[Denis Vernant: Introduction a la logique standard].

RésuméL'interprétation substitutionnelle de la quantification impose une redéfinition des principaux concepts du calcul logique.Son intérêt majeur réside dans le fait qu'elle permet d'esquisser une théorie de l'intensionnalité qui lève les difficultés résultant du traitement logique des contextes de modalité, de croyance et de citation.Pour autant, on ne saurait éluder la traditionnelle question de la référence et de l'existence. Celle‐ci relève maintenant d'une construction sémantique de modèles.SummaryThe substitutional interpretation of quantification modifies the main concepts of logical calculus.Its principal interest lies in (...) that it permits to sketch a theory of intensionality which removes the difficulties rising from the logical treatment of the contexts of modality, belief and quotation.For all that, we cannot evade the traditional question of reference and existence. This now depends on a semantical construction of models.ZusammenfassungDie substitutionelle Interpretation der Quantifikation erfordert eine neue Definition der Grundbegriffe des Logikkalküls.Ihr Hauptinteresse besteht darin, dass sie den Entwurf einer Theorie der Intensionalität ermöglicht; dadurch werden die Schwierigkeiten behoben, die bei der Behandlung von Kontexten mit Modal‐ und Meinungswörtern und Zitaten entstehen.Die traditionelle Frage nach der Referenz und der Existenz wird dabei nicht umgangen, indem sie nunmehr vermittelst von semantischen Modellen behandelt wird. (shrink)

Longtemps en linguistique, la sémantique a voulu reléguer la pragmatique au rang de discipline marginale. La pragmatique a enfin acquis droit de cité et consistance théorique, elle est un cadre général dans lequel les analyses traditionnelles du langage doivent être interprétées. Ainsi conçue, la pragmatique est un carrefour, point de rencontre des disciplines traitant du langage, approche actionnelle des phénomènes langagiers et communicationnels. Pages de début Prologue Chapitre Premier. Du discours à l'action Chapitre II. Genèse du concept d'assertion Chapitre III. (...) Classification des actes de discours et interactions langagières Chapitre IV. Pour une réévaluation pragmatique de l'assertion Chapitre V. Dialectique, forme dialogale et procès dialogique Chapitre VI. Modèle projectif du dialogue informatif Chapitre VII. L'intelligence de la machine et sa capacité dialogique Chapitre VIII. De l'action a la communication Épilogue Référencesbibliographiques Index des noms Index des concepts Pages de fin. (shrink)

"La philosophie occidentale s'est toujours pensée comme quête de vérité. Pour Socrate et les Mégariques cette quête relève du logos, mieux de la pratique du dialogue. Mobilisant les outils analytiques de la logique et de la philosophie du langage contemporaine, on propose ici de : 1-définir pragmatiquement les actes véridictionnels d'assertion, de dénégation qui ensemble constituent des actes d'estimation, mais aussi celui de désengagement qu'est la simple considération, en axiomatisant leurs relations mutuelles d'opposition ; 2-construire une logique dialogique de la (...) véridicité apte à rendre compte aussi bien de la démonstration de la validité formelle que de l'élaboration conjointe de la vérité "matérielle" prosaïque ; 3-déterminer les conditions praxéologiques d'établissement du vrai propres aux différents registres de véridicité. Ce faisant, on construit une alternative résolument actionnelle à l'antique traitement représentationnel et correspondantiste de la vérité"--P. [4] of cover. (shrink)

Résumé Procédant à une relecture de l’article de Jules Vuillemin « Difficultés logiques et problèmes philosophiques dans les Principia Mathematica de Russell », nous montrerons d’abord qu’effectivement la logique pure des Principia ne peut s’appliquer qu’à requérir des engagements existentiels sur des objets logico-mathématiques. Puis, en prolongeant les réflexions de Vuillemin, nous établirons que dans An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth Russell élabore une logique du langage ordinaire pour rendre compte à la fois de notre usage du langage et de (...) nos modes de connaissance empirique. (shrink)

