The editor of this book has put together here a very manageable selection from the published articles of C. S. Peirce and has prefaced it with his own very fine 42-page introduction. Being published articles, these have the advantages of being those which Peirce himself thought to be complete. Moreover, they are also thus able to be arranged chronologically and topically. This Moore does by including articles which fall into four major groups: 1) On epistemology, from The Journal of Speculative (...) Philosophy, 1868; 2) On Peirce’s early pragmatism and on the nature of scientific inquiry, from Popular Science Monthly, 1873-1878; 3) On Peirce’s basic metaphysics, from The Monist, 1891-1893; and 4) On his later pragmatism, from The Monist, 1905-1906. In his introduction, the editor summarizes and interrelates some of the key questions in Peirce’s philosophy and in these writings—questions on the nature of potentiality, the validity of the process of scientific inquiry, and the problem of the definition of concepts. Much of this treatment revolves around Peirce’s grappling with the key problem of the nature of universals. In the medieval dispute between the extreme realists and the nominalists, Peirce takes a middle moderate realist position, "that the referent of a concept is to be found in the experience of a specific object". On either of the other views, scientific knowledge would be impossible. (shrink)

The author demonstrates that W. E. Hocking’s political philosophy deserves far more consideration than it has so far received not only for its being a study in political philosophy, something there is too little of in the American tradition, but also because of the importance of the problems which are the focus of the study, the problems of liberty and community. Thigpen organizes material from a wide range of sources in Hocking’s extensive bibliography into an orderly presentation that moves from (...) relevant matter in Hocking’s theory of man and of knowledge, through practical applications of this matter to such issues as the basis and purpose of a state, and problems of rights and freedom, to the questions of international relations and world peace. (shrink)

This book is a collection of 18 essays portraying a "humanistic" outlook on several contemporary moral problems, and includes such essayists as Kurt Baier, Carl Rogers, B. F. Skinner, Sidney Hook, Abraham Edel, John Somerville, and Corliss Lamont. Although each was requested first to give his own definition of humanism and then to work out one application of it from his particular field or interest, these directions are not always strictly adhered to. Half of the essays had in fact, already (...) been published in some form in The Humanist. The 5 topical headings of the book show the diversity of fields and interests portrayed: Ethics, Religion and the Meaning of Life; The Good Life; The Individual: Law, Morality and Social Organization; Justice and Society; and Death. Although the essays are of unequal philosophical depth and acumen, this variety may be appealing for some uses of this as a text. However, two of the essays in particular stand out for this reviewer: "Ethics Without Religion" by Kai Nielsen, which perceptively outlines the problematic for as well as against an ethics not rooted in religion, and "The Enforcement of Morals" by Ernest Nagel which aptly analyzes the problem of the relation between the spheres of morality and law taking as a focus the noted Hart-Devlin debate of this issue. The thread which Kurtz believes unites all of these essays is their portrayal of a humanistic viewpoint, a viewpoint which he attempts to summarize in his own 14-page introduction, "What is Humanism?" But defining humanism is not an easy task. One must steer between a strictly negative view which defines it only in relation to what it opposes, and a broader but rather indefinite view of it as some form of man-centered philosophy. Although Kurtz wants to be positive in his own definition, he seems unable to move away from a negative and rhetorical presentation in which theism is simply stated to be incompatible with humanism. Moreover, his outline of a humanistic ethics is somewhat superficial. For example, he seems unaware of the problems involved in holding that ethical values are man’s own "creation" and at the same time are normative and objective. Nevertheless, the book may be of some help as a supplementary text to stimulate undergraduate students in discussion and study of the topics treated therein.—B.A.M. (shrink)

The author states that his purpose in this work is not primarily Peirce scholarship but epistemology. But the concentration is on Peirce’s theory of knowledge, a concentration which centers around what the author thinks is Peirce’s most valuable contribution to the subject—a solution to the problem of skepticism. In contrast to Descartes’ assertion that knowledge must be based on primitive intuitions, Peirce contends that all thought is in process, an organically intertwined system of inferences, a continuous flow of signs. Because (...) thinking is a process in time, it is always fallible. Rather than this being a hindrance to knowledge, Davis sees this as the key to Peirce’s escape from skepticism, for the knowledge so described is a continuous self-corrective process, a web which, if we but make the effort to untangle it, will continue to reward us with advance toward the truth. Of more revolutionary importance to the theory of knowledge, according to Davis, is Peirce’s theory of abduction, his answer to the problem of how synthetic knowledge is possible. Abduction is the act of making up explanatory hypotheses. It issues in insights which are the outgrowth of creativity and imagination. The test of these unifying ideas is their appropriateness or ability to satisfy our sensibilities. It is instinct, or that to which we are naturally bent, which guides the abductive process. Throughout this book great emphasis is placed on the importance of this to Peirce and to an adequate epistemology of instinct, feelings, the work of the heart, or sensibility. The scientist, as Davis sees it, is thus akin in method to the creative artist. While Davis intends also to show how this aspect of Peirce is consistent with his pragmatic maxim, their relationship is never quite clarified in this work. Nevertheless, the book is a well-written and very readable treatment of Peirce’s epistemology. It also includes a great many comparisons with similar and contrasting positions as found in a wide range of contemporary and classical philosophical treatises.—B.A.M. (shrink)