Book Reviewed in this article:Daniel M. Bell, Liberation Theology After the End of History: The Refusal to Cease Suffering.

The purpose of this short article is to argue that it is both possible and theologically wise to construct Christian social ethics within the framework of belief in the eschatological continuity between present and future creation. This is a response to Stephen Williams' article, but is also a development of my own line of thought.1 Williams calls into question the general position that a this-wordly eschatology is the best or even an adequate framework for thinking about Christian social responsibility. I (...) will respond in five short steps. First, I will say why one should construct Christian social ethics within an eschatological framework. Second, I will argue in favour of eschatological transformation instead of annihilation of the creation. Third, I shall draw some implications for social ethics from the belief in eschatological transformation. Fourth, I will discuss the plausibility of believing in the integration of the results of human work into God's new creation. Finally, I will reflect on the bearing of the fact and form of eschatological transformation on Christian cultural, social and ecological involvement. (shrink)

A guide to defining and then creating a flourishing life, based on the popular class at Yale What makes a good life? The question is inherent to the human condition, asked by people across generations, professions, and social classes, and addressed by all schools of philosophy and religions. This search for meaning, as Yale professors Miroslav Volf, Matthew Croasmun, and Ryan McAnnally-Linz argue, is at the crux of a crisis that is facing Western culture, a crisis that, they (...) propose, can be ameliorated by searching, in one's own life, for the underlying truth. In A Life Worth Living, named after its authors' highly sought-after undergraduate course, Volf, Croasmun, and McAnnally-Linz chart out this question, providing readers with jumping-off points, road maps, and habits of reflection for figuring out where their lives hold meaning and where things need to change. Drawing from the major world religions and from impressively truthful and courageous secular figures, A Life Worth Living is a guide to life's most pressing question, the one asked of all of us: How are we to live? (shrink)

From Damascus to Rwanda and South Africa, a hard lesson has been learned. In situations of conflict, reconciliation must be placed at the forefront in the pursuit of justice.

: The article analyzes the features of the doctrine of the church of the outstandingProtestant theologian of the early XXI century Miroslav Volf. Volf's understanding of the church as a reality that preceded the emergence of the individual as a Christian means a radical break with liberal Protestant ideas of the church community as created by the voluntary decision of individuals. But Volf does not share the collectivist idea of ​​the church as an organism in which (...) the individual is completely subjugated to the whole. It is established that Volf creates a communitarian model of the church, in which the church community is understood as the unity of diversity. Unity itself has the character of interpersonal relations. Individuals with different charisms in the community interact with each other like the fellowship of the Three in God. Communitarianism in Volf's ecclesiology as a "middle way" between liberal individualism and total collectivism has all the hallmarks of postliberal theological theory. It is proved that Volf's communitarianism became a creative development of Christian personalism of the XX century with its emphasis on the existential freedom of the individual and the importance of interpersonal relations. Volf succeeded in building ecclesiological communitarianism not so much because of his many specific speculations about the organization of church communities, but because of his vision of personalism. Namely, as we noted above, Volf combines the idea of ​​personality as dependent on its relations with other personalities with the vision of personality as an apophatic secret that is higher than all its properties and charisma. Accordingly, a personality that exists in absolute openness to the influences of other personalities on the one hand, and is absolutely unique on the other, makes possible the existence of a communitarian church community. Volf emphasizes that the catholicity of the individual Christian personality is as necessary as the catholicity of the whole church community. The characterization of the individual as a conciliar presupposes not only the traditional ideal of the integrity of all faculties and the charisma of the individual in his intention to communicate with God, but also the vision of the legitimacy of the inner diversity of the individual. The possible complexity of the identity of the individual is almost infinite, and the willingness to accept it in the community - the main feature of Volf's communitarianism. Similarly, every ecclesial community must be ready to accept as Christian all other ecclesial communities, whatever the peculiarities of their identity. It is clear that such an understanding of catholicity is possible only in Protestantism. As Volf rightly points out, Catholicism presupposes that the ecclesial community must be the local embodiment of the common ecclesial identity of the whole structure, and Orthodoxy emphasizes that a separate community is necessarily identical in identity to the common identity of the church through the Eucharist. Volf's communitarianism allows us to describe church communities and their associations as network structures in which all individuals are active actors whose abilities and charisms are important for the constitution of communities. (shrink)

Drawing on the final report of the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission and on theology, this essay builds on Miroslav Volf's social Trinitarian account of reconciliation as embrace. Specifically, this essay argues for the necessity of various forms of justice in social and political reconciliation and against the priority of forgiveness in reconciliation argued for by Volf. The heart of this argument is a theological anthropology that claims that to be created in the image of a perichoretic (...) God who is Trinity is necessarily to be interdependent beings. This interdependence is manifest in the interpersonal, social, and political relations that constitute and are constituted by individual humans and the institutions in which they live. Therefore, the creation and maintenance of just institutions is necessary for the formation of persons capable of practicing reconciliation, and for reconciled persons to live within. (shrink)

I explore the impact of memory altering technologies in the science fiction drama (2016–2020) in order to show that unreconciled altered traumatic memory may lead to a dystopian breakdown of society. I bring Miroslav Volf's theological perspectives on memory into conversation with the plot of Westworld in order to reveal connections between memory altering technologies and humanity's responsibility to remember rightly. Using Volf's theology of remembering as an interpretive lens, I analyze characters’ inability to remember rightly while (...) recalling partial memories of their trauma. In virtue of this examination, I contend that memory altering technologies may inhibit individuals from relational processes of healing, such as forgiveness. Consequently, I argue that this study leads to a richer understanding of the potential that memory altering technologies have for undermining humanity's ability to interact in a relational capacity, specifically in terms of forgiveness. (shrink)

Anthropology of Consciousness, Volume 32, Issue 1, Page 33-54, Spring 2021.