Par le terme de philosophie mathematique, Bertrand Russell designe une philosophie qui s'efforce d'expliquer les principes logiques sur lesquels reposent les mathematiques. Portant sur l'ensemble de l'oeuvre logico-mathematique de Russell, depuis les Principles of Mathematics jusqu'aux Principia Mathematica en passant par On Denoting, cette etude reconstitue la genese de la logique russellienne a partir d'une reflexion grammaticale et scrute l'analyse philosophique des concepts et propositions mathematiques qui gouverne leur reduction logiciste. L'auteur, adoptant une approche historique, souligne, a travers evolutions et (...) ruptures, la coherence d'une authentique pensee. (shrink)

RésuméLa question traditionnelle de ľexistence fait aujour?on;hui ľobjet ?on;un traitement logique rigoureux.Adoptant une perspective historique, nous proposons de rappeler les analyses inaugurales des Principia Mathematica qui, en plus de leur richesse intrinsèque, nous permettront ?on;apprécier la valeur de la doctrine quinéenne de 1'engagement ontologique.Ce faisant, nous montrerons que la théorie logique classique, loin de clore le débat, s'avère finalement tributaire de présupposés qui, tels ceux relatifs au rejet des entités possibles ou àľinterprétation de la signification, relèvent de choix philosophiques irréductibles.SummaryNowadays, (...) modern logic offers a formal treatement of the traditional question of existence.From a historical point of view, we propose to recall the original analyses of Principia Mathematica which, besides their intrinsic interest, will enable us to evaluate Quine's doctrine of ontological commitment.So, we shall point out that the classical logical theory, instead of settling the question, is finally subordinate to presuppositions which, like those about the rejection of possible entities or about interpretation of meaning, are a consequence of irreducible philosophical choices.ZusammenfassungDie traditionelle Frage nach der Existenz wird in der zeitgenössischen Philosophic aufgrund von logischen Techniken behandelt.Von einem historischen Gesichtspunkt ausgehend erinnert der Verfasser an die ursprünglichen Analysen in den Principia Mathematica, die uns, abgesehen von ihrem eigenen Wert, erlauben werden, Quines Lehre von den ontologischen Verpflichtungen zu beurteilen.Es erweist sich, dass die logische Behandlung in dieser Frage insofern nicht endgültig entscheiden kann, als die Theorie schliesslich von Voraussetzungen abhängt, die — wie diejenigen, die zur Verwerfung von bloss möglichen Entitäten oder zum Begriff der Bedeutung führen — selbst auf irreduziblen philosophischen Standpunkten beruhen. (shrink)

La dynamique des sciences se deploie selon des temporalites multiples qui possedent leurs propres rythmes. De ce point de vue, l'exercice qui consiste a scander en decennies l'histoire de la logique et des sciences formelles est perilleux. Peut-on aller au-dela et tenter de donner sens a cette decennie des annees trente? La fin du logicisme, l'avenement de nouvelles logiques, le developpement du formalisme, ses limitations internes, sa critique externe et les approches formelles du langage sont six traits caracteristiques explores dans (...) ce recueil d'articles qui font apparaitre l'eloignement ainsi que la proximite des annees trente et de cette fin de siecle. (shrink)

La dynamique des sciences se deploie selon des temporalites multiples qui possedent leurs propres rythmes. De ce point de vue, l'exercice qui consiste a scander en decennies l'histoire de la logique et des sciences formelles est perilleux. Peut-on aller au-dela et tenter de donner sens a cette decennie des annees trente? La fin du logicisme, l'avenement de nouvelles logiques, le developpement du formalisme, ses limitations internes, sa critique externe et les approches formelles du langage sont six traits caracteristiques explores dans (...) ce recueil d'articles qui font apparaitre l'eloignement ainsi que la proximite des annees trente et de cette fin de siecle. (shrink)

