Techniques for resolving some types of inherited mitochondrial diseases have recently been the subject of scientific research, ethical scrutiny, media coverage and regulatory initiatives in the UK. Building on research using eggs from a variety of providers, scientists hope to eradicate maternally transmitted mutations in mitochondrial DNA by transferring the nuclear DNA of a fertilised egg, created by an intending mother at risk of transmitting mitochondrial disease, and her male partner, into an enucleated egg provided by another woman. In this (...) article we examine how egg providers for mitochondrial research and therapy have been represented in stakeholder debates. A systematic review of key documents and parliamentary debates shows that the balance of consideration tilts heavily towards therapeutic egg providers; research egg providers have been ignored and rendered invisible. However, mapping the various designations of therapeutic egg providers shows that their role is so heavily camouflaged that they have only an absent presence in discussions. We explore this puzzling ambivalence towards egg providers whose contributions are necessary to the success of current mitochondrial research and proposed therapies. We suggest that labels that diminish the contributions of egg providers serve certain governance objectives in managing possible future claims about, and by, therapeutic egg providers. We demonstrate that the social positioning of research egg providers is entangled within that of therapeutic egg providers which means that the former can also never receive their due recognition. This article contributes to the wider literature on the governance of new technological interventions. (shrink)

This paper is a critical reflection on the concepts of Responsible Innovation (RI) and Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI). We offer an account of the emergence of these related but different accounts of responsible innovation that have recently been adopted by funders. We further report on our exploration of the knowledge and understanding of these concepts through the views of senior scientists involved in synthetic biology research projects. Though most of our respondents struggled to provide a clear account of RI/RRI (...) we identified that existing “practices of responsibility” include many aspects of RI/RRI but that this often went unrecognized as such. Most respondents associated RI/RRI with risk avoidance. While some visions of RI/RRI see scientists as taking an active role in shaping the future of innovation, we suggest that it is not for such individuals to take decisions alone on the types of futures a society should have available to it. (shrink)

Conventional wisdom has it that there is a class of attitude ascriptions such that in making an ascription of that sort, the ascriber undertakes a commitment to specify the contents of the ascribee’s head in what might be called a notionally sensitive, ascribee-centered way. In making such an ascription, the ascriber is supposed to undertake a commitment to specify the modes of presentation, concepts or notions under which the ascribee cognizes the objects (and properties) that her beliefs are about. Consequently, (...) it is widely supposed that an ascription of the relevant sort will be true just in case it specifies either directly or indirectly both what the ascribee believes and how she believes it. The class of “notionally sensitive” ascriptions has been variously characterized. Quine (1956) calls the class I have in mind the class of notional ascriptions and distinguishes it from the class of relational ascriptions. Others call the relevant class the class of de dicto ascriptions and distinguish it from the class of de re ascriptions. More recently, it has been called the class of notionally loaded ascriptions (Crimmins 1992, 1995). So understood, the class can be contrasted with the class of notionally neutral ascriptions. Just as the class of notional/de dicto/notionally loaded ascriptions is supposed to put at semantic issue the ascribee’s notions/conceptions/modes of presentation, so ascriptions in the relational/de re/notionally neutral class are supposed not to.. (shrink)

This article is a response to McLeod and Baylis (2007) who speculate on the dangers of requesting fresh ‘spare’ embryos from IVF patients for human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research, particularly when those embryos are good enough to be transferred back to the woman. They argue that these embryos should be frozen instead. We explore what is meant by ‘spare’ embryos. We then provide empirical evidence, from a study of embryo donation and of embryo donors' views, to substantiate some of (...) their speculations about the problems associated with requesting fresh embryos. However, we also question whether such problems are resolved by embryo freezing, since further empirical evidence suggests that this raises other social and ethical problems for patients. There is little evidence that the request for embryos for research, in itself, causes patients distress. We suggest, however, that no requests for fresh embryos should be made in the first cycle of IVF treatment. Deferring the request to a later cycle ensures that potential donors are better informed (by experience and reflection) about the possible destinations of their embryos and about the definition of ‘spare embryos’. Both this article, and that by McLeod and Baylis, emphasize the need to consider the views and experiences of embryo donors when evaluating the ethics of embryo donation for hESC research. (shrink)

