In one of the most noteworthy and criticized articles from the prominent periodical Foreign Affairs, Samuel Huntington defends the position that the most important geo-strategic problem of the future is the ‘clash of civilizations’. This replaces the older cold war paradigm and the one-sided conceptual model based on relations between states with the paradigm of cultural conflicts. According to Huntington, what ultimately counts for people is not political ideology or economic interests: “Faith and family, blood and belief, are what people (...) identify with and what they will fight and die for.”Despite many nuances, Huntington primarily emphasizes a global cultural conflict between the ‘West and the Rest’ of the world. In broad terms, he speaks of a ‘Confucian-Islamic connection’ that threatens and weakens Western values and power. He has in mind the connection between Islamic and Confucian countries that are quickly becoming industrialized, that are acquiring military as well as economic power, but that are also either unwilling or unable to adapt to Western culture. We could look upon China’s rejection of the universal declaration of human rights for being ‘myopically Western’ as a classic example. (shrink)

This article is the integral text of an inaugural lecture as professor extraordinary for business ethics at the Catholic University of Brabant at Tilburg, the Netherlands. The author is professor of ethics at the Catholic University of Leuven (K.U.Leuven) and an Associate Editor of this Review.

Business Ethics has really taken off in Belgium. The author is Professor at the Catholic University of Leuven, and an Associate Editor.

This article is the integral text of an inaugural lecture as professor extraordinary for business ethics at the Catholic University of Brabant at Tilburg, the Netherlands. The author is professor of ethics at the Catholic University of Leuven and an Associate Editor of this Review.

Along with the question of what kind of debt reduction we should grant to the third world, one must also ask the question of why such a reduction is needed, and what is the ethical justification for it. This question belongs in a specific context: that of the jubilee year. In Leviticus 25, it is said that every fifty years on the day of atonement the ram's horn is sounded and liberty is proclaimed “throughout the land to all its inhabitants; (...) it shall be a jubilee for you, when each of you shall return to his property and each of you shall return to his family”. The jubilee year is a year of freedom, a time of redistribution and new beginnings, of a return to the original relations among people, which also implies the forgiveness of the debts incurred by history's `losers'.This radical redistribution looks like a utopian dream, but it is nothing of the sort. It is thought of as a real historical possibility, about which a reasonable debate can take place. The Belgian bishops have pointed out that this historical possibility also involves recognizing the sacred historical significance of the life of Jesus Christ. According to Luke's gospel , itself referring to Isaiah 61:1-3, he conceived his life's task as that of effectively accomplishing the jubilee year. The tone is even more radical in a verse from Isaiah 58, 6 where there is talk of “freeing the oppressed”.Jesus's action was more than simply the proclamation of good news; his action also had real consequences for those concerned: it was good news for the poor, light for the blind, freedom for the imprisoned, and justice for those who are repressed. Jesus showed that social relations could no longer be the way they had been, and that imitating Him meant that the faithful had to become apologists for the poor, which means they had to work towards a new history in which “the contorted relations between people are set aright, poverty is overcome and all the debts of the destitute are forgiven”.In this article I would like to examine certain aspects of this ethical mission and show that this radical demand for debt forgiveness is not an exception in Christian ethics. To this end, I will reflect on various key concepts in Christian ethical thought: social justice, solidarity and the universal right to use earthly goods. (shrink)

The article argues against the tendency to reaffirm Catholic social thought as Catholic “doctrine” and proposes a reinterpretation in view of the participation of the Church in the transformation of the world. Revisiting Chenu’s critique of Catholic social thought as ideology, the article argues for a reinterpretation of Catholic social thought as Catholic social and ecological discernment in response to the contemporary megacrisis. That such a discernment requires reflective practice and forward-looking imagination is articulated in the light of the thought (...) of John Paul Lederach and Otto Scharmer. (shrink)

In one of the most noteworthy and criticized articles from the prominent periodical Foreign Affairs, Samuel Huntington defends the position that the most important geo-strategic problem of the future is the ‘clash of civilizations’. This replaces the older cold war paradigm and the one-sided conceptual model based on relations between states with the paradigm of cultural conflicts. According to Huntington, what ultimately counts for people is not political ideology or economic interests: “Faith and family, blood and belief, are what people (...) identify with and what they will fight and die for.”Despite many nuances, Huntington primarily emphasizes a global cultural conflict between the ‘West and the Rest’ of the world. In broad terms, he speaks of a ‘Confucian-Islamic connection’ that threatens and weakens Western values and power. He has in mind the connection between Islamic and Confucian countries that are quickly becoming industrialized, that are acquiring military as well as economic power, but that are also either unwilling or unable to adapt to Western culture. We could look upon China’s rejection of the universal declaration of human rights for being ‘myopically Western’ as a classic example. (shrink)

