1. Universi corporis pansophici caput summum --2. Arithmetische Beschreibung der Moral-Weisheit von Personen und Sachen.

The aspects of Erhard Weigel's Analysis Aristotelica ex Euclide restituta that foreshadowed and helped form some characteristics of symbolic logic are highlighted: first, the idea of a pure form of a logical syllogism or of a mathematical proof and, second, a tentative arithmetisation of some aspects of logic. Also, Weigel's emphasis on the role of symbols and figures in the process of mathematical proof is discussed.

Erhard Weigel (1625-1699), mathematician from Jena, developed within the context of his efforts for a mathematically oriented universal science and for a methodologically exact natural theology also a mathematical proof of God, which should prove God’s existence irrefutably and with the highest degree of certainty. Leibniz, as is known a disciple of Weigel himself, was already acquainted with the proof ’s earliest drafts from the 1670’s on and referred to almost all of Weigel’s publications on the (...) proof of God in his writings, which shows his never ceasing interest on this topic. The article presents the rationale of Weigel’s proof of God as well as the central aspects of Leibniz’s in part assenting while also in part critical considerations to it and gives an outlook on the importance of the topic for Leibniz’s own development. (shrink)

Between 1650 and 1664, a giant globe was created in Gottorf under Duke Friedrich III, which was widely known and marvelled at by many contemporaries as a wonder of the world. The scientific management of the project was the responsibility of the court mathematician and librarian Adam Olearius. The Gottorf Globe and its counterpart (a “Sphaera Copernicana”) presented the astronomical knowledge of the time in a pictorial form. The image of the earth and the cosmos was also intended to show (...) the Creator and his omnipotence. Erhard Weigel, professor of mathematics at the University of Jena from 1653, also constructed monumental globes. These baroque world models, as well as Robert Long’s 18th-century sphere, can be considered the precursors of today’s planetariums. (shrink)

From the mid-1600s to the beginning of the eighteenth century, there were two main circles of German scholars which focused extensively on diagrammatic reasoning and representation in logic. The first circle was formed around Erhard Weigel in Jena and consists primarily of Johann Christoph Sturm and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz; the second circle developed around Christian Weise in Zittau, with the support of his students, particularly Samuel Grosser and Johann Christian Lange. Each of these scholars developed an original form (...) of using geometric diagrams in logic. In this paper, I will trace the historical notes of John Venn and other modern logicians back to the original works published in the Weigel and Weise circles and describe the development of using geometric figures for logical reasoning and representation in that period of time. (shrink)

Assembled here for the first time in English translation, Sigrid Weigel and Georgina Paul offer illuminating new insights into Benjamin's theory, combining impulses from post-structuralism, feminism, cultural anthropology and psychoanalysis.

Ever since Parmenides, one of philosophy's riddles has been how we are able to direct our thoughts to non-being. Erhard uses the problem of non-existence as the starting point for an analysis of Husserl's phenomenology. He examines Husserl's interpretation of judgments about non-being as judgments made "under assumption" and his analysis of "free fantasy." Erhard thus demonstrates that Husserl is compatible with today's non-relational theories.

In this paper I argue that the almost forgotten early dissertation of the phenomenologist Hans Reiner Freiheit, Wollen und Aktivität. Phänomenologische Untersuchungen in Richtung auf das Problem der Willensfreiheit engages with what I call the unity problem of activity. This problem concerns the question whether there is a structure in virtue of which all instances of human activity—and not only “full-blown” intentional actions—can be unified. After a brief systematic elucidation of this problem, which is closely related to the contemporary “problem (...) of action,” I elaborate and critically discuss two relevant threads running through Reiner’s work. The first view concerns the alleged motivational asymmetry between activity and passivity according to which it is essential only for active experiences to be motivated by an underlying passivity. The second view focuses on Reiner’s phenomenology of the will, especially on his notions of “ego-centrality” and “inner will” the latter being introduced in analogy to Brentano’s notion of “inner consciousness.” These two notions are supposed to unify all manifestations of the human will, including “full-blown” intentional actions and non-intentional doings such as laughter. Reiner’s extension of will-based actions to non-intentional activity is one of the most remarkable aspects of his early work. Finally, I show that Reiner ultimately answers the unity problem in the negative because he ends up with the view that besides will-based agency he also acknowledges so-called “motor activity” which is not intrinsically related to the will. I close with a couple of tentative proposals how volitional and motor actions might be unified nonetheless. (shrink)

Erhard Wiersing ; Literaturverz. S. [1013] - 1071 ; Inhaltsverzeichnis ; Volltext // Exemplar mit der Signatur: München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek -- PVA 2007.1762.

