This paper explores the relationships between philosophical ethics and literary narratives. The focus on virtues and vices in recent ethics has made narratives more integrally relevant to ethics. Some of the best literature displays moral character in richer ways than philosophy alone has resources to do, but philosophy brings to its description a schematic precision that narrative alone cannot supply. As traits of character, virtues differ from events like the actions, thoughts, emotions, and episodic desires that express the traits; traits (...) are not episodes, but dispositions, and so require cumulative diachronic representation of such episodes. The paper illustrates this point particularly with respect to emotions. It ends with reflections on the constitutive narratives by which the grammar of the virtues of some moral traditions, such as Judaism and Christianity, is shaped. (shrink)

Expressions of gratitude abound. Hardly a book is published that does not include in its preface or acknowledgments some variation on, “I am grateful to…for…” Indeed, most achievements come to be only through the help of others. We value the benevolence of others, and when we—or our loved ones—are the recipients of benevolence, our emotional response is often one of gratitude. -/- But, are we bound to the requirement of ‘repaying’ our benefactors in some way? If we are, and there (...) are—as ordinary language suggests—debts of gratitude, what kind of debts are these? Does the appropriateness of my gratitude require that my benefactor in fact intended to benefit me (in just the way she did)? Is there a difference between feeling grateful and being grateful? Is a precondition of my being grateful to another that I respect her? Do we owe a special sort of gratitude to those who have shaped us into the persons we are? What are the psychological and normative relations between gratitude the emotion, and gratitude the virtue? -/- These are among the questions carefully addressed in The Moral Psychology of Gratitude. This volume provides readers with the state-of-the-art in research on gratitude. It does so in the form of sixteen never-before published articles on the emotion by leading voices in philosophy and the sciences of the mind. (shrink)

Another Essay on Chaucer's Criseyde might seem as redundant as another essay on Hamlet, whose bibliographer discouragingly warns us to expect a new pronouncement every week or so. Perhaps Criseyde would be almost as popular a subject as Hamlet if readers of Chaucer were as numerous as readers of Shakespeare. But she is popular enough already. Even now there is not much hope of discovering anything in Chaucer's poem that has not been noted by someone in the long line of (...) scholars to whom this essay is much indebted, though it may disagree with their conclusions. I believe, however, that the assembling of details and the resultant understanding of the infidelity here presented are not altogether derivative. If the argument is a poor thing, it is at least my own. jQuery.click { event.preventDefault(); }). (shrink)

This paper clarifies how stability of character is a good thing and how it is related to being open to change for the better by considering four ways character can be stable or unstable and four stable characteristics that are forms of openness to improvement of character.