Morality and ethics are most frequently identified with norms and values which one can establish, justify and apply in a reasonable way. Narrative ethics has shown, however, that this is not entirely correct and that we must account for the influence of stories and narrative traditions. By way of their paranetic character, narratives spur us on to boundary breaking responsible activity and, in so far as they have a role to play in the education process, they contribute to the narrative (...) configuration of the person as moral subject. The human person is more than a being which autonomously configures itself as subject. He or she can only achieve full selfhood in and through constant contact with others and with alterety of texts .Within narrative ethics itself, however, an important point of discussion has arisen. Philosophers such as A. McIntyre establish an immediate connection between narrativity and ethical behaviour. Others, such as Ricoeur, show, in my opinion convincingly, that narratives only have an influence on moral behaviour in a mediate way. The function of the imagination, situated between narrativity and ethics, allows us to live in our stories and give imaginary form to our fundamental choices and actions.The fact that imagination has stepped once again into the foreground of ethical discourse in recent years is an important one. The classic moral handbooks of both the philosophers and the theologians have tended all too often to undervalue and misinterpret it. (shrink)

The first annual meeting of the new European Ethics Network was held in Leuven from the 26th to the 28th of September. An initiative of Michel Falise, this network was originally a cooperating group of ethicists and centres of ethics at 40 Coimbra and FUCE universities. At present it has expanded, directly or indirectly via participating associations and networks, into a network of ethicists from every country of the European Union, from universities as well as from postsecondary engineering programs.It is (...) officially recognised and subsidised under the auspices of the European commission’s Socrates program. The European Ethics Network is not intended as a bureaucratic organisation but in the words of former K.U. Leuven rector Dillemans — as a “community of like-minded spirits, a community of ethicists who share the same concerns, not to preach to Europe, but to create a European vision of the role of ethics in the service of society”.The European Ethics Network grew out of the need for better ethical education in the training of future professionals such as medical experts, lawyers, managers, media experts, engineers and others. This goal can only be achieved by educating the professors and instructors, in both the research and teaching domains. What is mostimportant is to try and broaden formalistic or one-sided technical training into a more integrated approach, with greater global and social relevance. (shrink)

From 18 to 20 September 1997, the European Ethics Network held its second annual meeting. The theme this year was ‘Toward a Transdisciplinary Approach to Professional Ethics: Dialogue with the World of the Professions’. In attendance were some eighty participants from diverse European countries.The most important aspect of the second annual meeting was the presentation and discussion about the core materials project for the development of courses in professional ethics. This project involves the writing of European-based learning materials which instructors (...) can use as they develop their own courses and class presentation materials. The core materials project covers four areas: professional ethics in general, business ethics, medical ethics and engineering ethics. In the course of the discussions about the projects, ethicists were joined by non-ethicists, i.e. by representatives from the world of the professions. The presence and feedback from these professionals were welcome additions to this year’s meeting. A complete report and the proceedings from the second annual meeting will be published in an upcoming issue of Ethical Perspectives. (shrink)