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2015 Heft: 204 Seiten: 145-172.

Dieses voluminöse Werk ist Abhandlung, Lehrbuch und Nachschlagewerk in einem! Vertretern unterschiedlicher Forschungsgebiete, vor allem aber denen der Pädagogik, liegt hier der im heutigen Wissenschaftsraum erstmals unternommene Versuch vor, das Phänomen »Menschenbildung« nicht allein erziehungswissenschaftlich, sondern umfassend humanwissenschaftlich zu begründen. Unter Berücksichtigung der naturgeschichtlichen, historisch-kulturellen wie historisch-gesellschaftlichen Bedingungen wird auf eine grundsätzliche Vergewisserung des Verständnisses von Menschenbildung hingearbeitet, um letztendlich auch eine neue Sichtweise auf das Phänomen Bildung zu ermöglichen. Praxis wird nur insoweit thematisiert, als sie Gegenstand der Theorie ist (...) und damit ihrer Aufklärung dient. Unter Bildung wird dabei jener alles umfassende Wirkungs- und Handlungszusammenhang verstanden, in dem das menschliche Individuum vom Anbeginn seines Lebens bis zu seinem Tode geformt wird und sich selbst formt. (shrink)

During his whole scientific life Hermann Weyl was fascinated by the interrelation of physical and mathematical theories. From the mid 1920s onward he reflected also on the typical difference between the two epistemic fields and tried to identify it by comparing their respective automorphism structures. In a talk given at the end of the 1940s he gave the most detailed and coherent discussion of his thoughts on this topic. This paper presents his arguments in the talk and puts it in (...) the context of the later development of gauge theories. (shrink)

Dans un discours prononcé à Zurich vers la fin des années 1940, Hermann Weyl a examiné l'épistémologie dialectique de Ferdinand Gonseth et l'a considérée comme trop strictement limitée aux aspects de changement historique. Son expérience de la philosophie diaclectique post-kantienne, en particulier la dérivation du concept de l'espace et de la matière chez Johann Gottlieb Fichte, avait constitué une base dialectique solide pour ses propres études de 1918 en une géométrie purement infinitésimale et la théorie antérieure d'un champ de matière (...) géométriquement unifié (en prolongement du programme Mie-Hilbert). Bien que Weyl se fût alors éloigné des aspects spéculatifs de la philosophie de sa jeunesse et eût montré, en particulier, moins d'enthousiasme qu'auparavant pour Fichte, il nourrissait encore de nombreux doutes sur la base culturelle de la science mathématique moderne et sur son rôle dans la culture matérielle du modernisme de pointe. Pour Weyl, la « réflexion » philosophique était une nécessité culturelle ; il se tourna alors vers lexistentialisme de Karl Jaspers et de Martin Heidegger pour trouver des raisons plus profondes, dans un mouvement comparable à son orientation vers la philosophie de Fichte après la Première Guerre mondiale. Le débat de la fin des années 1940 peut être compris comme une sorte de supplément postérieur à la Seconde Guerre mondiale par rapport à ses commentaires plus connus sur les mathématiques et les sciences naturelles publiés au milieu des années 1920. (shrink)

Scheibe is one of the most important philosophers of science in Germany. He has written extensively on all the problems that confront the philosophy of physics: rationalism vs. empiricism; reductionism; the foundations of quantum mechanics; space-time, and much more. Since little of his work has been translated into English, he is not yet well known internationally. However, this collection of some 40 of his papers will remedy this unfortunate situation.

Hermann Weyl was one of the early contributors to the mathematics of general relativity. This article argues that in 1929, for the formulation of a general relativistic framework of the Dirac equation, he both abolished and preserved in modified form the conceptual perspective that he had developed earlier in his “analysis of the problem of space.” The ideas of infinitesimal congruence from the early 1920s were aufgehoben in the general relativistic framework for the Dirac equation. He preserved the central idea (...) of gauge as a “purely infinitesimal” aspect of symmetries in a group extension schema. With respect to methodology, however, Weyl gave up his earlier preferences for relatively a-priori arguments and tried to incorporate as much empiricism as he could. This signified a clearly expressed empirical turn for him. Moreover, in this step he emphasized that the mathematical objects used for the representation of matter structures stood at the center of the construction, rather than interaction fields which, in the early 1920s, he had considered as more or less derivable from geometrico-philosophical considerations. (shrink)