Although Husserlian phenomenology appears to require that practitioners bracket all metaphysical questions and claims, this requirement runs against the evidence of experience in which objects themselves are presented as constituents of experience. Moreover, to completely bracket metaphysical considerations would suggest that phenomenology is compatible with metaphysical views it should in principle deny. Nonetheless, permitting metaphysical claims threatens to contravene the critical limits of phenomenology, to invite claims that would require a perspective different in kind than our own to verify. These (...) tensions raise an important question, namely, what are the metaphysical implications of the phenomenologically intuitive claim that objects themselves are constituents of experience? To answer this question, I draw on a broad swath of thought on transcendental idealism and phenomenology. I argue that a modest metaphysics of appearance is warranted within the critical limits of Husserlian phenomenology. Through discussing and addressing the problems that typically plague transcendental arguments, I show that Husserlian phenomenology permits stronger claims about objects of experience than deflationary accounts allow but does not permit claims about intrinsic properties allowed by some forms of transcendental idealism. (shrink)

The book answers long-standing questions on scientific modeling and inference across multiple perspectives and disciplines, including logic, mathematics, physics and medicine. The different chapters cover a variety of issues, such as the role models play in scientific practice; the way science shapes our concept of models; ways of modeling the pursuit of scientific knowledge; the relationship between our concept of models and our concept of science. The book also discusses models and scientific explanations; models in the semantic view of theories; (...) the applicability of mathematical models to the real world and their effectiveness; the links between models and inferences; and models as a means for acquiring new knowledge. It analyzes different examples of models in physics, biology, mathematics and engineering. Written for researchers and graduate students, it provides a cross-disciplinary reference guide to the notion and the use of models and inferences in science. (shrink)

According to A-theories of time, the metaphysical ground of change and dynamicity is provided by a continuous shifting in which events are past, present and future (A-determinations). It is often claimed that these theories make better sense of our experience of dynamicity than their rival, the B-theories; according to the latter, dynamicity is grounded solely in the irreducible earlier-than relations (B-relations) which obtain between events or states of affairs. In this paper, I argue that the experience of time's dynamicity, on (...) the contrary, cannot be accounted for solely in terms of representations of irreducible A-determinations, because any representation which is adequate to ground these experiences must itself involve representation of irreducible B-relations, while it needs not involve representation of A-determinations. Even if, as a matter of contingent fact, our experiences of dynamicity consisted of representations of successions of A-determinations, what would account for them being experiences of dynamicity would be solely the B-theoretic relations of succession, rather than the irrelevant A-theoretic nature of the relata. (shrink)

Husserl’s theory of types is most often associated with his account of perception. Here, types operate as pre-predicative frames of experience that guide the perception of objects. In this paper, I will argue that Husserl’s theory of types is also central to his account of intersubjectivity. More specifically, I will show that a foundational kind of typical subjectivity is entailed by his discussion of the sphere of ownness. It is by way of this type that even a solitary subject can (...) tacitly anticipate the possibility of other subjects. It is also this type that is enriched through interactions between actual subjects. (shrink)

Realitism: the postmodern attack on reality -- Realism: things that have existed since the beginning of the world -- Reconstruction: why criticism starts from reality -- Emancipation: unexamined life has no value.

ABSTRACT This essay is an introduction to Time and Reality I, the first part of a special issue dedicated to the philosophy of time. Here I outline a number of new trends in philosophical theorizing about time, detailing how the various contributions fit into the picture. I argue that there has been a potentially misleading tendency to separate the debate over the passage of time from the debate over the reality of tense. This has obscured a number of interesting philosophical (...) questions. One of the aims of this volume is to bring these two issues together, where they belong. I argue that many contributions to it go in the right direction. The contributions to this volume also establish uncharted philosophical junctures between Metaphysics, Aesthetics, Morality, and the Philosophy of Mind. (shrink)

