In this chapter, we argue that Du Châtelet’s account of motion is an important contribution to the history of the absolute versus relative motion debate. The arguments we lay out have two main strands. First, we clarify Du Châtelet’s threefold taxonomy of motion, using Musschenbroek as a useful Newtonian foil and showing that the terminological affinity between the two is only apparent. Then, we assess Du Châtelet’s account in light of the conceptual, epistemological, and ontological challenges posed by Newton to (...) any relational theory of motion. What we find is that, although Du Châtelet does not meet all the challenges to their full extent, her account of motion is adequate for the goal of the Principia: determining the true motions in our planetary system. (shrink)

The definitions of yu 宇 and zhou 宙 in the “Gengsang Chu 庚桑楚” chapter of the Zhuangzi have been cited as the earliest definitions of space and time in the Chinese philosophical tradition. However, careful analysis of chosen modern translations reveals that the definitions entail rather obscure relationships between the Dao and space and time. I argue that the obscurity is not inherent in the text, but arises from the practice of rendering yu and zhou as the conceptual counterparts of (...) space and time or related concepts. Instead, I propose that we leave the terms untranslated. This practice would not only forestall interpretive difficulties concerning the Dao’s relations to space and time, but it would also preserve the Zhuangzist yu and zhou as two distinctive, ontic notions that indicate the Dao’s indeterminate modes of existence, a unique feature of the Zhuangzi. (shrink)