Finite automata have been recently used as alternative, discrete models in theoretical physics, especially in problems related to the dichotomy between endophysical/intrinsic and exophysical/ extrinsic perception . These studies deal with Moore experiments; the main result states that it is impossible to determine the initial state of an automaton, and, consequently, a discrete model of Heisenberg uncertainty has been suggested. For this aim the classical theory of finite automata — which considers automata with initial states — is not adequate, and (...) a new approach is necessary. A study of finite deterministic automata without initial states is exactly the aim of this paper. We will define and investigate the complexity of various types of simulations between automata. Minimal automata will be constructed and proven to be unique up to an isomorphism. We will build our results on an extension of Myhill-Nerode technique; all constructions will make use of “automata responses” to simple experiments only, i.e., no information about the internal machinery will be considered available. (shrink)

Very large databases are a major opportunity for science and data analytics is a remarkable new field of investigation in computer science. The effectiveness of these tools is used to support a “philosophy” against the scientific method as developed throughout history. According to this view, computer-discovered correlations should replace understanding and guide prediction and action. Consequently, there will be no need to give scientific meaning to phenomena, by proposing, say, causal relations, since regularities in very large databases are enough: “with (...) enough data, the numbers speak for themselves”. The “end of science” is proclaimed. Using classical results from ergodic theory, Ramsey theory and algorithmic information theory, we show that this “philosophy” is wrong. For example, we prove that very large databases have to contain arbitrary correlations. These correlations appear only due to the size, not the nature, of data. They can be found in “randomly” generated, large enough databases, which—as we will prove—implies that most correlations are spurious. Too much information tends to behave like very little information. The scientific method can be enriched by computer mining in immense databases, but not replaced by it. (shrink)

We study some aspects of the emergence of _lógos_ from _xáos_ on a basal model of the universe using methods and techniques from algorithmic information and Ramsey theories. Thereby an intrinsic and unusual mixture of meaningful and spurious, emerging laws surfaces. The spurious, emergent laws abound, they can be found almost everywhere. In accord with the ancient Greek theogony one could say that _lógos_, the Gods and the laws of the universe, originate from “the void,„ or from _xáos_, a picture (...) which supports the unresolvable/irreducible lawless hypothesis. The analysis presented in this paper suggests that the “laws„ discovered in science correspond merely to syntactical correlations, are local and not universal. (shrink)

If is a random sequence, then the sequence is clearly not random; however, seems to be “about half random”. L. Staiger [Kolmogorov complexity and Hausdorff dimension, Inform. and Comput. 103 159–194 and A tight upper bound on Kolmogorov complexity and uniformly optimal prediction, Theory Comput. Syst. 31 215–229] and K. Tadaki [A generalisation of Chaitin’s halting probability Ω and halting self-similar sets, Hokkaido Math. J. 31 219–253] have studied the degree of randomness of sequences or reals by measuring their “degree (...) of compression”. This line of study leads to various definitions of partial randomness. In this paper we explore some relations between these definitions. Among other results we obtain a characterisation of Σ1-dimension in terms of strong Martin-Löf ε-tests , and we show that ε-randomness for ε is different than the classical 1-randomness. (shrink)

Turing’s famous 1936 paper “On computable numbers, with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem” defines a computable real number and uses Cantor’s diagonal argument to exhibit an uncomputable real. Roughly speaking, a computable real is one that one can calculate digit by digit, that there is an algorithm for approximating as closely as one may wish. All the reals one normally encounters in analysis are computable, like π, √2 and e. But they are much scarcer than the uncomputable reals because, as (...) Turing points out, the computable reals are countable, whilst the uncomputable reals have the power of the continuum. Furthermore, any countable set of reals has measure zero, so the computable reals have measure zero. In other words, if one picks a real at random in the unit interval with uniform probability distribution, the probability of obtaining an uncomputable real is unity. One may obtain a computable real, but that is in- finitely improbable. But how about individual examples of uncomputable reals? We will show two: H and the halting probability Ω, both contained in the unit interval. Their construction was anticipated in.. (shrink)