In October 2015 the UK enacted legislation to permit the clinical use of two cutting edge germline-altering, IVF-based embryonic techniques: pronuclear transfer and maternal spindle transfer. The aim is to use these techniques to prevent the maternal transmission of serious mitochondrial diseases. Major claims have been made about the quality of the debates that preceded this legislation and the significance of those debates for UK decision-making on other biotechnologies, as well as for other countries considering similar legislation. In this article (...) we conduct a systematic analysis of those UK debates and suggest that claims about their quality are over-stated. We identify, and analyse in detail, ten areas where greater clarity, depth and nuance would have produced sharper understandings of the contributions, limitations and wider social impacts of these mitochondrial interventions. We explore the implications of these additional considerations for the protection of all parties involved, should the techniques transfer to clinical applications; the legitimacy of focussing on short-term gains for individuals over public health considerations, and the maintenance and improvement of public trust in medical biotechnologies. We conclude that a more measured evaluation of the content and quality of the UK debates is important and timely: such a critique provides a clearer understanding of the possible, but specific, contributions of these interventions, both in the UK and elsewhere; also, these additional insights can now inform the emerging processes of implementation, regulation and practice of mitochondrial interventions. (shrink)

This paper presents, from the perspectives of both social scientists and microbiologists, a case study of the implementation and practice of Responsible Innovation (RI) in a UK-based synthetic biology project. We highlight the impact of interdisciplinary working and examine the benefits that arise from creating the time and space for shared reflection on research. Our discussions over the course of the project included concerns about the potential escape to the environment of laboratory-constructed genetic material and alternatives to the role that (...) antibiotic resistance genes play in synthetic biology. As a result, the design of a key product of the project was altered in ways that go beyond normal institutional requirements. We highlight our view of the importance of continued interdisciplinary collaboration and the utility of the framework of Responsible Innovation in achieving this. We conclude with observations on the difficulties of sustaining such collaborations. (shrink)

Rampant moral relativism is widely decried as the leading source of the degeneracy of modern life.1 Though I proudly count myself a relativist, I rather doubt that relativism has anything like the cultural influence that its most ardent critics fearfully attribute to it. Much of what gets criticized under the rubric of relativism is often really no such thing. Relativists need not be hedonists, egoists, nihilists or even moral skeptics. Moreover, when it comes to the upper reaches of our intellectual (...) culture, relativism is more often dismissed than defended.2 I don’t deny that in certain literary corners of academe, relativism retains a fashionable post-modern cache.3 But in more sober philosophical circles, the catalog of ills from which relativism is widely thought to suffer is impressive.4 When taken as a characterization of the nature of moral discourse and moral argument, relativism is often thought to be descriptively inadequate. Contra the relativist, we do not treat moral disputes as rationally irresolvable. We do not tolerate all alternative moral “codes” as equally valid. Relativism may be true of merely cultural norms or practices. But morality has a felt universality that makes it quite different in character from a system of merely cultural norms or practices. In the face of morally abhorrent practices, we don’t simply shrug our shoulders and say that while the relevant practices may be wrong for us, they are alright for them. Relativism is sometimes even said to be self-undermining. It makes the very thing it purports to explain – the possibility of rationally intractable disagreements – impossible in the first place. Partly because of its supposedly self-undermining character, relativism is sometimes accused of being a strictly incredible doctrine. Those who profess to be relativists must, if this is true, either be insincere, confused, or self-deceived. Though someone might well sincerely hold the mistaken second-order belief that she believes that she believes that relativism is true, no one, in his or her deepest heart of hearts, sincerely, non selfdeceptively and informedly believes that relativism is true.. (shrink)