Ce livre se propose de réaliser le projet ambitieux d'établir les fondements d'une épistémologie des nanotechnosciences. Il s'agit d'une analyse de philosophie des sciences portant sur cet objet nouveau et de grande importance scientifique, économique, politique et sociale. Cet ouvrage dresse un paysage détaillé des questions épistémologiques que posent les nanotechnosciences et cherche, chez les philosophes des sciences qui proposent des théories du changement scientifique, les moyens de répondre à ces questions. Compte tenu des conclusions de Guèye selon lesquelles aucune (...) des théories philosophiques actuelles ne répond vraiment aux questions épistémologiques soulevées par l'avènement des « nanotechnologies », il suggère quelques pistes pour dépasser les limites des épistémologies contemporaines, en s'appuyant sur la philosophie du langage d'Austin et sur la praxéologie de Denis Vernant. Dans cette contribution majeure au débat scientifique sur les nanotechnosciences, il procède à l'examen des principales théories philosophiques du changement scientifique dans le but de décider de leur capacité à prendre en charge les changements introduits par l'apparition des nouvelles technologies de « l'infiniment petit ». Ce projet philosophique tire son intérêt et sa pertinence du fait que l'apparition des « nanotechnologies » constitue un changement phénoménal, et qu'il est important de disposer d'une théorie du changement scientifique qui en rendît compte. Un autre thème majeur de ce livre est celui de la place de la recherche de la vérité dans les nanotechnosciences. Même s'il s'agit d'un thème trop vaste, Guèye l'affronte cependant sans détour dans ce livre. La problématique du rapport entre science et technologie y est abordée plus franchement. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviews 171 c:\users\ken\documents\type3402\rj 3402 050 red.docx 2015-02-04 9:19 PM REFLECTIONS FROM PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA Russell Wahl English and Philosophy / Idaho State U. Pocatello, id 83209 usa [email protected] Alexandre Guay, ed. Autour des Principia Mathematica de Russell et Whitehead. (Collection Histoire et Philosophie des Sciences.) Dijon: Editions Universitaires de Dijon, 2012. Pp. 168. isbn 978-2-36441-001-4. €20.00 (pb). his collection, by several distinguished French philosophers, is intended to be a work (...) on problems which are suggested by or perhaps stem from Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica. It turns out to be a somewhat eclectic collection. Some of the papers explicate points in Principia, some delve into issues from Principia or perhaps suggested by something in it, and q= 172 Reviews c:\users\ken\documents\type3402\rj 3402 050 red.docx 2015-02-04 9:19 PM some into issues suggested by later works of Russell’s. The collection was put together for the centenary of Principia, with the idea of focusing on “its posterity, the doors it has opened, the questions it has brought up, and the techniques it has initiated” (p. 5). The essays are all interesting, but in some of them the main focuses are only introduced and are not developed very much, appearing to explicate points already made in detail elsewhere and not adding a great deal that is new. The first essay, for example, gives an overview of the development of Russell’s logic, the theory of classes and the account of relations, the antinomies, the theory of descriptions and even the ramified theory of types. While the review is useful, there doesn’t seem to be here anything more than what would be found in the previous works of Denis Vernant, Jules Vuillemin, or Philippe de Rouilhan, on which the author draws. Hints of further issues are to be found in the discussion, but they are not developed because of the sheer number of points being reviewed. Denis Vernant, in the fifth essay, gives a thorough review of Russell’s account of similarity of relations and his use of this in relation-arithmetic, mostly from Chapter 6 of Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy. Vernant points out that Russell uses the terms “analogy” and “exactly analogous” in several places and thinks of these in terms of his definition of structure. At the end of the essay Vernant begins with Russell’s formal account of structure and seeks to give an account of analogy, and specifically metaphor, using the tools of similarity of structure. Again, the discussion of similarity relations is good, but does not really go beyond previous work, and the application to metaphor, while interesting, is very brief. The sixth essay, by Nadine Gessler and Denis Miéville, discusses Lesniewski ”s criticisms of Principia and gives some hint of Lesniewski’s own positions. Lesniewski’s work is very interesting and has probably not been given its due. These authors briefly mention Lesniewski’s concerns about classes, the assertion sign and definitions, and then give a short presentation of Lesniewski’s own views. This last part is again just sketched out. The authors do point out difficulties Lesniewski had with parts of Principia, including the sloppiness about use and mention, the requirement that definitions be non-creative and the theory of types. They also point out that Lesniewski had a view of logic (reminiscent of Arnauld and Nicod) as “the art of thinking”, and they discuss his suspicion of sets as abstract entities rather than mereological wholes of the kind which can be grounded in experience. Lesniewski apparently thought of mathematical logic as limiting and not encompassing the whole of thinking. This is curious, because often Russell and Whitehead are accused of expanding logic in order to capture all mathematics as part of logic. Gessler and Miéville accent the differences between Lesniewski ’s position and Principia, but in many ways Lesniewski’s views are actually Reviews 173 c:\users\ken\documents\type3402\rj 3402 050 red.docx 2015-02-04 9:19 PM closer to those of Whitehead and Russell than to, e.g., the views... (shrink)