A consensus exists in the Christian tradition concerning the idea that a faith conviction based on the gospel also has ethical and political implications. Much disunity remains, however, with respect to the interpretation of the relationship between the two. Throughout the history of theological thought we can find a variety of hypotheses on the question ranging from ideas of theocracy and ‘status confessionis’ declarations to manifold interpretations of the ‘two kingdom’ theory.In the political praxis of modern secularised society, the latter (...) ‘two kingdom’ theory, even when it is not explicit, is given some preference because it responds to our desire to guarantee the autonomy of politics in the face of ecclesiastical or ideological paternalism. Such a position is theoretically rendered by the liberal ‘method of avoidance’ and those political theologies which make a clear distinction between one’s secular dealings as a citizen or politician and one’s ‘ecclesiastical’ dealings as a believer.An unconscious maintenance of the ‘two kingdom’ theory also bears witness to the fact that the sense of responsibility and the realism of those politicians who take the logic of power into consideration, who are not afraid to get their hands dirty, is often highly praised while the ‘naive’ idealism of those who permit themselves to be guided by their faithful adherence to ideological goals are just as frequently looked down upon and spoken of with disapprobation. In concrete political praxis, the tendency to make a sharp separation between an ‘ethics of conviction’ and an ‘ethics of responsibility’ is further reinforced by the increasing influence of the technocrats and the representatives of various interest groups who inhabit the inner circle of ministerial cabinets. In such contexts, a realistic, ‘no-nonsense’ balance of interests is all too often considered the only viable and desirable option at the government’s disposal.Nevertheless, the relationship between ‘Gesinnungsethik’ and ‘Verantwortungsethik’ remains of essential importance to the political world. Without directional perspectives and individuals oriented towards high moral goals which derive their significance from meta-ethical frames of meaning, the political machine with its strategic rationality is in danger of becoming a pointless, systemimmanent and even alienating reality for many citizens. (shrink)

This book, which is one of the results of the "Core Materials Project" of the "European Ethics Network," submits for discussion the first results of an ...

This book is part of the core materials project of the 'European Ethics Network'.

Today, applied ethics confronts many problems: technological and biomedical innovations, crisis of the welfare state, rising unemployment, migration and xenophobia. These and the changes accompanying them are, in themselves, important objects of study.An investigation on the level of the differentiated disciplines of practical ethics is insufficient. In as far as practical ethics also serves to disclose reality, it shows that modern problems can only be understood in the light of the general cultural crisis of which they are, at the very (...) least, symptoms. In the first part of this article, we will try to clarify this byanalyzing the crisis in the ethos of modern secularized society. The second part will try to show that Christian ethics can offer a meaningful answer to this cultural crisis, and how it can do so. (shrink)

Business Ethics has really taken off in Belgium. The author is Professor at the Catholic University of Leuven, and an Associate Editor.

‘Narrativity and Hermeneutics’ is not an obvious subject to mark the fifth anniversary of a centre devoted to applied ethics. Narrative tradition and the interpretation of texts are not the main concern of handbooks on biomedical ethics, engineering ethics, business ethics or ecological ethics. The reasons are evident; most practitioners of applied ethics see their area of research as a functionally differentiated discipline, a carefully circumscribed field wherein only specialists are competent. In their textbooks they adopt the view of ethical (...) expertise as defended by Theo van Willingenburg in his noteworthy thesis Inside the Ethical Expert. According to this view, practitioners of applied ethics are experts possessing a body of specialized knowledge and skill within a given domain acquired through a substantial amount of study and training. Besides being able to clarify problems and analyze concepts and arguments, they are, as experts, also able to apply specific skills of moral reasoning to reach a substantiated evaluation of values and norms, with the ultimate purpose of offering suitable ethical advice.The acquisition of a certain amount of expertise is doubtless important. The practice of applied ethics is more than probing for a good moral intention. They primarily pursue the right moral choice, i.e. the action that in a given, often complex situation, is objectively suitable to express a good moral intention. A right moral choice is impossible without a thorough clarification of the complex reality about which a moral judgment must be made.Yet emphasizing ethical expertise does not say everything. Is it correct to position ethicists as experts parallel to the medical, economic or technical experts with whom they deal? Does applied ethics, because of its functionally differentiated approach, not run the risk of either reducing itself to a professional deontology with a limited view of responsibility or enclosing itself with other experts in an iron cage of technocratic, bureaucratic or instrumental rationality? When forming an ethical judgment, is it possible to exclude completely all influence arising from personal convictions? (shrink)

Clausewitz is not as some misinterpretations suggest a philosopher of total war. An analysis of his hermeneutical key presented in the first chapter of the first book of 'On War' makes it clear that there is a crucial distinction between his pure abstract concept of war - the notion of absolute war - and his theory of real war, where the irrationality ofviolence and the force of the military will, are subjected to political rationality. According to Clausewitz politicians carry the (...) ultimate responsibility in determining the ends of war, and this can only be done after a thorough appraisal of national and international realities. One of the consequences of his position is that the military and political levels are not, as A. Rapoport suggests, interchangeable but in a subordinate position. Military leaders should always follow the logic of politics, politicians however should not neglect the grammar of war. Despite some texts that might suggest the contrary, Clausewitz held a clear option for a defensive policy. Value judgments are left to philosophers. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship between the Islamic religion and the level of socially responsible business conduct (SRBC) of Islamic entrepreneurs. The authors find that the common ideas of SRBC correspond with the view of business in Islam, although there are also some notable differences. They also find that Muslim entrepreneurs attach a higher weight to specific elements of SRBC than do non‐Muslims. However, they also find that Muslims are less involved with applying SRBC in practice than non‐Muslim managers.