The neuroscience of language studies the relationship between linguistic phenomena and the structure and functioning of the human brain. In this chapter, the authors focus on the neural basis supporting the remarkable human capacity to effortlessly assemble single words into more complex hierarchical structures, thus enabling the production and comprehension of unbounded arrays of different linguistic expressions. They begin with a brief discussion of language as a biological system that includes a historical sketch of the understanding of language in the (...) brain. The authors provide an overview of the early days of brain‐syntax research in neuropsychology, primarily on the basis of lesion studies. They end with a reflection on the impact that Noam Chomsky's ideas have had on the neuroscience of language. (shrink)

_Schiller versus Fichte_ ist die Geschichte eines Widerstreits zwischen Sinn-Konstellationen im Kern der post-kantischen Philosophie. Die Originalität dieser neuen Interpretation des Verhältnisses zwischen Schiller und Fichte liegt darin, dass der Fokus – im Gegenteil zu den bisherigen Interpretationen – auf den agonistischen Charakter des Verhältnisses liegt. Die agonistische Rekonstruktion dieses Ereignisses der Geschichte der abendländischen Philosophie zeigt, dass der Ursprung des sogenannten Deutschen Idealismus eine Krise bzw. ein Widerstreit zwischen ästhetischer und praktischer Vernunft, zwischen absoluter Dualität und absoluter Einheit als (...) regulativen Prinzipien des Denkens ist. (shrink)

La poeta Gloria Dünkler nació en Pucón, Chile, en 1977. Sus padres se dedicaban a la artesanía, la pesca y la música en la región de la Araucanía. Ella estudió Pedagogía en la Universidad de la Frontera y Bibliotecología y Documentación en la Universidad Tecnológica Metropolitana. Actualmente trabaja en la Biblioteca Central de la Facultad de Ciencias de la Universidad de Chile. Su obra editada está compuesta por Quillaco seducido (Edición de autor, 2003), Füchse von Llafenko (Ediciones Tácitas, 2009), Spandau (...) (Ediciones Tácitas, 2012), Yatagán (Ediciones Tácitas, 2015) y Castrato (Ediciones Tácitas, 2020). Además, poemas suyos fueron incluidos en las antologías Mujeres en la poesía chilena actual (Semejanza, 2000), Desde todo el silencio (Los puños de la paloma, 2008), Comer con la mirada (Desde la gente, 2008) y Doce en punto (UNAM, 2012). La obra de Dünkler ha alcanzado amplio reconocimiento en su país, donde obtuvo tres importantes premios: el de la Academia Chilena de Letras (2009), el Premio Municipal de Literatura de Santiago (2012) y el Premio Pablo Neruda de Poesía Joven (2015). Su obra ha sido traducida al alemán, al polaco y al catalán. (shrink)

Maurizio Ferraris explores how, through the reading of Proust's _In Search of Lost Time_, one can explore memory, art, and society, using the book as a guide for living life.

We offer a critical survey of the most discussed accounts of epistemic peer disagreement that are found in the recent literature. We also sketch an alternative approach in line with a pluralist understanding of epistemic rationality.

There are two no-change objections that can be raised against the B-theory of time. One stems from the observation that in a B-theoretic scenario changes of determinations can only be represented by propositions which have eternal truth values. The other derives from the principle that nothing can vary over a period of time if it doesn’t instantiate a state of change at all the instants of time which compose it. Here I argue that both objections apply to all comparative conceptions (...) of change, regardless of whether they take tense seriously or not. It follows that, contrary to what is widely believed, A-theoretic accounts of time are not immune to no-change objections, just in virtue of being realist about tense. A-theorists must either accept the conclusion that time, according to their account, does not flow, or put forward an account of flow that is not comparative. A number of difficulties with both of these options are discussed. (shrink)