This article applies the Kantian doctrine of respect for persons to the problem of sweatshops. We argue that multinational enterprises are properly regarded as responsible for the practices of their subcontractors and suppliers. We then argue that multinationalenterprises have the following duties in their off-shore manufacturing facilities: to ensure that local labor laws are followed; to refrain from coercion; to meet minimum safety standards; and to provide a living wage for employees. Finally, we consider and reply to the objection that (...) improving health and safety conditions and providing a living wage will cause greater harm than good. (shrink)

We distinguish dynamical and statistical interpretations of evolutionary theory. We argue that only the statistical interpretation preserves the presumed relation between natural selection and drift. On these grounds we claim that the dynamical conception of evolutionary theory as a theory of forces is mistaken. Selection and drift are not forces. Nor do selection and drift explanations appeal to the (sub-population-level) causes of population level change. Instead they explain by appeal to the statistical structure of populations. We briefly discuss the implications (...) of the statistical interpretation of selection for various debates within the philosophy of biologythe `explananda of selection' debate and the `units of selection' debate. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:In a series of reports the United Nations Special Representative on the issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations has emphasized a tripartite framework regarding business and human rights that includes the state “duty to protect,” the TNC “responsibility to respect,” and “appropriate remedies” for human rights violations. This article examines the recent history of UN initiatives regarding business and human rights and places the tripartite framework in historical context. Three approaches to human rights are distinguished: moral, political, and legal. (...) It is argued that the tripartite framework’s grounding of the responsibility of TNCs to respect human rights is properly understood as moral and not merely as a political or legal duty. A moral account of the duty of TNCs to respect basic human rights is defended and contrasted with a merely strategic approach. The main conclusion of the article is that only a moral account of the basic human rights duties of TNCs provides a sufficiently deep justification of “the corporate responsibility to respect human rights” feature of the tripartite framework. (shrink)

We review recent developments in ethical pluralism, ethical particularism, Kantian intuitionism, rights theory, and climate change ethics, and show the relevance of these developments in ethical theory to contemporary business ethics. This paper explains why pluralists think that ethical decisions should be guided by multiple standards and why particularists emphasize the crucial role of context in determining sound moral judgments. We explain why Kantian intuitionism emphasizes the discerning power of intuitive reason and seek to integrate that with the comprehensiveness of (...) Kant’s moral framework. And we show how human rights can be grounded in human agency, and explain the connections between human rights and climate change. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Little theoretical attention has been paid to the question of what obligations corporations and other business enterprises have to the four billion people living at the base of the global economic pyramid. This article makes several theoretical contributions to this topic. First, it is argued that corporations are properly understood as agents of global justice. Second, the legitimacy of global governance institutions and the legitimacy of corporations and other business enterprises are distinguished. Third, it is argued that a deliberative democracy (...) model of corporate legitimacy defended by theorists of political CSR is unsatisfactory. Fourth, it is argued that a Rawlsian theoretical framework fails to provide a satisfactory account of the obligations of corporations regarding global justice. Finally, an ethical conception of CSR grounded in an appropriately modest set of duties tied to corporate relationships is then defended. This position is cosmopolitan in scope and grounded in overlapping arguments for human rights. (shrink)

