The articles in this book display the originality and creativity of Eros and Eris, and their important role in the history of our culture, particularly in the history of philosophy and its role in today's systematic philosophy. Although these contributions to a hermeneutical phenomenology in this compilation are organized in a linear-chronological order (treating Homer, Hesiod, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, Cusanus, Kant, Hegel, Schelling, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger and Levinas), they all carry out their own hermeneutical movement in the (...) history of philosphy on the basis of a commitment with out life, here and now, and a thematic, professional interest. Among the contributors are: R. Bernasconi, J. Colette, J.F. Courtine, L. Dupré, Kl. Düsing, J. Greisch, J. Kockelmans, P.-J. Labarrière and G. Jarczyk, E. Levinas, Al. Lingis, J.-L. Marion, O. Pöggeler, W. Richardson, P. Ricoeur, J. Sallis, M. Theunissen and S. IJsseling. (shrink)

L'amicizia, secondo Nietzsche, richiede un tipo particolare di conoscenza di sé: quella che consente di nascondersi e che preserva dall'illusione che gli amici possano essere mai completamente trasparenti gli uni agli altri. Questo tipo di conoscenza di sé genera solitudine, che a sua volta suscita un desiderio di amicizia. Gli amici possono essere onesti tra di loro solo quando si consentono reciprocamente di nascondersi e ciò richiede un senso molto acuto della "misura e della medietà", come quello manifestato dal nobile.Friendship, (...) according to Nietzsche, is in need of a particular kind of self-knowledge: the kind that allows one to hide oneself and that prevents one from the illusion that friends could ever be completely open towards one another. This kind of self-knowledge causes solitude, which, in turn, causes a longing for friendship. Friends can only be honest to each other when they allow each other reciprocally their hiding. This demands a very sharp sense of "measure and middle", such as the noble presents it. (shrink)

In the general introduction to the first part of his Philosophie de la Volonté, Le volontaire et l’involontaire Paul Ricoeur writes that the phenomenological or ‘pure description […] of the Voluntary and the Involuntary’ is ‘constituted by bracketing’ two things: first the fault, which is essentially a perversion of the pure nature or the essence of human willing; and second ‘Transcendence which hides within it the ultimate origin of subjectivity’. Evil, the condition of brokenness or the reality of the fault, (...) asks for an empirical description of concrete myths and symbols. He will remove this first bracketing in the second part of his Philosophy of the Will and in the long ‘series of detours’ of his hermeneutical writings. The second bracketing, however, will turn out to be much more difficult to remove. It demands a ‘poetics’, which would threaten Ricoeur’s effort to separate his Christian faith from his ‘autonomous’ philosophizing. In this article I argue that Ricoeur eventually did present his poetics, though only in the epilogue to his penultimate book on ‘Difficult Forgiveness’. The article indicates why this epilogue might fulfil the promise of a poetics, explains why this could only be done in an epilogue and gives at least one possible reason why Ricoeur could write at the end of his oeuvre, what he could not at its beginning. (shrink)

© 2014 International Journal of Philosophy and Theology. In the general introduction to the first part of his Philosophie de la Volonté, Le volontaire et l’involontaire Paul Ricoeur writes that the phenomenological or ‘pure description […] of the Voluntary and the Involuntary’ is ‘constituted by bracketing’ two things: first the fault, which is essentially a perversion of the pure nature or the essence of human willing; and second ‘Transcendence which hides within it the ultimate origin of subjectivity’. Evil, the condition (...) of brokenness or the reality of the fault, asks for an empirical description of concrete myths and symbols. He will remove this first bracketing in the second part of his Philosophy of the Will and in the long ‘series of detours’ of his hermeneutical writings. The second bracketing, however, will turn out to be much more difficult to remove. It demands a ‘poetics’, which would threaten Ricoeur’s effort to separate his Christian faith from his ‘autonomous’ philosophizing. In this article I argue that Ricoeur eventually did present his poetics, though only in the epilogue to his penultimate book on ‘Difficult Forgiveness’. The article indicates why this epilogue might fulfil the promise of a poetics, explains why this could only be done in an epilogue and gives at least one possible reason why Ricoeur could write at the end of his oeuvre, what he could not at its beginning. (shrink)

As the title implies, this article asks what an adequate practical ethic is and what a hermeneutic of moral experience can mean for practical ethics. We will use some elements from Ricoeur’s work to examine our view critically and develop it further. We will ask how experience can be an object of hermeneutical study and how we can tie narrativity and normativity together.