In his genetic phenomenology, Husserl introduces types, pre-predicative frames of experience that guide the perception and cognition of objects. In this essay, I argue that there are two types that are functionally almost identical to Kant’s schemata. To support this conclusion, I first present an interpretation of Kant’s discussion of schemata. I argue that we must see schemata as pure, a priori cognitions that involve only pure intuition, pure concepts of the understanding, and the imagination. I offer two analogies to (...) explain how schemata function to subsume objects under concepts and to anticipate possible objects of experience before moving on to discuss the schema of substance. Next, I present a brief explanation of Husserl’s genetic phenomenology, organizing my presentation around the idea of apperception. This paves the way for a demonstration of how the fundamental type is best understood as standing at the center of a cluster of concepts, including apperception, passive belief, natural bodies, and the one spatio-temporal horizon of experience. I argue that the fundamental type is central to Husserl’s attempt to ground logic in pre-predicative experience. Finally, I compare two specific types with schemata on the grounds cultivated in the previous sections. The first of these types, the fundamental type, functions to pre-predicatively anticipate objects of possible experience, just as schemata do. The second of these types, which is implied by but never discussed in Husserl’s work, serves to mediate between a formal system of rules and an intuitive grasp of the world, just as schemata do. (shrink)

A corpus made by online Canadian newspaper articles, coming from the archives of CBC News, Vice Canada and Huffington Post Canada, and related multimedia contents such us audio interviews, videos and especially links to images and comments shared on Twitter, allows us to reconstruct the debate on the seal hunt that involved Canadian media in 2014. In specific, we propose an interpretation of the pro-sealing discourse by Canadian Inuit and Newfoundlanders as an ironic and incisive answer to the serious United (...) States animal rights activists discourse, explaining how these two different points of view on animals come from a different experience of the environment and a different conception of nature. The image of the seal became the friction point between Western naturalism against Inuit animism: a multinaturalist clash in the North America post-colonial situation. A clash solved by people as Tanya Tagaq and other Inuit artists that belong to these two different semiospheres and thanks to their border placement can allow a dialog between Inuit and North American cultures traducing aesthetic forms, values and meanings. To study the structures of meaning at the base of this clash and iconoclash Iconoclash. Beyond the image-wars in science, religion and art, pp 14–37, ZKM and MIT Press, Boston, 2002) on the artic seal between opposite cultures, it has been necessary to use the socio-semiotic approach with the help of semiotics of culture tools (Lotman in Universe of the mind. A semiotic theory of culture. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1990, Culture and explosion. Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin, 2009]. (shrink)

Las experiencias de justicia transicional en la antigüedad griega muestran hasta qué punto las emociones pueden jugar un papel específico en el restablecimiento social de la memoria, la justicia y la verdad. A partir de un estudio de fuentes clásicas provenientes de Atenas, Dicea y Nacone, el propósito del presente trabajo es identificar la ficción afectiva sobre la que reposan estos marcos institucionales: al proyectar el plano emocional desde los individuos hasta la colectividad, se produce una instalación política del páthos (...) que, mediante la planificación, procura superar los efectos traumáticos de la guerra civil y diseñar una comunidad emocional basada en las virtudes de la reconciliación. (shrink)

A theory of action is fundamental for legal theory, as the law is meant to direct behaviour: it influences the behaviour of agents who can understand the law’s prescriptions and act accordingly. A connection between law and action is assumed by the most diverse approaches to the law; when no reference is made to this connection it is since it appears to be an obvious truism. Let us list just a few examples where this connection appears most clearly.

El texto aborda la idea de poema en Walter Benjamin, aconsiderando tanto el contexto histórico como el literario que da pie a su particular concepción. La obra de arte en general y el poema en particular, suponen una instancia no representable, que permanece en un espacio indefinido, sin embargo, aprehensible mediante una dialéctica que tiene lugar en la propia obra.

