There is a long tradition of arguing that design and science are importantly different. One such argument is that the separation of science and design is an implication that can be drawn from the Simon–Kroes model of the nature of technical artifacts. This paper argues that the Simon–Kroes model does not imply a radical separation between science and design: if we accept the Simon–Kroes model of the nature of technical artifacts and their production, then we must also accept that all (...) the sciences also produce technical artifacts, and in importantly similar ways. Moreover, the placing of both science and design in a naturalist framework reinforces this conclusion and opens up new vistas for synergetic cross-disciplinary discussion of design and methodology. (shrink)

We examine the claim that design is demarcated from science by having wicked problems while science does not and argue that it is wrong. We examine each of the ten features Rittel and Weber hold to be characteristic of wicked problems and show that they derive from three general sources common to science and design: agent finitude, system complexity and problem normativity, and play analogous roles in each. This provides the basis for a common core cognitive process to design and (...) science. Underlying our arguments is a shift to a strategic problem-solving conception of method in both disciplines that opens up new opportunities for synergetic cross-disciplinary research and practice. (shrink)

When the U.S. conducts warfare, elements of a force are drawn from different services and work together as a single team to accomplish an assigned mission. To achieve such unified action, it is necessary that the doctrines governing the actions of members of specific services be both consistent with and subservient to joint Doctrine. Because warfighting today increasingly involves not only live forces but also automated systems, unified action requires that information technology that is used in joint warfare must be (...) aligned with joint doctrine. It requires also that the separate information systems used by the different elements of a joint force must be interoperable, in the sense that data and information that is generated by each element must be usable (understandable, processable) by all the other elements that need them. Currently, such interoperability is impeded by multiple inconsistencies among the different data and software standards used by warfighters. We describe here the on-going project of creating a Joint Doctrine Ontology (JDO), which uses joint doctrine to provide shared computer-accessible content valid for any field of military endeavor, organization, and information system. JDO addresses the two previously mentioned requirements of unified action by providing a widely applicable benchmark for use by developers of information systems that will both guarantee alignment with joint doctrine and support interoperability. (shrink)

Kripke and putnam have argued that metaphysical necessity is truth in all possible worlds, Hence is a kind of logica necessity; it is this claim I argue against. My argument proceeds by way of my considering and elaborating an example to show that although 'gold has atomic number 79' be counted a metaphysically necessary truth, There is a possible world in which it is false; it turns out to be for all I show here at most a physical necessity, True (...) in all those worlds structurally similar to the actual world. (shrink)

My early promise to answer Dummett's criticisms has been kept: both general criticisms of Goodman's constructional method and particular criticisms of specific aspects of the system developed in SA have been met. The general conclusion has to be that Dummett in his review, and in his elaborations in his two later articles, is not a reliable guide to SA itself, or to its significance. Those whom I hypothesized as having left their copies of SA unread on the basis of Dummett's (...) unfavourable judgment should now, even if belatedly, read them. (shrink)