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzsche-Studien Jahrgang: 45 Heft: 1 Seiten: 143-157.

The paper offers a counter- reading to Derrida's “utopian” reading of Nietzsche, focussing instead on Nietzsche's cynical view of friendship, based on the impossibility of being a friend to oneself. Unlike Aristotle, who sees the basis of human political nature in their shared rationality and mutual friendship, Nietzsche sees not only politics, but human beings themselves as being constituted by a violent act of submission, and characterised by an ongoing struggle for power. The paper further examines two intellectual traditions about (...) friendship and politics, one according to which the two are positively related and no real tension could exist between them. Another tradition holds friendship to be irreconcilable with politics. Elements of both traditions can be recognised in Nietzsche who, finding the radical deceptive nature of friendship unacceptable, moves to a solitude which is equally unbearable. For it is precisely the hermit that knows that his solitude makes him into an other to himself, which turns out to be a motive for real friendship, the third element which prevents the lonely hermit from sinking into the depth of self- interrogation. The paper concludes with the recognition that friendship, for Nietzsche, can only have an intermediary function on the way to full realisation of friendship, which will be a friendship of an inner difference or plurality, i.e. on our way to what is ultimately beyond the human condition, to the “over man”. (shrink)

O presente artigo examina o conceito, o diagnóstico e o prognóstico feito por Nietzsche a respeito do niilismo europeu e sua história, e o analisa como uma das mais importantes de suas contribuições para a filosofia e a cultura de nosso tempo.

Amsterdam University Press is a leading publisher of academic books, journals and textbooks in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Our aim is to make current research available to scholars, students, innovators, and the general public. AUP stands for scholarly excellence, global presence, and engagement with the international academic community.

Insofar as the notion of forgiveness stems from the Jewish and Christian traditions, it seems to point at something very extraordinary. Although Christianity recommends or even commissions forgiveness to everybody, it nevertheless seems to consist of something which is not humanly possible: how could one remember the evil committed , and at the same time not blame the one who committed it? By ultimately reserving the entitlement and ability to forgive to God, by describing human forgiveness as a theological virtue, (...) and by emphasizing the gratuitous or gracious character of forgiveness, this tradition seems most of all to show that forgiveness is generally speaking impossible. In this paper, this conception of forgiveness is presented with the help of Jacques Derrida. The question how this apparently impossibility nevertheless sometimes happens is first answered with the help of Thomas Aquinas. Against this background, the paper claims that a ‘secular’ interpretation of forgiveness is also possible, which does justice to its being humanly impossible. Such interpretation describes forgiveness as an intersubjective act. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Nietzsche's Critique of Morality and Ethics The Morality of the Critique.

In this article I examine the question whether classical virtue ethics, specifically the virtue of moderation, can still be of any significance for one of the major problems of our times: the environment. Can the virtue of moderation make a meaningful contribution to environmental ethics?