Suppose that persons A and B give us a sequence of 32 bits each, saying that they were obtained from independent coin flips. If A gives the stringu = 01001110100111101001101001110101and B gives the stringv = 00000000000000000000000000000000,then we would tend to believe A and would not believe B: the string u seems to be random, but the string v does not. Further on, if we change the value of a bit in a “random” string, then the result is still a “random” (...) string. If we keep making such changes in a “random” string, then we will eventually complete destroy randomness. (shrink)

Do the partial order and ortholattice operations of a quantum logic correspond to the logical implication and connectives of classical logic? Rephrased, How far might a classical understanding of quantum mechanics be, in principle, possible? A celebrated result of Kochen and Specker answers the above question in the negative. However, this answer is just one among various possible ones, not all negative. It is our aim to discuss the above question in terms of mappings of quantum worlds into classical ones, (...) more specifically, in terms of embeddings of quantum logics into classical logics; depending upon the type of restrictions imposed on embeddings, the question may get negative or positive answers. (shrink)

Recently, G. ASSER has obtained two interesting characterizations of the class of unary primitive recursive string-functions over a fixed alphabet as Robinson algebras. Both characterizations use a somewhat artificial string-function, namely the string-function lexicographically associated with the number-theoretical excess-over-a-square function. Our aim is to offer two new and natural Robinson algebras which are equivalent to ASSER’S algebras.

We present an abstract framework in which we give simple proofs for Gödel’s First and Second Incompleteness Theorems and obtain, as consequences, Davis’, Chaitin’s and Kritchman-Raz’s Theorems.

The present paper proposes a generalisation of the notion of disjunctive sequence, that is, of an infinite sequence of letters having each finite sequence as a subword. Our aim is to give a reasonable notion of disjunctiveness relative to a given set of sequences F. We show that a definition like “every subword which occurs at infinitely many different positions in sequences in F has to occur infinitely often in the sequence” fulfils properties similar to the original unrelativised notion of (...) disjunctiveness. Finally, we investigate our concept of generalised disjunctiveness in spaces of Cantor expansions of reals. (shrink)

Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems have the same scientific status as Einstein's principle of relativity, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, and Watson and Crick's double helix model of DNA. Our aim is to discuss some new faces of the incompleteness phenomenon unveiled by an information-theoretic approach to randomness and recent developments in quantum computing.

Penrose [40] has discussed a new point of view concerning the nature of physics that might underline conscious thought processes. He has argued that it might be the case that some physical laws are not computable, i.e. they cannot be properly simulated by computer; such laws can most probably arise on the “no-man’s-land” between classical and quantum physics. Furthermore, conscious thinking is a non-algorithmic activity. He is opposing both strong AI , and Searle’s [47] contrary viewpoint mathematical “laws”).

In this paper we consider the possibility of a Quantum Molinism : such a view applies an analogue of the Molinistic account of free will‘s compatibility with God’s foreknowledge to God’s knowledge of (supposedly) indeterministic events at a quantum level. W e ask how (and why) a providential God could care for and know about a world with this kind of indeterminacy. We consider various formulations of such a Quantum Molinism, and after rejecting a number of options arrive at one (...) seemingly coherent formulation. (shrink)

In this paper, we raise two points. First, any rights‐based theory should provide a method by which to guide reasoning in addressing conflicts of rights. The reason, we argue, is that these theories must provide guidance on what should be done. Second, this method must contain two key recommendations: (1) We should try to find a deliberative mechanism through which none of the rights is simply eliminated from the scene; (2) these rights may be balanced against each other to define (...) which right should prevail, but without considering non‐rights‐interests as if they were rights in the process. These recommendations instantiate two crucial principles that underlie our common intuitions on rights, namely, the principle that rights deserve equal respect and the principle that rights should be taken seriously. (shrink)