There are two competing interpretations of the modern synthesis theory of evolution: the dynamical (also know as ‘traditional’) and the statistical. The dynamical interpretation maintains that explanations offered under the auspices of the modern synthesis theory articulate the causes of evolution. It interprets selection and drift as causes of population change. The statistical interpretation holds that modern synthesis explanations merely cite the statistical structure of populations. This paper offers a defense of statisticalism. It argues that a change in trait frequencies (...) in a population can be attributed only to selection or drift against the background of a particular statistical description of the population. The traditionalist supposition that selection and drift are description‐independent causes of population change leads the dynamical interpretation into a dilemma: it must face a contradiction or accept the loss of explanatory power. (shrink)

Most shoppers like bargains. Do bargains come at the expense of workers in sweatshops around the world? The authors argue that many large multinational corporations are running the moral equivalents of sweatshops and are not properly respecting the rights of persons. They list a set of minimum standards of safety and decency that they claim all corporations should meet (and that many are not). Finally, they defend their call for improved working conditions by replying to objections that meeting improved conditions (...) will cause greater harm than good, even to the workers themselves. They consider many specifi c corporations and name names and point the finger at various forms of disrespect for persons, along the way. (shrink)

"The main conclusion of this essay is that it is plausible to conclude that corporations are capable of exhibiting intentionality, and as a result that they may be properly understood as moral agents" (p. 281).

ABSTRACT:We review recent developments in ethical pluralism, ethical particularism, Kantian intuitionism, rights theory, and climate change ethics, and show the relevance of these developments in ethical theory to contemporary business ethics. This paper explains why pluralists think that ethical decisions should be guided by multiple standards and why particularists emphasize the crucial role of context in determining sound moral judgments. We explain why Kantian intuitionism emphasizes the discerning power of intuitive reason and seek to integrate that with the comprehensiveness of (...) Kant’s moral framework. And we show how human rights can be grounded in human agency, and explain the connections between human rights and climate change. (shrink)

According to Aristotelian essentialism, the nature of an organism is constituted of a particular goal-directed disposition to produce an organism typical of its kind. This paper argues—against the prevailing orthodoxy—that essentialism of this sort is indispensable to evolutionary biology. The most powerful anti-essentialist arguments purport to show that the natures of organisms play no explanatory role in modern synthesis biology. I argue that recent evolutionary developmental biology provides compelling evidence to the contrary. Developmental biology shows that one must appeal to (...) the capacities of organisms to explain what makes adaptive evolution adaptive. Moreover, the specific capacities in question are precisely those that, according to Aristotle, constitute the nature of an organism. Essentialism 1.1 Aristotelian biological kinds Evolutionary anti-essentialism 2.1 Taxonomic anti-essentialism 2.2 Explanatory anti-essentialism Adaptation 3.1 Stability 3.2 Mutability 3.3 Phenotypic plasticity and adaptive evolution The natures of organisms Conclusion. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been an increasing interest among philosophers of memory in the questions of how to characterize and to account for the temporal phenomenology of episodic memory. One prominent suggestion has been that episodic memory involves a feeling of pastness, the elaboration of which has given rise to two main approaches. On the intentionalist approach, the feeling of pastness is explained in terms of what episodic memory represents. In particular, Fernández has argued that it can be explained (...) in terms of memory representing itself as being caused by a past perceptual experience. On the metacognitive approach, which we have recently developed in, the feeling of pastness results from the monitoring and interpretation of the processing features of episodic remembering. In this paper, we show that the metacognitive approach should be preferred over the intentionalist approach. We argue that intentionalism, and Fernández’ causal self-referential view in particular, ultimately fail as accounts of the feeling of pastness. The difficulties faced by intentionalism allows us to single out three constraints that any satisfactory account of the temporal phenomenology of episodic remembering needs to meet. We conclude by arguing that the metacognitive view satisfies those constraints in a neat way, and as such, that it should be preferred over intentionalism. (shrink)

