Many philosophers have contended that (traditional) theism or supernaturalism suffers from what can properly be called the Problem of Divine Hiddenness (the PDH ). [See Howard-Snyder and Moser 2002]. Moreover, it is the contention of many proponents of the PDH that this “problem,” if, indeed, not just a component of the “problem of evil,” bears a striking similarity to the latter. Specifically, at the heart of this ostensible difficulty for theism is that Divine “Hiddenness,” like pain and suffering—or at least (...) pain and suffering in the amount that the world contains—is precisely the opposite of what one would expect if there existed a (maximally great) supernatural Person. Accordingly, it is maintained by proponents of the PDH that supernaturalism is disconfirmed by the relevant “problem.” The aim of this essay is to establish that there is more than ample metaphysical warrant (of a sort overlooked thus far) for maintaining that the “hiddenness” of God is exactly what should be expected if theism is true. Thus, the conclusion we hope to secure is that the PDH has considerably less to recommend it than its proponents have thought, and, accordingly, that it fails to constitute an effective threat to supernaturalism. (shrink)

Central to Spinozism is the thesis that the immanence of the Divine Substance in the cosmos (in natural objects) is – like the immanence of the dancer in the dance –maximal or total. Just as the dance consists entirely of the dancer in aesthetically‐stylized motion, so the domain of nature is nothing in addition to God in cosmic guise. Accordingly, natural objects constitute modes of God. Hence, Spinozism and (traditional) theism are obviously irreconcilable. For it is indispensable to theism that (...) the immanence of God in the cosmos is not maximal; rather, that natural objects are distinct from the Divine Substance. Now it has standardly been presupposed by theists (and many others) that natural objects could not be distinct from God without being ontologically exterior to God; thus, that theism would readily collapse into Spinozism if the cosmos was interior to the Divine Substance. It seems to me that this is a long‐standing mistake. After demonstrating that there is probative warrant for maintaining that theism requires the interiority of natural objects to God, there is shown to be more than adequate justification for denying that this necessitates the collapse of theism into Spinozism. (shrink)

The doctrine of Tzimzum (or divine “withdrawal”) occupies pride of place in the Jewish mystical tradition as a response to what is arguably the chief theological or metaphysical concern of that tradition: namely, how God’s Infinity or Absolute Unlimitedness does not preclude the existence of a distinct domain of finite being. Alternatively, how can it be that God, by virtue of His Maximal Plenteousness, does not exhaust the whole of Reality? I attempt to show that, while a plausible argument - (...) one that does not involve the idea of Tzimzum --- can be mounted against this “pantheism” problem, the doctrine of Tzimzum has considerable force as the nucleus of a theodicy. (shrink)

The doctrine of Tzimzum (or divine “withdrawal”) occupies pride of place in the Jewish mystical tradition as a response to what is arguably the chief theological or metaphysical concern of that tradition: namely, how God’s Infinity or Absolute Unlimitedness does not preclude the existence of a distinct domain of finite being. Alternatively, how can it be that God, by virtue of His Maximal Plenteousness, does not exhaust the whole of Reality? I attempt to show that, while a plausible argument - (...) one that does not involve the idea of Tzimzum --- can be mounted against this “pantheism” problem, the doctrine of Tzimzum has considerable force as the nucleus of a theodicy. (shrink)

I am grateful to Mr Levine for his careful and accurate rendering of the thesis which I presented and defended in my first paper on the topic of ‘self-authenticating religious experience’. As should be reasonably clear from his remarks, I defended therein the negative and somewhat modest epistemological thesis that even if it is inconceivable for there to occur self-authenticating experience of God, it is far from obvious that such is the case. Hence, it seems to me that the claim (...) of more than a few theistic mystics to have had such experience is entitled to something more than the rather cavalier rejection it has received at the hands of many ‘tough-minded’ epistemologists of religion. (shrink)

While proponents of traditional theism obviously reject the “pantheistic” metaphysic that there is nothingwhich is ultimately distinct from God—i.e., that the Divine Substance exhausts the whole of Reality—it seems tome that the following question is yet properly to be addressed: given that the doctrine of God’s infinity or absolute unlimitedness is no less axiomatic or nonnegotiably foundational to traditional theism than it is to the pantheistic interpretation of reality, how can traditional theists justifiably deny that the Divine Substance exhausts the (...) whole of Reality? What acceptable basis do traditional theists have—given their presupposition that God is absolutely unlimited—for denying the long-standing contention of Spinoza and Spinozists that the Divine Being of canonical Judeo-Christian belief could not ultimately fail to be all-inclusive? (shrink)

While proponents of traditional theism obviously reject the “pantheistic” metaphysic that there is nothingwhich is ultimately distinct from God—i.e., that the Divine Substance exhausts the whole of Reality—it seems tome that the following question is yet properly to be addressed: given that the doctrine of God’s infinity or absolute unlimitedness is no less axiomatic or nonnegotiably foundational to traditional theism than it is to the pantheistic interpretation of reality, how can traditional theists justifiably deny that the Divine Substance exhausts the (...) whole of Reality? What acceptable basis do traditional theists have—given their presupposition that God is absolutely unlimited—for denying the long-standing contention of Spinoza and Spinozists that the Divine Being of canonical Judeo-Christian belief could not ultimately fail to be all-inclusive? (shrink)

This anthology deserves a big scholarly cheer from those philosophers—on the increase, I believe—who regard the Bishop of Cloyne as a theistic metaphysician and epistemologist of perception of the first importance. Also, these essays should prove beneficial to those benighted ‘educated laymen’ whose understanding of Immaterialism is exhausted by Samuel Johnson’s kicking of the stone.