Philosophical writing on the welfare state has taken a defensive turn in recent years, largely in response to two related phenomena: the re-emergence of pro-market ideologies in the larger political culture and the imperiled condition of real world welfare states in a global economy in which national governments have diminishing capacities for shaping the social and economic lives of their citizens. But thanks in part to the tireless advocacy of Philippe Van Parijs, an even more radically redistributive form of public (...) provision than the welfare state has come onto the intellectual agenda—and the political agenda too, at least in Belgium and the Netherlands. Van Parijs proposes that all citizens be accorded an unconditional “basic income grant” as large as is compatible with the need to generate as much wealth as possible for redistribution. By now, this idea has many defenders. It also boasts a genealogy extending back to such writers as Tom Paine, François Huet, Edward Bellamy and G. D. H. Cole. But Van Parijs has become its best-known and most adept philosophical proponent, and this book represents his most sustained effort to date to investigate its normative foundations. (shrink)

It is universally agreed that involuntary unemployment is an evil for unemployed individuals, who lose both income and the non-pecuniary benefits of paid employment, and for society, which loses the productive labor that the unemployed are unable to expend. It is nearly as widely agreed that there is at least a prima-facie case for alleviating this evil – for reasons of justice and/or benevolence and/or social order. Finally, there is little doubt that the evils of involuntary unemployment cannot be adequately (...) addressed in contemporary societies without state intervention – whether through monetary or fiscal policies, cash payments or other subsidies to the unemployed, direct provision of employment by the state, or some combination of these measures. (shrink)

This bold and unabashedly utopian book advances the thesis that Marx's notion of communism is a defensible, normative ideal. However, unlike many others who have written in this area, Levine applies the tools and techniques of analytic philosophy to formulate and defend his radical, political programme. The argument proceeds by filtering the ideals and institutions of Marxism through Rousseau's notion of the 'general will'. Once Rousseau's ideas are properly understood it is possible to construct a community of equals who share (...) some vision of a common good that can be achieved and maintained through cooperation or coordination that is at once both voluntary and authoritative. The book engages with liberal theory in order to establish its differences from Rousseauean-Marxian political theory. This provocative book will be of particular interest to political philosophers and political scientists concerned with Marxism, socialist theory and democratic theory. (shrink)

It is widely held that in the eighteenth and nineteenth and centuries history came into its own as a proper object of scientific scrutiny, and that the work of Darwin and Marx was decisive in this regard. We readily concede the revolutionary character of Darwinism and Marxism in relation to earlier accounts of natural and human history. And we agree too, as is widely supposed, that there are important conceptual affinities joining Darwin's theory of evolution and Marx's theory of history. (...) However, it has not been sufficiently appreciated how these theories differ-precisely in the sense they count as historical. Evolutionary theory and historical materialism exemplify different strategies for making history an object of theoretical investigation. By reflecting on these differences, we can gain some purchase on the kind of theory historical materialism is and appreciate the very special sense in which Marx did indeed construct an historical theory. (shrink)

In our essay ‘What’s Historical About Historical Materialism?’, we drew two contrasts between the Darwinian theory of evolution (ET) and the Marxist theory of historical materialism (HM).1 We described the former as a ‘micro-theory’ and the latter as a ‘macro-theory’. We also argued that, in Darwinian theory, evolution is driven by exogenous forces, specifically, by natural selection induced by environmental factors; whereas historical materialism sees the transformation of a society from feudalism to capitalism and then to socialism as a consequence (...) of an endogenous process, involving ‘contradictions’ between forces and relations of production and class struggle. Nolan has taken issue with both of these contrasts; his view is that the two theories are more similar than our account allows. (shrink)

For more than two decades, C. B. Macpherson has waged a relentless campaign to expose and critize the ‘possessive individualist’ assumptions of classical and liberal democratictheory. This new book —a collection of essays, including several not previously published —gives a clear focus to this campaign and provides the fullest expression to date of its positive side: the elaboration of a social philosophy incorporating liberal values but free from possessive individualist assumptions. What is defective in the assumptions is less the internal (...) theoretical problems they generate than that they have become historically outmoded. For Macpherson, liberal democracy is historically — even politically — inadequate, before it is theoretically inadequate. It is inadequate for us — now — because it rests on assumptions we no longer need, assumptions that have ceased to be historically progressive. However, liberal democracy is not, as surgeons would say, beyond operation. On Macpherson's view, nearly everything that is attractive in liberal theory can be salvaged. Democratic Theory is appropriately subtitled: Essays in Retrieval. (shrink)

Much as what we now call ‘the Marxism of the Second International’ long ago passed from the scene, the Age of ‘Western Marxism’ has apparently come to an end. Internal theoretical developments, changes in intellectual culture and, above all, political circumstances have joined together to hasten the demise of this episode in the history of radical theory. It would be instructive to trace the trajectory of Western Marxism, and to reflect on the political conditions for its decline. In both Western (...) and Eastern Europe, Marxian politics has been in crisis at least since the watershed year of 1968, and in disarray for more than a decade. Western Marxism has always been joined programatically to currents within these political movements and has suffered grave, indeed fatal, damage in consequence. But it is not my intention to reflect on the vicissitudes of Western Marxism here. What follows will consider instead a style of theorizing that has effectively superceded Western Marxism, just as Western Marxism earlier replaced the Marxism of the Second International. This new kind of radical theory is widely designated—approvingly by some, disparagingly by others—‘analytical Marxism.’. (shrink)

