Neural devices have the capacity to enable users to regain abilities lost due to disease or injury – for instance, a deep brain stimulator (DBS) that allows a person with Parkinson’s disease to regain the ability to fluently perform movements or a Brain Computer Interface (BCI) that enables a person with spinal cord injury to control a robotic arm. While users recognize and appreciate the technologies’ capacity to maintain or restore their capabilities, the neuroethics literature is replete with examples of (...) concerns expressed about agentive capacities: A perceived lack of control over the movement of a robotic arm might result in an altered sense of feeling responsible for that movement. Clinicians or researchers being able to record and access detailed information of a person’s brain might raise privacy concerns. A disconnect between previous, current, and future understandings of the self might result in a sense of alienation. The ability to receive and interpret sensory feedback might change whether someone trusts the implanted device or themselves. Inquiries into the nature of these concerns and how to mitigate them has produced scholarship that often emphasizes one issue – responsibility, privacy, authenticity, or trust – selectively. However, we believe that examining these ethical dimensions separately fails to capture a key aspect of the experience of living with a neural device. In exploring their interrelations, we argue that their mutual significance for neuroethical research can be adequately captured if they are described under a unified heading of agency. On these grounds, we propose an “Agency Map” which brings together the diverse neuroethical dimensions and their interrelations into a comprehensive framework. With this, we offer a theoretically-grounded approach to understanding how these various dimensions are interwoven in an individual’s experience of agency. (shrink)

Deep Brain Stimulation is an FDA-approved treatment for the symptoms of Parkinson's disease, essential tremor, dystonia, and epilepsy—with experimental use for mood disorders. DBS systems consist of a signal generator, typically implanted in the user's chest, that sends impulses to electrodes implanted in select areas of the user's brain. These signals change the activity of areas of the brain associated with unwanted symptoms. Several research groups have begun trials to use DBS as a treatment for psychiatric disorders. DBS, however, comes (...) with a... (shrink)

Novel neurotechnologies, like deep brain stimulation and brain‐computer interface, offer great hope for treating, curing, and preventing disease, but raise important questions about effects these devices may have on human identity, authenticity, and autonomy. After briefly assessing recent narrative work in these areas, we show that agency is a phenomenon key to all three goods and highlight the ways in which neural devices can help to draw attention to the relational nature of our agency. Drawing on insights from disability theory, (...) we argue that neural devices provide a kind of agential assistance, similar to that provided by caregivers, family, and others. As such, users and devices participate in a kind of co‐agency. We conclude by suggesting the need for developing relational agency‐competencies—skills for reflecting on the influence of devices on agency, for adapting to novel circumstances ushered in by devices, and for incorporating the feedback of loved ones and others about device effects on agency. (shrink)

In this article, we focus on the concept of leadership ethics and make observations about transformational, transactional and servant leadership. We consider differences in how each definition of leadership outlines what the leader is supposed to achieve, and how the leader treats people in the organization while striving to achieve the organization's goals. We also consider which leadership styles are likely to be more popular in organizations that strive to maximize short run profits. Our paper does not tout or degrade (...) any of these leadership theories. Instead, it points out which theories allow reason to play more than a minimal role in ethical decision-making, as well as those that are most consistent with a firm's desire to achieve efficiency in the short run. We explain our view that the way leadership is practiced in large, bureaucratic organizations suggests that ethics is often absent from the leader's decision-making process. Consequently, we suggest that before we engage in a meaningful dialogue about what kind of leaders we might really want in business, we must consider how much short-run profit we are willing to forego in exchange for more ethical corporate cultures. (shrink)

This essay has its origin in a project on the globalization of science that rediscovered the wisdom of past research practices through the technology of the future. The main argument of this essay is that a convergence of digital video technologies with practices of social surveillance portends a methodological shift towards a new variety of qualitative methodology. Digital video is changing the way that students of the social world practice their craft, offering not just new ways of presenting but new (...) ways of practicing field research. We introduce concepts of the fluid wall and videoactive context to emphasize that the camera is an actor in the research process, and both behaviour and observation occur in both directions--in front of and behind the camera. While these practices and procedures are novel in some ways, they may also be viewed as old methods in the context of new instruments for recording as well as a new social understanding of these instruments. Since new technologies interact with the social context, the digital video methods we discuss in this essay are likely to become increasingly important for generations to come. We provide an overview of the use of digital video in research practice and present an account of the use of digital video methodology in Chile. (shrink)

This chapter explores the question of whether intelligent machines like WALL.E and EVE could potentially be real. It also considers the more fundamental question of whether artificial intelligence is a possibility. WALL.E was significantly different from previous Pixar films in that its central characters – the intelligent machines WALL.E and EVE – were depicted as potentially real, given enough time and technology. To be sure, previous Pixar films presented people with intelligent characters: intelligent toys, intelligent animals, and even anthropomorphized intelligent (...) automobiles. With the notions of change and stability in hand, one can say that natural things have an intrinsic principle which accounts for (that is, causes) their being potentially or actually what they are. Like the Axiom, WALL.E and EVE are artificial because their formal causes are not intrinsic. Like the Axiom, their formal causes are imposed from outside. (shrink)

Haeusermann et al. (2023) provide a valuable ethnographic window into how RNS device users understand themselves in relation to refractory epilepsy, the medications for it, and the use of the impla...