With the gradual deepening of environmental problems and the increase in consumer awareness of environmental protection, many enterprises have already begun to pay attention to green supply chain management. However, the price of green products is higher than that of nongreen products, which is an enormous challenge for many small- or medium-sized enterprises. To study the pricing and coordination of green supply chains under capital constraints, a model consisting of a manufacturer and a capital-constrained retailer is established; the manufacturer invests (...) in green products and provides a deferred payment contract. Setting the situation without capital constraints as a benchmark, this study explores the impact of the retailer’s capital constraints on the manufacturer’s product greenness design; an interesting result shows that deferred payment can help encourage the retailer to order more products and improve the profit of the manufacturer and the efficiency of the entire supply chain as well as the product’s greenness level simultaneously. However, the profit of the retailer will be hurt by the deferred payment contract. Therefore, to guarantee the profit of the entire channel and to make the two agents obtain a win-win outcome, a new two-way revenue-sharing contract is designed to coordinate the green supply chain. (shrink)

Game experiments designed to test the effectiveness of reward and/or punishment incentives in promoting cooperative behavior among their participants are quite common. Results from two such recent experiments conducted in Beijing, based on the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game and Public Goods Game respectively, are summarized here. The unexpected empirical outcomes for the repeated PD game, that cooperation actually decreased when the participants had the option of using a costly punishment strategy and that participants who used costly punishment in some round (...) of the repeated game often did so in the first round, are discussed in terms of differences in attitudes toward reputation in Chinese culture compared to other locations (mostly in Western society) where similar experiments have been conducted. The second experiment models an institution providing incentives to increase contribution levels (i.e., cooperation) to the public good. The results show that combined institutional reward and punishment is the most effective means to increase cooperation, followed by a scheme using only punishment. It is shown how these empirical results are related to the theoretical predictions that assume players play rationally by optimizing their personal payoff given their opponents’ actions in these multi-player games. (shrink)

Human contact networks constitute a multitude of individuals and pairwise contacts among them. However, the dynamic nature, which generates the evolution of human contact networks, of contact patterns is unknown yet. Here, we analyse three empirical datasets and identify two crucial mechanisms of the evolution of temporal human contact networks, i.e., the activity state transition laws for an individual to be socially active and the contact establishment mechanism that active individuals adopt. We consider both of the two mechanisms to propose (...) a temporal network model, the so-called memory-driven model, of human contact networks. Then, we study the susceptible-infected spreading processes on empirical human contact networks as well as four corresponding temporal network models and compare the full prevalence time of SI processes with various infection rates on the networks. The full prevalence time of SI processes in the MD model is the same as that in real-world human contact networks. Moreover, we find that the individual activity state transition promotes the spreading process, while the contact establishment of active individuals suppresses the prevalence. Besides, we observe that individuals who establish social ties with a small exploring rate are still able to induce an endemic which prevails in the networks. The study offers new insights to predict and control the diffusion processes on networks. (shrink)