In the decade after the death of Hegel in 1833, a group of young philosophers sought to extend some of Hegel’s ideas to criticize contemporary thought and society. These were the so-called “Young Hegelians,” which included the young Karl Marx. With interest in Marx and Marxism on the wane, interest in the Young Hegelians has also subsided. That is unfortunate, since the Young Hegelians have much to teach us. This paper recounts the Young Hegelians’ critique of religion, beginning with that (...) of Ludwig Feuerbach in his seminal work, The Essence of Christianity. (shrink)

In what follows, “persons” are ideal-typical concepts of human beings, deployed expressly or supposed implicitly in particular theoretical contexts. Thus, the person of Kantian moral philosophy is a pure bearer of moral predicates, bereft of all properties that empirically distinguish human beings from one another: properties that, in Kant's view, are irrelevant to moral deliberation. No man or woman, actual or possible, could be so starkly featureless. But Kant's aim was not to describe human beings in actual or possible deliberations, (...) but moral agency as such. Similarly, homo oeconomicus, economic man, is not a composite man or woman, but also a person, a theoretical construct introduced for explanatory purposes in models of economic behavior. My aim is to investigate capitalist persons: ideal-typical concepts of human beings deployed in justifying theories of capitalist property relations. I shall identify two capitalist persons, and impugn one of them. To situate my position historically, I call the impugned person Lockean, and the other Kantian. It is tempting to designate the Lockean person “ the capitalist person.” However, this characterization would be misleading. Justifying theories of capitalism can employ either concept, and both can serve in accounts of socialist economies. Nevertheless, the Lockean person is tendentially procapitalist while the Kantian person is not. What follows is therefore relevant to the broader capitalism/socialism debate. To fault the Lockean person is not quite to fault capitalism itself. But a case against the Lockean person, if successful, would undermine an important strain of procapitalist argument. More importantly, the considerations I will adduce suggest a way of thinking about distributive justice and, ultimately, an ideal of equality that socialism, but not capitalism, can in principle accommodate. (shrink)

_Engaging Political Philosophy_ investigates the political philosophies of Hobbes, Rousseau, Locke, Mill, Rawls, and Marx and reveals the scope and limits of the philosophical tradition they helped to forge. Investigates the political philosophies of Hobbes, Rousseau, Locke, Mill, Rawls, and Marx. Reveals the scope and limits of the philosophical tradition they helped to forge. Provides a cohesive narrative about modern political philosophy. Serves as both an accessible introduction and an interesting, original interpretation of ideas that have influenced our society.

Atheism: young Hegelian style -- A social thing -- The tenacity of an illusion -- Beyond God and evil -- The liberal turn -- A precarious left.

Human history is a history of the domination of some groups by others, sustained in part by the willing subordination of the members of dominated groups. How can this remarkable fact be explained? On Michael Rosen’s telling, some of the best political theorists of the early modern period, from Machiavelli through Rousseau and Hume, grappled with this question. But it was, of course, in Marx’s work that the problem of voluntary servitude received its most philosophically trenchant and historically influential treatment. (...) Rosen’s central claim is that Marx ultimately failed to explain this phenomenon satisfactorily. He does think that at least one self-described Marxist, Walter Benjamin, advanced promising suggestions, and he concludes On Voluntary Servitude with his own sketch of a solution, drawing in part on Jon Elster’s reconstructions of Marxist positions. But, as Rosen makes painfully clear, we are still some way from a full understanding of why people voluntarily accept forms of political domination opposed to their own interests. (shrink)

Written by renowned political philosopher Andrew Levine, _Political Keywords_ guides readers through today’s most commonly used- and misused- political terminology. A much-needed dictionary of contemporary political vernacular from “alienation” to “Zionism” Defines the most important political keywords, i.e. the often-confusing terms that are used to describe our politics Refamiliarizes the reader with today’s most commonly used and misused terms, thus clarifying the current political landscape Assumes no prior academic background in politics Includes extensive cross-referencing, suggested further readings, and a comprehensive (...) glossary Provides the ideal guide to navigating a landscape of dangerously vague terms. (shrink)

On 5 Nivôse of the Year II, addressing the National Assembly on behalf of the Committee of Public Safety, Robespierre declared: “The theory of revolutionary government is as new as the revolution that has brought it about. It should not be sought in the books of political writers, who have not foreseen this revolution, nor in the laws of tyrants, who content to abuse their power, are little concerned to investigate its legitimacy.” It is tempting to suppose Robespierre is exaggerating. (...) Whatever the relation of revolutionary government to “the laws of tyrants,” Robespierre's ties to the republican tradition in political philosophy, and especially to Rousseau, are striking and nearly everywhere acknowledged, not least by Robespierre himself. However, I am not concerned here with the question of Rousseau's influence upon Robespierre, but with the rather different question of conceptual affinity. Even if Robespierre's intent were just to put The Social Contract into practice, it is still appropriate to ask whether Robespierre is a Rousseauean. (shrink)

On 5 Nivôse of the Year II, addressing the National Assembly on behalf of the Committee of Public Safety, Robespierre declared: “The theory of revolutionary government is as new as the revolution that has brought it about. It should not be sought in the books of political writers, who have not foreseen this revolution, nor in the laws of tyrants, who content to abuse their power, are little concerned to investigate its legitimacy.” It is tempting to suppose Robespierre is exaggerating. (...) Whatever the relation of revolutionary government to “the laws of tyrants,” Robespierre's ties to the republican tradition in political philosophy, and especially to Rousseau, are striking and nearly everywhere acknowledged, not least by Robespierre himself. However, I am not concerned here with the question of Rousseau's influence upon Robespierre, but with the rather different question of conceptual affinity. Even if Robespierre's intent were just to put The Social Contract into practice, it is still appropriate to ask whether Robespierre is a Rousseauean. (shrink)