth or falsehood; and a sentence has meaning only if such a determination is possible. (shrink)

The first volume of the Library of Living Philosophers (LLP) appeared in 1939, the brainchild of the late Professor Paul A. Schilpp. Schilpp saw that it would help to eliminate confusion and endless sterile disputes over interpretation if great philosophers could be confronted by their capable philosophical peers and asked to reply. As well as a number of critical essays with the chosen philosopher's replies to each essay, each volume would include an intellectual autobiography and an up-to-date bibliography The LLP (...) series has exceeded even Schilpp's expectations, enabling great philosophers to do more than clarify by extending and elaborating their thoughts. A volume in the Library of Living Philosophers is not merely a commentary on a philosopher's work; it is a critical part of that work. (shrink)

Among the various meanings in which the word ‘probability’ is used in everyday language, in the discussion of scientists, and in the theories of probability, there are especially two which must be clearly distinguished. We shall use for them the terms ‘probability1’ and ‘probability2'. Probability1 is a logical concept, a certain logical relation between two sentences ; it is the same as the concept of degree of confirmation. I shall write briefly “c” for “degree of confirmation,” and “c” for “the (...) degree of confirmation of the hypothesis h on the evidence e“; the evidence is usually a report on the results of our observations. On the other hand, probability2 is an empirical concept; it is the relative frequency in the long run of one property with respect to another. The controversy between the so-called logical conception of probability, as represented e.g. by Keynes, and Jeffreys, and others, and the frequency conception, maintained e.g. by v. Mises and Reichenbach, seems to me futile. These two theories deal with two different probability concepts which are both of great importance for science. Therefore, the theories are not incompatible, but rather supplement each other. (shrink)

It is not the aim of the present essay to defend the principle of empiricism against apriorism or anti-empiricist metaphysics. Taking empirism for granted, we wish to discuss, the question what is meaningful. The word ‘meaning’ will here be taken in its empiricist sense; an expression of language has meaning in this sense if we know how to use it in speaking about empirical facts, either actual or possible ones. Now our problem is what expressions are meaningful in this sense. (...) We may restrict this question to sentences because expressions other than sentences are meaningful if and only if they can occur in a meaningful sentence. (shrink)

Available for the first time in 20 years, here are two important works from the 1920s by the best-known representative of the Vienna Circle.

ZusammenfassungUnter den nichtlogischen Konstanten der Wissenschaftssprache werden zwei Arten unterschieden, die Beobachtungsterme und die theoretischen Terme . Die letzteren werden nicht durch Definitionen eingeführt, sondern durch Postulate zweier Arten, nämlich theoretische Postulate, zum Beispiel Grundgesetze der Physik, und Korrespondenzpostulate, die die theoretischen Terme mit Beobachtungstermen verbinden. Wie schon Hilbert gezeigt hat, können in dieser Weise sowohl die Mathematik als auch die theoretische Physik als ungedeutete Kalküle aufgestellt werden. Es wird hier kurz erklärt, dass durch diesen Aufbau auch den mathematischen Termen (...) eine Bedeutung beigelegt wird. Die theoretischen Terme erhalten durch die Korrespondenzpostulate wenigstens eine unvollständige Deutung. Es wird gezeigt, wie die Unterscheidung von analytischen und synthetischen Sätzen auch für die theoretische Sprache definiert werden kann.Among the non‐logical constants of the language of science two kinds are distinguished, the observation terms and the theoretical terms . The latter terms are introduced, not by definitions, but by postulates of two kinds, theoretical postulates, e.g., basic laws of physics, and correspondence postulates which connect the theoretical terms with observation terms. As Hilbert has explained, both mathematics and theoretical physics can in this way be constructed in the form of uninterpreted calculi. It is here briefly indicated that by this method of construction also the mathematical terms have meanings assigned to them. The theoretical terms obtain at least an incomplete interpretation by means of the correspondence postulates. It is shown how the distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences can be defined also for the theoretical language. (shrink)