Kitcher has proposed an ideal-theory account—well-ordered science (WOS)— of the collective good that science’s research agenda should promote. Against criticism regarding WOS’s action-guidance, Kitcher has advised critics not to confuse substantive ideals and the ways to arrive at them, and he has defended WOS as a necessary and useful ideal for science policy. I provide a distinction between two types of ideal-theories that helps clarifying WOS’s elusive nature. I use this distinction to argue that the action-guidance problem that WOS faces (...) remains even under the aims/means distinction, because the WOS’s failure is more basic than critics have suggested. (shrink)

Um marco sobre a questão do tempo na História da Filosofia, o livro XI das Confissões de Agostinho de Hipona (354–430) ainda hoje recebe interpretações. O presente artigo menciona pontos que já apresentei noutro texto sobre o tempo como espelho da alma, no entanto ele recebe o acréscimo de dois pontos que mudam a ênfase de minha interpretação prévia: (1) a citação a Josué e (2) a escolha de Deus creator ominum para exemplificar a relação, via tempo, entre ser humano, (...) Deus e o mundo. Mediante a análise textual do livro XI, a seguinte conclusão será encaminhada: embora Agostinho não recuse a existência do tempo como uma realidade independente das vivências humanas, ele privilegia outro aspecto do tempo, medular nas Confissões, a saber, a relação humana com o tempo em correspondência com a intenção da vontade pela qual a vida humana é governada. Em Agostinho, o tempo da vida se compromete com a ética, e reflete o modo como a vontade habita a vida. Tempo e alma, nas Confissões, são interdependentes a ponto de a experiência humana do tempo ser um espelhamento da vontade. (shrink)

Is it justified to hold that an agent S has a (moral) right to P if the duty-bearer is not specified? There is an intense ongoing debate on this question. There are two positions in the literature. On the one hand, O´Neill´s much-discussed account of rights holds that it is justified to say that an agent S has a right to P if and only if the duty-bearer is sufficiently determined – i.e. if and only if it is clear against (...) whom S may claim her right to P (O’Neill 1986, 1988, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2016). Call this, the ‘claimability condition’. On the other hand, interest-based theorists argue that it can be justified to say that an agent S has a right to P even if the duty-bearer is not sufficiently determined (Caney 2007; Griffin, 2008; Raz 1988; Tasioulas 2007; see also: Etinson, 2013; Ypi 2010). Who (if anyone) is correct in this fundamental discussion about the very nature of rights? In this paper, I provide an answer to this crucial question. Neither O´Neill nor interest-based theorists provide good reasons to justify their positions. However, I argue, the claimability condition is an existence condition of rights justified on the basis of their action-guiding character. The reason is that if the duty-bearer is not specified, the content of the right (its correlative obligation) does not sufficiently guide what the agent should do because it is indeterminate who is required to act (or refrain from acting). (shrink)

Intellectual property regimes necessarily create artificial scarcity leading to wastage, both by blocking follow-up research and hindering access to those who are only able to pay less then the actual retail price. After revising the traditional arguments to hinder access to people’s intellectual labour we will examine why we should be more open to allow free-riding of inventive efforts, especially in cases where innovators have not secured the widest access to the fruits of their research and failed to cooperate with (...) follow-up innovators. We will do so by questioning the voluntariness involved in consumption of objects of innovation, restating the positive social externalities that arise when wider access to the fruits of innovation is assured, and examining the eventual harms innovators face. (shrink)

Food security brings a number of benefits to humanity from which nobody can be excluded and which can be simultaneously enjoyed by all. An economic understanding of the concept sees food security qualify as a global public good. However, there are four other ways of understanding a public good which are worthy of attention. A normative public good is a good from which nobody ought to be excluded. Alternatively, one might acknowledge the benevolent character of a public good. Others have (...) argued that public goods demand being public in the sense of being visible to all. Finally, it has also been argued that public goods are those goods which need joint action to be produced and maintained. This chapter discusses these five understandings of the public good in relation to food security and highlights the advantage of assessing policies from each of these perspectives. (shrink)