Suppose that you prefer A to B, B to C, and C to A. Your preferences violate Expected Utility Theory by being cyclic. Money-pump arguments offer a way to show that such violations are irrational. Suppose that you start with A. Then you should be willing to trade A for C and then C for B. But then, once you have B, you are offered a trade back to A for a small cost. Since you prefer A to B, you (...) pay the small sum to trade from B to A. But now you have been turned into a money pump. You are back to the alternative you started with but with less money. This Element shows how each of the axioms of Expected Utility Theory can be defended by money-pump arguments of this kind. The Element also defends money-pump arguments from the standard objections to this kind of approach. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core. (shrink)

Enacting an AI system typically requires three iterative phases where AI engineers are in command: selection and preparation of the data, selection and configuration of algorithmic tools, and fine-tuning of the different parameters on the basis of intermediate results. Our main hypothesis is that these phases involve practices with ethical questions. This paper maps these ethical questions and proposes a way to address them in light of a neo-republican understanding of freedom, defined as absence of domination. We thereby identify different (...) types of responsibility held by AI engineers and link them to concrete suggestions on how to improve professional practices. This paper contributes to the literature on AI and ethics by focusing on the work necessary to configure AI systems, thereby offering an input to better practices and an input for societal debates. (shrink)

A straightforward way to handle moral uncertainty is simply to follow the moral theory in which you have most credence. This approach is known as My Favourite Theory. In this paper, I argue that, in some cases, My Favourite Theory prescribes choices that are, sequentially, worse in expected moral value than the opposite choices according to each moral theory you have any credence in. In addition this, problem generalizes to other approaches that avoid intertheoretic comparisons of value, such as My (...) Favourite Option, the Borda Rule, Variance Normalization, and the Principle of Maximizing Expected Normalized Moral Value. (shrink)

Spinoza and Education offers a comprehensive investigation into the educational implications of Spinoza’s moral theory. Taking Spinoza’s naturalism as its point of departure, it constructs a considered account of education, taking special care to investigate the educational implications of Spinoza’s psychological egoism. What emerges is a counterintuitive form of education grounded in the egoistic striving of the teacher to persevere and to flourish in existence while still catering to the ethical demands of the students and the greater community. -/- In (...) providing an educational reading of Spinoza’s moral theory, this book sets up a critical dialogue between educational theory and recent studies which highlight the centrality of ethics in Spinoza’s overall philosophy. By placing his work in a contemporary educational context, chapters explore a counterintuitive conception of education as an ethical project, aimed at overcoming the desire to seek short-term satisfaction and troubling the influential concept of the student as consumer. This book also considers how education, from a Spinozistic point of view, may be approached in terms of a kind of cognitive therapy serving to further a more scientifically adequate understanding of the world and aimed at combating prejudices and superstition. -/- Spinoza and Education demonstrates that Spinoza’s moral theory can further an educational ideal, where notions of freedom and self-preservation provide the conceptual core of a coherent philosophy of education. As such, it will appeal to researchers, academics and postgraduate students in the fields of philosophy of education, theory of education, critical thinking, philosophy, ethics, and Spinoza studies. (shrink)

This paper examines the concept and moral significance of “childhood interests.” This concept is important in medical decision-making for children and more broadly in the field of pediatric ethics. The authors argue that childhood interests are identifiable components of childhood well-being that carry moral weight. Parents have a special role in protecting and promoting these interests and special obligations to do so. These parental obligations are grounded by the independent interests of the child, as well as the good of society (...) more generally. Because parents have these child-rearing obligations, they must also have the authority and wide discretion necessary to fulfill them. However, while parental discretion is wide, it is not unlimited, for it must be used to safeguard and advance childhood interests. (shrink)

