Langan believes that the writings of Merleau-Ponty "do not merely parallel roughly the three Kantian Critiques but... the development they reveal is impelled by the same internal necessity implicit in both philosophers' transcendental starting point." This interpretive scheme, like many sweeping generalizations sprinkled throughout the book, begs more questions than it solves. What exactly is the transcendental starting point? Does Merleau-Ponty believe that the claims of reason are wholly provisory and that "their value is essentially practical"? Does he make a (...) sharp distinction between the theoretical and the practical? If Langan believes that the two latter questions should be answered affirmatively, then his overall interpretation is downright misleading. Moreover, continual use is made of a whole battery of terms requiring clarification—e.g., "given," "dialectic," "ontological," "sense," "natural world." But Langan has captured much of the spirit of Merleau-Ponty's thought—especially in Chapter 2, "Incarnated Intentionality," a helpful, imaginative reconstruction of The Phenomenology of Perception. And in the last chapter he rightly attacks Merleau-Ponty for his vacillation between realistic and idealistic points of view. But, almost entirely on the basis of a few textual citations, Langan quickly pushes Merleau-Ponty into the idealist camp. If our critic is "convinced that although description from the transcendental viewpoint may invite disaster, it does not necessarily lead to it," then where did Merleau-Ponty make a wrong turn? Or did he?—A. P. (shrink)