Prior research has suggested that perceptual disfluency activates analytical processing and increases the solution rate of mathematical problems with appealing but incorrect answers (i.e., the Cogn...

In 2004 in Prague, I met Slovak philosopher Miroslav Marcelli, who had attended Foucault's lectures in Paris in 80s. We talked about the legacy of Foucault and contemporary philosophy. Mr. Marcelli taught me philosophy at Comenius University in 1995.. I never visited his lectures, I only passed the exam.. The most interesting point was his answer to my 'provocations' replicating the common prejudice about impracticability of the philosophy. He answered "Do you think that e.g. Descartes didn't know about it?" (...) In fact, people tend to think that philosophers or mathematicians, are "asocial" without "social" intelligence, while their occasional isolation (e.g. Nietzsche) is a product of social exclusion, rather than their choice. In 2013 I applied Foucault's concept of Discontinuity to short 10 minutes movie: Discontinuity, projected in my exhibition "From Animation" in Holland Park, London. The film has 3 parts, ends as it starts to show the significant historical events in 4 windows, when the same idea appears to disappear to re-appear.. Foucault's philosophy doesn't seem to me so unique now, e.g. the idea that many historical changes or progress itself is often illusionary - masking the power structure, had already been explored 515 BC, in depth by Parmenides who concluded: the change is impossible. (shrink)

I confront arbitrariness of the sign to a criterion assessing the quality of language, logical system, psychometrics and art.

The paper aims to present Spinoza’s understanding of the ontological status of finite beings, which was heavily influenced by mathematics, i.e. geometry. Spinoza stratified finite beings into two fairly incompatible layers: the one subjectively conceived, while the other is the objective level. The first level is related to the essence of being that is caused by God through immanent causality: here, we speak of entailment on the logical and epistemological level, and not the level of reality. Unlike essence, existence represents (...) the second level of being: existence is caused by the real finite being through transeunt cause. The first level, by its ontological status, is very close to mathematical entities, therefore the qualification that Spinoza ‘geometrized reality under a species of the essences’. Namely, he geometrized the segment under the scope of ontology, i.e. the essences of finite modes. The final part of the paper is dedicated to one of the main reasons why Spinoza failed to provide a satisfactory solution to this ontological problem, which is not the only such problem of his system. This would be that Spinoza paid too muchattention on ethics, to the detriment of metaphysics, i.e. ontology as general metaphysics. For Spinoza, ontology is subjected to epistemology and ethics, therefore the name ‘functional metaphysics’. U članku se tematizira Spinozino shvaćanje ontologijskog statusa konačnih bića koje je bilo pod znatnim utjecajem matematike odnosno geometrije. Spinoza je konačna bića stratificirao na dvije teško pomirljive razine: jedna je ona subjektivno zamišljena, a druga bi trebala biti zbiljska razina. Prva se razina odnosi na bit bića koju uzrokuje Bog na način imanentne uzročnosti: radi se o slijeđenju na logičkoj i spoznajnoj razini, a ne o zbiljskoj razini. Za razliku od bîti, egzistencija predstavlja drugu razinu bića: egzistenciju uzrokuje zbiljsko konačno biće na način tranzeuntnog uzroka. Prva je razina po svome ontologijskom statusu vrlo bliska matematičkim entitetima, zbog čega se rabi kvalifikacija da je Spinoza ‘geometrizirao stvarnost pod vidikom bîti’. Geometrizirao je, naime, segment kojim se bavi ontologija, a to su bîti konačnih modusa. U završnom dijelu članka navodi se jedan od glavnih razloga Spinozina nezadovoljavajućeg rješenja ovog ontologijskog problema, iako to nije i jedini ontologijski problem njegova sustava. Taj bi razlog bila Spinozina velika usredotočenost na etiku, a na štetu metafizike, odnosno ontologije kao opće metafizike. Spinoza je ontologiju promatrao u funkciji epistemologije i etike, pa se govori o ‘funkcionalnoj metafizici’. (shrink)

The paper aims to present Spinoza’s understanding of the ontological status of finite beings, which was heavily influenced by mathematics, i.e. geometry. Spinoza stratified finite beings into two fairly incompatible layers: the one subjectively conceived, while the other is the objective level. The first level is related to the essence of being that is caused by God through immanent causality: here, we speak of entailment on the logical and epistemological level, and not the level of reality. Unlike essence, existence represents (...) the second level of being: existence is caused by the real finite being through transeunt cause. The first level, by its ontological status, is very close to mathematical entities, therefore the qualification that Spinoza ‘geometrized reality under a species of the essences’. Namely, he geometrized the segment under the scope of ontology, i.e. the essences of finite modes. The final part of the paper is dedicated to one of the main reasons why Spinoza failed to provide a satisfactory solution to this ontological problem, which is not the only such problem of his system. This would be that Spinoza paid too much attention on ethics, to the detriment of metaphysics, i.e. ontology as general metaphysics. For Spinoza, ontology is subjected to epistemology and ethics, therefore the name ‘functional metaphysics’. (shrink)

Grammatische Ausdrucksmittel der Hierarchisierung der semantischen Struktur des Satzes.