One might think that money pumps directed at agents with cyclic preferences can be avoided by foresight. This view was challenged two decades ago by the discovery of a money pump with foresight, which works against agents who use backward induction. But backward induction implausibly assumes that the agent would act rationally and retain her trust in her future rationality even at choice nodes that could only be reached if she were to act irrationally. This worry does not apply to (...) BI-terminating decision problems, where at each choice node backward induction prescribes a move that terminates further action. For BI-terminating decision problems, it is enough to assume that rationality and trust in rationality are retained at choice nodes reachable by rational moves. The old money pump with foresight was not BI-terminating. In this paper, we present a new money pump with foresight, one that is both BI-terminating and considerably simpler. (shrink)

According to Longtermism, our acts’ expected influence on the expected value of the world is mainly determined by their effects in the far future. There is, given total utilitarianism, a straightforward argument for Longtermism due to the enormous number of people that might exist in the future, but this argument does not work on person-affecting views. In this paper, we will argue that these views might also lead to Longtermism if Prudential Longtermism is true. Prudential Longtermism holds for a person (...) if and only if our acts’ overall influence on that person’s expected well-being is mainly determined by the acts’ effects in the far future. We argue that (due to a small chance of anti-ageing and uploading) there could be an enormous amount of prudential value for some contemporary person in the far future and that value may be so large that it dominates their overall expectation of lifetime well-being. (shrink)

Given reductionism about people, personal persistence must fundamentally consist in some kind of impersonal continuity relation. Typically, these continuity relations can hold from one to many. And, if they can, the analysis of personal persistence must include a non-branching clause to avoid non-transitive identities or multiple occupancy. It is far from obvious, however, what form this clause should take. This paper argues that previous accounts are inadequate and develops a new proposal.

Education and Free Will critically assesses and makes use of Spinoza’s insights on human freedom to construe an account of education that is compatible with causal determinism without sacrificing the educational goal of increasing students’ autonomy and self-determination. Offering a thorough investigation into the philosophical position of causal determinism, Dahlbeck discusses Spinoza’s view of self-determination and presents his own suggestions for an education for autonomy from a causal determinist point of view. -/- The book begins by outlining the free will (...) problem in education, before expanding on a philosophical understanding of autonomy and how it is seen as an educational ideal. It considers Spinoza’s determinism and discusses his denial of moral responsibility. Later chapters consider the relationship between causal determinism and autonomy, the educational implications of understanding free will and how free will can be utilised as a valuable fiction in education. -/- This book will be of great interest to academics and postgraduate students in the field of education, especially those with an interest in moral education and philosophy of education. It will also be of interest to those in the fields of philosophy and psychology and specifically those focusing on the free will problem, on Spinoza studies, and on the relation between moral psychology and external influence. (shrink)

This book is a philosophical enquiry into the educational consequences of Spinoza’s political theory. Spinoza’s political theory is of particular interest for educational thought as it brings together the normative aims of his ethical theory with his realistic depiction of human psychology and the ramifications of this for successful political governance. As such, this book aims to introduce the reader to Spinoza’s original vision of civic education, as a project that ultimately aims at the ethical flourishing of individuals, while being (...) carefully tailored and adjusted to the natural limitations of human reason. -/- Readers will benefit from a succinct introduction to Spinoza’s political philosophy and from an account of civic education that is based on careful exegetical work. It draws conclusions only hinted at in Spinoza’s own writings. (shrink)

A standard liberal claim is that freedom of choice is not only instrumentally valuable but also intrinsically valuable, that is, valuable for its own sake. I argue that each one of five conditions is plausible if freedom of choice is intrinsically valuable. Yet there exists a counter-example to the conjunction of these conditions. Hence freedom of choice is not intrinsically valuable.

Is an outcome where many people are saved and one person dies better than an outcome where the one is saved and the many die? According to the standard utilitarian justification, the former is better because it has a greater sum total of well-being. This justification involves a controversial form of moral aggregation, because it is based on a comparison between aggregates of different people's well-being. Still, an alternative justification—the Argument for Best Outcomes—does not involve moral aggregation. I extend the (...) Argument for Best Outcomes to show that any utilitarian evaluation can be justified without moral aggregation. (shrink)

This article develops a new measure of freedom of choice based on the proposal that a set offers more freedom of choice than another if, and only if, the expected degree of dissimilarity between a random alternative from the set of possible alternatives and the most similar offered alternative in the set is smaller. Furthermore, a version of this measure is developed, which is able to take into account the values of the possible options.