The debate about how neurotechnologies impact authenticity has focused on two inter-related dimensions: self-discovery and self-creation. In this paper, we develop a broader framework that includes the experimental and relational dimensions of authenticity, both understood as decisive for shaping one’s narrative identity. In our view, neurointerventions that alter someone’s personality traits will also impact her very own self-understanding across time. We argue that experimental authenticity only needs a minimum conception of narrative coherence of the self and that reversibility should remain (...) a key feature in the ethical assessment of neurotechnologies. The relational dimension of authenticity derives from the fact that a process of self-constitution is never a solitary business. The significant others act not just as subsequent judges of one’s life decisions, but as real co-authors of one’s self. We discuss relevant cases in which others are actively contributing to the meaning-making process, as to the direction one’s life is taking. We also claim that the experimental and the relational dimensions of authenticity should aim to correct each other. The relational dimension introduces socially approved standards as well as limitations to the array of available possibilities of self-fashioning or human enhancement. The experimental side enables us to avoid confusing one’s personal identity with a social and narrative construct that only bears the mark of social pressure and conformism. (shrink)

The mixture of political, social, cultural and economic environments in Latin America, together with the enormous diversity in climates, natural habitats and biological resources the continent offers, make the ethical assessment of agricultural policies extremely difficult. Yet the experience gained while addressing the contemporary challenges the region faces, such as rapid urbanization, loss of culinary and crop diversity, extreme inequality, disappearing farming styles, water and land grabs, malnutrition and the restoration of the rule of law and social peace, can be (...) of great value to other regions in similar latitudes, development processes and social problems. This chapter will provide a brief overview of these challenges from the perspective of a continent that is exposed to the consequences of extreme inequality in multiple dimensions and conclude by arguing for the need to have a continuous South-South dialogue on the challenges of establishing socially and environmentally sustainable food systems. (shrink)

The much-discussed “claimability objection” holds that it is unjustified to believe that all individuals have a human right to subsistence because the bearers of the correlative duties are not sufficiently determined. This argument is based on the so-called “claimability-condition”: S has a right to P if and only if the duty-bearer is sufficiently determined. Practice-based theorists defend the human right to subsistence by arguing that if we take the existing human rights practice seriously, there is no indeterminacy about the allocation (...) of duties. In this paper, I challenge this (apparently compelling) defense of the human right to subsistence with a dilemma. If the claimability condition is true, the practice-based defense fails to undermine the claimability objection because the duty-bearer is determined in some, but not all, cases. If practice-based theorists reject the claimability condition, they generate an account of human rights that is problematic from the practical perspective because it may contain duties that are unable to guide action. (shrink)

The forfeiture thesis is posed as an independent thesis in moral philosophy according to which agents forfeit (or lose) rights if they perform certain act-types. According to many, this thesis plays a crucial role in the justification of (legal) punishment. In this paper, I argue that the forfeiture thesis is unnecessary – we can simply dismiss it without any substantive loss. Echoing an aspect of the specificationist approach to rights, the reason is that we may replace the forfeiture thesis with (...) an exception clause in the very content of the right not to be subjected to hard treatment: P has no right not to be subjected to hard treatment simpliciter, but a right not to be subjected to hard treatment unless P performs an act-type φ – e.g., murdering an innocent person. This alternative has substantive advantages over the forfeiture thesis, which, in turn, shows that the former cannot be reduced to the latter. (shrink)

The organizational account of biological functions interprets functions as contributions of a trait to the maintenance of the organization that, in turn, maintains the trait. As has been recently argued, however, the account seems unable to provide a unified grounding for both intra- and cross-generation functions, since the latter do not contribute to the maintenance of the same organization which produces them. To face this ‘ontological problem’, a splitting account has been proposed, according to which the two kinds of functions (...) require distinct organizational definitions. In this article, we propose a solution for the ontological problem, by arguing that intra- and cross-generation functions can be said to contribute in the same way to the maintenance of the biological organization, characterized in terms of organizational self-maintenance. As a consequence, we suggest maintaining a unified organizational account of biological functions. (shrink)

