Is there a theoretically interesting notion that is a natural extension of the concept of rigidity to general terms? Such a notion ought to satisfy two Kripkean conditions. First, it must apply to typical general terms for natural kinds, stuffs, and phenomena, and fail to apply to most other general terms. Second, true 'identification sentences' (such as 'Cats are animals') containing general terms that the notion applies to must be necessary. I explore a natural extension of the notion of rigidity (...) to general terms, the notion of an essentialist predicate. I argue that, under natural assumptions, this notion satisfies the two Kripkean conditions. (shrink)

In reply to Arif Ahmed, I argue that the apparatus of essentiality and qualified and unqualified possibilist identifications, developed in my paper 'Rigidity and Essentiality', can be used to provide a flawless reconstruction of several Kripkean ideas about the semantics of typical natural kind predicates, the essence of natural kinds, the contingency of usual descriptive identifications, and the arguments against psychophysical identity theories.