Over the past 40 years, scholars and practitioners of public relations have often cast public relations workers in the role of the public relations-person-as-corporate-conscience. This work, however, maintains that this construct is so problematic that invoking it is of negligible use in addressing ethical issues that emerge during a crisis. In fact, a complex crisis, such as the Jahi McMath “brain death” case at Children’s Hospital Oakland, demonstrates the need to abandon the PRPaCC construct to better engage affected stakeholders, including (...) “outsiders” to the organization, who often determine whether an organization is facing a crisis. Through an examination of both the concept of the PRPaCC and the McMath crisis, this work makes the case for moving beyond the PRPaCC construct in favor of a more modest role for the public relations person: facilitating widespread ethical deliberation and discussion throughout an organization, potentially helping the organization alleviate concerns that contribute to crises. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the prevailing assumption that there is a right to procreate and question whether there exists a coherent notion of such a right. I argue that we should question any and all procreative activities, not just alternative procreative means and contexts. I suggest that clinging to the assumption of a right to procreate prevents serious scrutiny of reproductive behavior and that, instead of continuing to embrace this assumption, attempts should be made to provide a proper foundation (...) for it. I argue that the focus of procreative activities and discourse on reproductive ethics should be on obligations instead of rights, as rights talk tends to obfuscate recognition of obligations toward others, particularly those who bear the most significant burdens of the procreative process. I examine some possible foundations of a right to procreate as well as John Robertson’s thoughtful account of “procreative liberty” but conclude that at the present time there exists no compelling account of a right to procreate. Finally, I conclude that in the absence of a satisfactory account of a right to procreate, we should refrain from grounding practices or polices on the assumption that there is such a right. (shrink)

This dissertation explores the notion of a right to reproduce in the context of assisted reproductive technologies and argues that there are no good arguments supporting the notion of a genuine, independent right to reproduce. Although it is generally believed to be self-evident that there is a right to reproduce, I question this line of thinking and expose the fact that there is no adequate demonstration of a right to reproduce. Once I point out that there is no adequate basis (...) for a so-called right to reproduce, I proceed to argue that the proper emphasis in reproductive ethics is on obligations toward offspring rather than a so-called right to reproduce. Once the focus shifts to that of obligations toward offspring, it becomes clear that the emphasis on the supposed right to reproduce has resulted in avoidable harm to offspring, instances of morally impermissible procreation, and the rise of a lucrative, morally suspect fertility industry. I argue that it is necessary to take another look at both old-fashioned and assisted procreation under the microscope of obligation in order to point out how the current state of affairs, especially in the ART industry, has gone awry. Ultimately, I show that there should be greater focus on protecting the present and future autonomy of all persons and that this requires greater efforts to educate the public regarding their reproductive responsibility, as well as radical revisions of the ART industry, particularly in the United States. (shrink)

Academic-industry collaborations and the conflicts of interest (COI) arising out of them are not new. However, as industry funding for research in the life and health sciences has increased and scandals involving financial COI are brought to the public’s attention, demands for disclosure have grown. In a March 2008 American Council on Science and Health report by Ronald Bailey, he argues that the focus on COI—especially financial COI—is obsessive and likely to be more detrimental to scientific progress and public health (...) than COI themselves. In response, we argue that downplaying the potential negative impact of COI arising out of academic-industry relationships is no less harmful than overreacting to it. (shrink)