Entre 1843 y 1844, uno de los conceptos centrales del pensamiento de Karl Marx es el de ser genérico. Es indudable en este concepto la herencia terminológica feuerbachiana, cuya principal referencia es el concepto de género. Sin embargo, este trabajo muestra que en su funcionamiento el ser genérico, lejos prolongar el concepto feuerbachiano, implica su refutación. Esto permite comprenderlo en una problemática más amplia de la obra de Marx: el proceso histórico de sustitución de las interrelaciones fundantes de los cuerpos (...) por su forma representada. (shrink)

In a famous lecture in 1900, David Hilbert listed 23 difficult problems he felt deserved the attention of mathematicians in the coming century. His conviction of the solvability of every mathematical problem was a powerful incentive to future generations: ``Wir müssen wissen. Wir werden wissen.'' (We must know. We will know.) Some of these problems were solved quickly, others might never be completed, but all have influenced mathematics. Later, Hilbert highlighted the need to clarify the methods of mathematical reasoning, using (...) a formal system of explicit assumptions, or axioms. Hilbert's vision was the culmination of 2,000 years of mathematics going back to Euclidean geometry. He stipulated that such a formal axiomatic system should be both `consistent' (free of contradictions) and `complete' (in that it represents all the truth). Hilbert also argued that any wellposed mathematical problem should be `decidable', in the sense that there exists a mechanical procedure, a computer program, for deciding whether something is true or not. Of course, the only problem with this inspiring project is that it turned out to be impossible. (shrink)

El presente texto tiene como propósito analizar teórico-conceptualmente las prácticas pedagógicas de la ética implementadas por los docentes en la universidad tradicional y la universidad popular en los años 2010 – 2020. Teniendo en cuenta, primero, las características inherentes de la universidad tradicional tanto en sus orígenes y principios fundamentales; segundo, las practicas pedagógicas de la ética en el rol docente; y tercero, el advenimiento, desarrollo y propuesta de la Universidad popular. Mediante este análisis fue posible develar los paralelismos entre (...) sus divergencias y puntos de encuentro con base en la ética-práctica del rol docente, para el mejoramiento continuo tanto de esta área del conocimiento como de los demás saberes en general. (shrink)

En este artículo defendemos la existencia de un perspectivismo ontológico pluralista inherente a la filosofía de Baruch Spinoza. Indispensable para la constitución de esta noción es la relación establecida entre su teoría general de composición de los cuerpos y los conceptos de “afecto”, “inmanencia”, “potencia” y “multitud”. El objetivo de este análisis es una fundamentación interior del concepto de “puntos de vista”: es imposible pensarlo como una característica epistemológica de un individuo aislado, pero tampoco es posible unificarlo mediante el postulado (...) de una propiedad común. En consecuencia, el perspectivismo ontológico espinosista implica una teoría del punto de vista pluralista que elude los problemas planteados por la clausura del modelo Uno-Todo. (shrink)

ENTREVISTA COM PROFESSORAS (ES) DE FILOSOFIA DO ENSINO SUPERIOR DO CEARÁ – BLOCO IICom: Cristiane Maria Marinho, Francisco José da Silva, Camila do Espírito Santo Prado de OliveiraPor: Antônio Alex Pereira de Sousa, Paulo Willame Araújo de Lima.

