Although irrationality always presupposes rationality, I think there are good arguments to claim that sometimes rationality presupposes irrationality.This paper tries to show how irrational action can support rationality in two ways: it can develop and preserve rationality. I also argue that sometimes the development and the conservation of rationality can only be realized by irrational action.

The End of Boredom Boredom has been admired for its audacity to see human life as it is: ultimately without meaning. Moreover, boredom has been attributed the power to overcome itself. The contention is that it is sufficient not to resist boredom. In this article I oppose these views. First, I describe and analyze boredom as a bipolar mood: on the one hand the person who is bored experiences a generalized loss of meaning in ordinary life, on the other hand (...) he is oriented towards something extraordinary, but indefinite (or at least underdetermined) that will reinstate meaning in life. The person who is deeply bored is deadlocked between these two poles. The deadlock of this bipolar state has gotten a peculiarly keen edge in modern society. I argue next that neither of the poles of boredom has the capacity to end the mood. The expectation that in a state of generalized meaninglessness something meaningful will reveal itself, is an illusion and part of the deadlock of boredom. It deepens boredom. Finally, I outline an alternative way of ending boredom that implies that one should resist the mood. We should object to the person who is bored that the generalization of his deprecation of what has meaning in ordinary life to basic human interests and activities, makes no sense. These things cannot be meaningfully doubted without one’s becoming an outsider to human life. I grant that an argument alone cannot end a mood. It is at least as important to seduce the person who is bored to reengage with these basic interests and activities. As an outsider who postpones life indefinitely, he cannot fully understand their meaning. (shrink)

Modern society as well as modern ethical theory is characterised by excessiveness. To produce and to consume as much as possible is the current world ethos. The utility principle of consequentialism is considered to be too demanding and Kant’s categorical imperative too strict. In this article it is my proposal to reintroduce the virtue of detachment as a basic component of the moral attitude. Detachment used to be a virtue in classical virtue ethics such as Cynicism, Epicureanism and Stoicism. I (...) take detachment to be the alternative for an attitude of excess. A detached person accepts his vulnerability and his being to a certain extent left to coincidences. Detachment is not opposed to attachment. It requires attachment. The virtue of detachment involves the ability to break away from the activities, persons, things, places and perhaps even principles one is attached to. It is irreducible to maximally promoting well-being and honouring unconditionally each person. (shrink)

Analyse van het begrip moraliteit als grondslag voor de ethiek, voorbij een beklemmend stelstel van dwingende regels.

This article addresses the issue of properly assenting children with psychotic disorders to participate in clinical research. Due to the protective concerns with such a vulnerable population, additional precautions are necessary to ensure that youth with psychotic disorders assent to research with an appropriate level of understanding regarding study procedures. Current literature suggests that positive/negative symptoms and minor cognitive deficits do not interfere with the ability to comprehend study-related information for adults with psychosis if the study information is presented through (...) an educative process. Similarly, youth benefit from repeated presentation of procedures and periodic assessment of their comprehension. An integrated educative process is proposed that emphasizes the importance of an interactive consent through repetition and participant/investigator feedback. (shrink)

BackgroundResearch on prevalence of cognitive frailty phenotypes in community-dwelling older adults in different countries is important to estimate their prevalence and to determine the influence of cognitive reserve and mental health in order to prevent frailty. The aims of this study were to estimate the prevalence of reversible and potentially reversible cognitive frailty in a Portuguese sample of old adults and explore the associations between these phenotypes and demographic, comorbidity, social support, cognitive reserve and mental health factors.MethodsWe assessed frailty in (...) 250 community-dwelling older adults aged 60 years or over without dementia, neurological or psychiatric disorders. Subjective cognitive decline and Mild cognitive impairment were diagnosed according to standard criteria. The questionnaires Charlson Index, Medical Outcomes Study Social Support, Cognitive Reserve Index and General Health were used for assessing comorbidity, social support, cognitive reserve and mental health, respectively.ResultsPrevalence of R-CF was 14%, and that of PR-CF, 15.2%. Cognitive frailty profiles differed significantly in relation to education, comorbidity, mental health, and cognitive reserve, but not in age or sex. Multivariate logistic regression showed that age, sex, comorbidity, social support, mental health, and cognitive reserve together predicted R-CF and PR-CF with significant OR for mental health and cognitive reserve.DiscussionCognitive reserve and mental health are important factors predicting R-CF and PR-CF. We recommend assessing these factors for early detection of cognitive frailty and promoting psychological well-being and lifestyles that increase cognitive reserve in adults. (shrink)

A response to Lee Basham's 'The Need for Accountable Witnesses: A Reply to Dentith'.

This essay illustrates what the Chinese family-based and harmony-oriented model of medical decision making is like as well as how it differs from the modern Western individual-based and autonomy-oriented model in health care practice. The essay discloses the roots of the Chinese model in the Confucian account of the family and the Confucian view of harmony. By responding to a series of questions posed to the Chinese model by modern Western scholars in terms of the basic individualist concerns and values (...) embedded in the modern Western model, we conclude that the Chinese people have justifiable reasons to continue to apply the Chinese model to their contemporary health care and medical practice. (shrink)

This reply to an ongoing debate between conspiracy theory researchers from different disciplines exposes the conceptual confusions that underlie some of the disagreements in conspiracy theory research. Reconciling these conceptual confusions is important because conspiracy theories are a multidisciplinary topic and a profound understanding of them requires integrative insights from different fields. Specifically, we distinguish research focussing on conspiracy *theories* (and theorizing) from research of conspiracy *belief* (and mindset, theorists) and explain how particularism with regards to conspiracy theories does not (...) mean we cannot define a problematic subclass of conspiracy beliefs, while avoiding the problems of generalism. We hope this reply helps conspiracy theory researchers recognize the differences between studying conspiracy theories and conspiracy beliefs and appreciate the possibilities for fruitful, integrative, and interdisciplinary research. (shrink)

Violations and biases relative to normative principles of rationality tend to occur when the structure of task environments is novel or the decision goals are in conflict. The two blades of bounded rationality, the structure of task environments and the computational capacities of the actor, can sharpen the conceptual distinctions between the sources of the normative and descriptive gap.

Intentional change when viewed as making a risky or intertemporal choice with evolutionary relevance helps us understand its successes and its failures. To promote future-oriented ecological rationality requires establishing a linkage between nongenetic, cultural, and symbolic selections and genetic adaptations. Coupled with biophilic instinct, intentional conservation is more likely to prevail against evolved desires of environmental exploitation.

We agree with Ainslie's general approach to intertemporal choices and self-control. However, we argue that a concept of “will” is superfluous in explaining tradeoffs between SS (smaller and sooner) and LL (larger and later) rewards in a framework of temporal goal setting and goal aggregation. We provide an alternative framework of reference point-dependent tradeoffs between SS and LL options.