According to the form of logical pluralism elaborated by Beall and Restall there is more than one relation of logical consequence. Since they take the relation of logical consequence to reside at the very heart of a logical system, different relations of logical consequence yield different logics. In this paper, we are especially interested in understanding what are the consequences of endorsing Beall and Restall’s version of logical pluralism vis-à-vis the normative guidance that logic is taken to provide to reasoners. (...) In particular, the aim of this paper is threefold. First, in Sections 2 and 3, we offer an exegesis of Beall and Restall’s logical pluralism as a thesis of semantic indeterminacy of our concept of logical consequence – i.e. understood as indeterminacy logical pluralism. Second, in Sections 4 and 5, we elaborate and critically scrutinize three models of semantic indeterminacy that we think are fit to capture Beall and Restall’s indeterminacy logical pluralism. Third, in Section 6, following Beall and Restall’s assumption that the notion of logical consequence has normative significance for deductive reasoning, we raise a series of normative problems for indeterminacy logical pluralism. The overall conclusion that we aim to establish is that Beall and Restall’s indeterminate logical pluralism cannot offer an adequate account of the normative guidance that logic is taken to provide us with in ordinary contexts of reasoning. (shrink)

We argue that the view that we misperceive time as passing is self-undermining.

The visuospatial system integrates inner and outer functional processes, organizing spatial, temporal, and social interactions between the brain, body, and environment. These processes involve sensorimotor networks like the eye–hand circuit, which is especially important to primates, given their reliance on vision and touch as primary sensory modalities and the use of the hands in social and environmental interactions. At the same time, visuospatial cognition is intimately connected with memory, self-awareness, and simulation capacity. In the present article, we review issues associated (...) with investigating visuospatial integration in extinct human groups through the use of anatomical and behavioral data gleaned from the paleontological and archaeological records. In modern humans, paleoneurological analyses have demonstrated noticeable and unique morphological changes in the parietal cortex, a region crucial to visuospatial management. Archaeological data provides information on hand–tool interaction, the spatial behavior of past populations, and their interaction with the environment. Visuospatial integration may represent a critical bridge between extended cognition, self-awareness, and social perception. As such, visuospatial functions are relevant to the hypothesis that human evolution is characterized by changes in brain–body–environment interactions and relations, which enhance integration between internal and external cognitive components through neural plasticity and the development of a specialized embodiment capacity. We therefore advocate the investigation of visuospatial functions in past populations through the paleoneurological study of anatomical elements and archaeological analysis of visuospatial behaviors. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss Priest’s account of change and motion, contrasting it with its more orthodox rival, the Russellian account. The paper is divided in two parts. In first one we take a stance that is more sympathetic to the Russellian view, arguing that Priest’s arguments against it are inconclusive. In the second part, instead, we take a more sympathetic attitude towards Priest’s objections. We argue, however, that if these objections pose insurmountable difficulties to the Russellian account, then they (...) pose the same difficulties also to Priest’s favoured Hegelian account, and for the same reasons. (shrink)

In his In Contradiction (1987), Priest levelled three powerful arguments against the received Russellian view of change and motion. He argued that his preferred paraconsistent theory of change, the Hegelian account, is immune from these objections. Here I argue that these three arguments are sound, but that the Hegelian account falls pray to them too. I conclude, however, that the Hegelian account is in a better position to tackle these challenges.

We present a modal logic called (logic of intention and attempt) in which we can reason about intention dynamics and intentional action execution. By exploiting the expressive power of , we provide a formal analysis of the relation between intention and action and highlight the pivotal role of attempt in action execution. Besides, we deal with the problems of instrumental reasoning and intention persistence.

Jusqu’à récemment, les deux textes écrits par Georges Canguilhem sur l’écologie restaient peu connus. Aujourd’hui, ils sont réunis dans le tome V des Œuvres complètes. Chez Can-guilhem, le sujet de l’écologie est intrinsèquement lié aux concepts de technique et de milieu, dont la généalogie théorique remonte à ses premiers ouvrages des années 1930. Ce qui éclaire ces questions : l’être humain doit-il renoncer aux techniques pour restaurer un équilibre supposé avec la nature, ne serait-il pas plutôt nécessaire de rendre à (...) ses besoins leur priorité sur les intérêts économiques? (shrink)