This paper argues for a revised concept of authenticity entailing two demands that must be balanced. The first demand moves authenticity from the position of a strictly self-regarding virtue towards the position of a fully social virtue, acknowledging the crucial feature of steadiness, i.e. self-consistency, as being precisely what we ‘naturally’ lack. Nevertheless, the value of personal authenticity in a modern, open society comes from the fact that it brings about not only steadiness, but also the public development of a (...) variety of existential options that can be understood as Millian ‘original experiments in living’. Thus the second demand of authenticity is a demand for ‘experimental’ authenticity which covers the whole spectrum of technologies of the self, from Nietzschean ‘brief habits’, to the use of enhancement technologies. (shrink)

Agostinho de Hipona recebeu uma formação intelectual nos moldes da cultura clássica, tendo sido educado segundo o ciclo disciplinar varroniano. Provém dessa educação sua apreciação da dialética como arte que instrui argumentar corretamente e que permite discernir, nos discursos, os elementos que geram a falsidade da conclusão. É a dialética que permite conectar proposições verdadeiras para alcançar conclusões também verdadeiras e é elaa ciência que deflagra a falsidade e a dissimulação nos argumentos. Ora, na obra Contra Crescônio, gramático e donatista, (...) Agostinho defende-se da acusação descabida de ser ele um homo dialecticus que, por sua habilidade de argumentar, falsearia o verdadeiro e tornaria o verdadeiro falso. Crescônio, para acusar Agostinho, acusa a dialética. Em sua réplica, Agostinho defenderá a eminência e importância dessa ciência para, a partir desse fundamento, atacar o donatismo e, finalmente, liquidar Crescônio. É precisamente essa apreciação positiva da dialética que este artigo pretende destacar, ressaltando assim a importância do estudo de Contra Crescônio para o estudo da dialética agostiniana. Abstract:Augustine of Hippo received an intellectual formation in the molds of the classical culture, having been educated according to Varro’s disciplinary cycle. This educational background provided him an appreciation of Dialectics as the liberal art which instructs to reason correctly, and allows discerning, in discourses, the elements that generate false conclusions. It is Dialectics that allows connecting true propositions to reach true conclusions, and it is the science that deflagrates falsehood and dissimulation in arguments. In his work, Against Cresconius, grammarian and Donatist, Augustine defends himself against the unreasonable charge of being a homo dialecticus, who, by his ability to argue, would falsify the truth and turn it false. Cresconius, to accuse Augustine, charges dialectics. In his reply, Augustine will defend the eminence and importance of this science to, from this foundation, attack Donatism and, finally, liquidate Cresconius. It is precisely this positive appreciation of Dialectics that this article intends to highlight, thus highlighting the importance of studying Contra Cresconius for the study Augustinian Dialectics. (shrink)

Resumen: El siguiente artículo parte reconociendo el carácter protector de la téchne y sus momentos constitutivos. De acuerdo a esta determinación es posible advertir el límite de la téchne a partir de la cuestión socrática de la virtud. La virtud, en la medida que no es un asunto análogo a los objetos de la téchne, precisa de un especial acceso. Desde la constatación del diálogo como el único modo de conocer la virtud, se pone de relieve su sentido comunitario y (...) el carácter del examen socrático. En el diálogo socrático se anuncia, así, que la virtud no es nunca algo técnicamente clausurado ni epistémicamente conceptualizado, sino el mayor bien humano que se cumple en su aproximación a través del examen conjunto de la propia vida.: This article starts by recognizing the protective nature of téchne and its development. It is thereby possible to understand the limits of téchne based on the Socratic question of virtue. Virtue, insofar as it is not a matter analogous to the objects of téchne, requires a special access. The communitarian sense and the character of the Socratic inquiry are made plain, given dialogue as the only way of knowing virtue. Socratic dialogue discloses that virtue is never technically closed or epistemically conceptualized, but that this greatest human good is fulfilled through the joint examination of life itself. (shrink)