There are two general approaches to characterising biological functions. One originates with Cummins. According to this approach, the function of a part of a system is just its causal contribution to some specified activity of the system. Call this the ‘C-function’ concept. The other approach ties the function of a trait to some aspect of its evolutionary significance. Call this the ‘E-function’ concept. According to the latter view, a trait's function is determined by the forces of natural selection. The C-function (...) and E-function concepts are clearly quite different, but there is an important relation between them which heretofore has gone unnoticed. The purpose of this paper is to outline that relation.This is not the first paper to discuss the relation of C-function and E-function. Previous attempts all follow either one of two strategies. The first proposes that the two concepts are ‘unified.’ The other proposes that they are radically distinct and apply to wholly different fields within biology. (shrink)

Several notions of computability-theoretic reducibility between [Formula: see text] principles have been studied. This paper contributes to the program of analyzing the behavior of versions of Ramsey’s Theorem and related principles under these notions. Among other results, we show that for each [Formula: see text], there is an instance of RT[Formula: see text] all of whose solutions have PA degree over [Formula: see text] and use this to show that König’s Lemma lies strictly between RT[Formula: see text] and RT[Formula: see (...) text] under one of these notions. We also answer two questions raised by Dorais, Dzhafarov, Hirst, Mileti, and Shafer on comparing versions of Ramsey’s Theorem and of the Thin Set Theorem with the same exponent but different numbers of colors. Still on the topic of the effect of the number of colors on the computable aspects of Ramsey-theoretic properties, we show that for each [Formula: see text], there is an [Formula: see text]-coloring [Formula: see text] of [Formula: see text] such that every [Formula: see text]-coloring of [Formula: see text] has an infinite homogeneous set that does not compute any infinite homogeneous set for [Formula: see text], and connect this result with the notion of infinite information reducibility introduced by Dzhafarov and Igusa. Next, we introduce and study a new notion that provides a uniform version of the idea of implication with respect to [Formula: see text]-models of RCA0, and related notions that allow us to count how many applications of a principle [Formula: see text] are needed to reduce another principle to [Formula: see text]. Finally, we fill in a gap in the proof of Theorem 12.2 in Cholak, Jockusch, and Slaman. (shrink)

After providing a brief history of global climate change, we consider and reject the influential position that free markets and responsive democracies relieve corporations of obligations to protect the environment. Five main objections to the free market view are presented, focusing in particular on the roles of business organizations in the transportation and electricity generation sectors. Ethically grounded management and public policy recommendations are offered.

The concept of the environment appears to be indispensably involved in adaptive explanation. Quite what its role is, however, is a matter of some dispute. The environment is customarily viewed as the dual of the organism; a wholly external, discrete, autonomous cause of evolution. On this view, the external environment is the principal cause of the adaptedness of form, and the determinant of what it is to be an adaptation. I argue that this conception of the environment neither adequately explains (...) nor individuates evolutionary adaptations. Instead, adaptation, properly construed, is an evolutionary response to affordances. The environment, traditionally construed, underdetermines an organism’s affordances. Instead, I argue that the environment takes its place in evolutionary models not as a discrete causal entity, but as an abstraction. (shrink)