The traditional Christian version of the Golden Rule, some modern philosophical reformulations, and the Confucian version are compared. It is argued that the Confucian version, in contrast with its Western parallels, is based on shu as bodily or somatic interpersonal care and love, and thus should be understood first of all as a human "way" rather than as a divine rule, a way grounded in the human heart and a way for the human community.

“Thing” and “nothing” are metaphysical themes of thinking for major philosophers both in the West and in East Asia, such as Heidegger, Kant, and Laozi 老子. In light of a discussion of Heidegger’s understanding of thing-ing and no-thing and of his critical interpretation of Kant on the same issue, I shall in this essay reconstruct a Laozian theory of thing and nothing. My conclusion is that thing and nothing are not two “things,” as often assumed by an epistemological approach, but (...) ontologically one thing cut by an absolute limit set up by human rationality which is contained either in our consciousness or in our languages. (shrink)

The problem of ‘transcendence’/‘transcendental’/ ‘transcendent’ runs throughout Heidegger’s Being and Time, and it is central to many of its core concerns. The confusion about the different meanings of using the same words in the history of philosophy from Kant to Heidegger causes not only problems in understanding but also problems in the translation of the philosophical classics, especially in a non-Indo-European language such as Chinese. Through examination of Kant’s conception of the ‘transcendental’ and a critical textual analysis of Heidegger’s reinterpretation (...) of ‘transcendence’ as a temporal ecstatic Dasein’s existence, this essay attempts to show that the problem of transcendence, along with the debates over the Chinese translation of the relevant terms, is not merely a problem in a traditional theory of knowledge or epistemology. Rather, it belongs primarily and essentially to fundamental ontology and thus to Heidegger’s question of Being. (shrink)

This paper is a discussion of three approaches popular in contemporary studies of Confucianism for understanding the relationship between the self and others. I argue that all three of the influential conceptions of self that are prominent in these accounts (the “universal self,” the “organic self,” and the “relational self”) still stand in the shadow of the Indo-European metaphysical traditions of self or are insufficient for going beyond that shadow. Based on the ways in which Chinese characters are generated “genealogically,” (...) I propose an alternative understanding of the Confucian conception of self as a “genealogical self.” Finally, I shall show how this genealogical conception of self leads us to understand Confucian ethics as exemplary and communal rather than absolutely individualistic and normative. (shrink)

The essay examines three major Chinese translations of Heidegger’s Dasein as cizai, yuanzai and qinzai, and their linguistic and philosophical meanings respectively. Looking at these translations individually, I find that each term has its own strengths, and yet none is without drawbacks. Hence, no single one of them could provide a perfect correlation with the meaning and the linguistic composition of the original German word and Heidegger’s Dasein in all aspects. Only through considering all three translations we will get a (...) more adequate picture of the Chinese interpretation and reception of Heidegger’s Dasein. (shrink)