Aunque el contenido del Eutifrón se revela en saber qué es la piedad, este diálogo, pese a una inevitable apariencia, no tiene como fin último proporcionar una definición proposicional de este fenómeno. La piedad se pone al descubierto a partir de la dialéctica de Sócrates, cuya insistencia en volver al principio del problema no proviene de una incapacidad del interlocutor de definir el asunto, sino de la debilidad misma del discurso. La necesidad de plantear otra vez desde el principio la (...) cuestión suscita en el intérprete advertir la importancia de la ejecución misma del diálogo como testimonio y acreditación de su propio contenido. De acuerdo a esta ejecución se podrá comprender en qué medida el sentido de la piedad se encuentra en relación al carácter principiante de Sócrates. (shrink)

Barnes (2014) has argued in this journal for the following conditional: If there is any metaphysical indeterminacy, this must be at the most fundamental level of reality. To argue for this claim, Barnes relies on two principles that I shall call bivalent completeness and determinate link. According to the former, a complete description is a bivalent assignment of truth values to every sentence. The determinate link, instead, establishes that the determination relation between levels of reality preserves determinacy from one level (...) to another. In response to Barnes’ conclusion, Eva (2018) has recently pointed out that bivalent completeness is question begging. In this paper, I will first show why Eva's line of reasoning can be resisted. My aim will then be to present a stronger case against Barnes’ argument by challenging the determinate link. In the presence of metaphysical indeterminacy, the link between fundamental and derivative facts might itself be the locus of indeterminacy. I will conclude by showing that Barnes and Eva make many unwarranted assumptions regarding both indeterminacy and fundamentality. The logical space around the connection between these two notions appears to be much wider than what they seem to be aware of, or so I will argue. (shrink)

What are the main conditions that any theory of human rights should satisfy to guide action? If agents must take action for a fairer world as human rights discourse suggests, this is a crucial question to reflect upon. In this paper, I make a proposal. I argue that any theory of (moral) human rights that guides action on the basis of correlative duties must satisfy three key conditions. The first condition is focused on the specification of act-types, the second concerns (...) the distribution of correlative duties, and the third is focused on the resolution of (resolvable) conflicts of human rights. I show that this proposal has substantive implications because it implies to reject, challenge and, in some cases, resist ideas that are commonly accepted in the literature on human rights. (shrink)

De ce a fost fondată Uniunea Europeană? Un prim răspuns ar fi dorinţa de pace după un război devastator şi umilitor. Un al doilea răspuns ar fi realizarea importanţei unităţii. O unitate care se va caracteriza printr-o diversitate a culturilor şi a limbilor. Statele europene nu au dorit să renunţe la suveranitatea lor, au vrut să devină un corp comun pentru a nu a mai putea fi călcate în picioare de iureşul istoriei. Ca orice unitate, UE avea nevoie de un (...) cadru de reglementare oferit de instituţii şi politici europene. De asemenea, pentru a armoniza ceva trebuie să poţi pune împreună anumite elemente separate. Armonizarea Uniunii a fost realizată prin fondarea instituţiilor şi a reglementărilor acestora (structura instituţională a UE este prezentată în Anexa nr. 1). Instituţionalizarea Uniunii Europene este cheia de boltă a construcţiei istorice europene. Început în anul 1957, acest proces a lăsat urme adânci în conştiinţa politică europeană. Dacă la început a fost privită cu reticenţă, acum Uniunea nu poate exista fără instituţii. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to examine the problematic frontier that separates the phenomenology of the body and the phenomenology of animality. The main difficulty is to differentiate phenomenologically not only between embodiment and animality, but also between specifically human embodied experience and what is accessible to us through empathy in relation to the corporeality of the animal. I will tackle these questions by considering relevant textual material from the writings of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. On the one (...) hand, I will show that although embodiment and animality are convergent on the level of the naturalistic attitude in Husserl’s Ideas II, they are divergent as soon as we place ourselves in the personalistic attitude, where the body enters into a different conjunction—namely, with the idea of person and of the spiritual world. On the other hand, Heidegger claims that, in spite of the abysmal bodily kinship with the animal, there is an essential difference between the human body and the animal organism, thus opposing the tendencies to humanize the animal and to animalize the human. (shrink)