Today the problem of responsible parenthood is frequently reduced to the question of whether or not a couple actually desires to have a child. In medical circles the same question is reduced even further to a choice between the various forms of medical assistance available to a couple who might desire to have a child, but who have been unsuccessful in their own efforts. As a counterbalance to this narrowing process, it would seem appropriate to ask a number of questions (...) which in fact ought to precede it: Why do we want children in the first place? What are we really looking for in our desire to have children? What does it actually mean to have children?In attempting to answer these questions, our course will be a philosophical one, focusing on the meaning of our actions and the reality which surrounds us. Philosophy is unlikely to uncover new facts in such an investigation; its task is simply to examine the presuppositions present prior to our interpretation of the data that emerge from this. Our answers to the questions surrounding our desire for children and the meaning of parenthood must come prior to the available facts on the matter for the simple reason that it will define the significance that these facts will have for us.The questions frequently raised in ethical, pedagogical and juridical literature concerning the rights of parents and children with respect to one another must also precede our examination of the facts. Rights and obligations always pertain to a specific relationship. Knowledge of such relationships is presumed, therefore, when we go about discussing the rights and obligations of the parties involved. By exploring the presuppositions which make our questioning and understanding of the facts possible, philosophy endeavours to create a space wherein we can look at things differently, a space where new and different possibilities are opened up. While we admit that philosophy is not going to uncover new facts, it will, if it works, produce new possibilities for understanding the facts and give them meaning.In this paper, I would like to begin by offering a description of the love parents feel for their children. In the second section I will attempt to draw some conclusions from this description concerning our desire to have the children we do not yet have. In the final section I will endeavour to situate these conclusions in a somewhat broader context. (shrink)

Amsterdam University Press is a leading publisher of academic books, journals and textbooks in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Our aim is to make current research available to scholars, students, innovators, and the general public. AUP stands for scholarly excellence, global presence, and engagement with the international academic community.

Socialism, utilitarianism and democracy are, according to Nietzsche, secularised versions of Christianity. They have continued the monomaniac onesidedness of the Christian idea of what a human being is and should be, and they have even strengthened this monomania through its ‘immanentisation'. The article shows that this ‘immanentisation' is of crucial importance for Nietzsche's critique of democracy. This critique may suggest that Nietzsche's alternative for the disappeared Christian faith is not only a more radical rupture from the religious past, but also (...) a re-interpretation or recreation of the notion of transcendence implied in that faith.. South African Journal of Philosophy Vol. 26 (1) 2007: pp. 5-16. (shrink)

Until recently, psychologists have conceptualised and studied trust in God (TIG) largely in isolation from contemporary work in theology, philosophy, history, and biblical studies that has examined the topic with increasing clarity. In this article, we first review the primary ways that psychologists have conceptualised and measured TIG. Then, we draw on conceptualizations of TIG outside the psychology of religion to provide a conceptual map for how TIG might be related to theorised predictors and outcomes. Finally, we provide a research (...) agenda for future empirical work in this area, as well as practical applications for counsellors and religious leaders. (shrink)

The global COVID-19 pandemic has created a crisis of suffering. We conceptualize suffering as a deeply existential issue that fundamentally changes people indelible ways and for which there are no easy solutions. To better understand its effects and how people can flourish in the midst of this crisis, we formally introduce and elaborate on an Existential Positive Psychology Model of Suffering (EPPMS) and apply that to the COVID-19 global pandemic. Our model has three core propositions: (a) suffering reveals existential concerns, (...) (b) existential anxiety impairs one's ability to find meaning, and (c) cultivating meaning is the primary way to address suffering and allay existential anxiety, eventually leading to flourishing (and potentially growth). We apply this model to the COVID-19 pandemic, including how to build meaning, and discuss clinical implications. (shrink)

Aan het eind van Zur Genealogie der Moral kondigt Nietzsche aan dat hij later een boek zal schrijven over ‘de geschiedenis van het Europese nihilisme’ . Dat boek is er nooit gekomen, althans niet van Nietzsches hand. Het enige wat we hebben zijn de aantekeningen daarvoor in zijn nalatenschap. Een van die notities is het beroemde ‘Lenzer Heide Ontwerp’ , een tekst waaraan Nietzsche zelf de titel Het Europese nihilisme gaf.Nadat Nietzsche de winter van 1886/87 in Nice had doorgebracht, trok (...) hij in het voorjaar weer richting Zwitserland om zich voor de zomer in Sils Maria te vestigen. In Nice had hij juist Dostojevski ontdekt, van wie hij onder andere de Aantekeningen uit het ondergrondse las, een boek dat een zeer kritische psychologie van de nihilist bevat. Op zijn reis naar het Engadin bleef Nietzsche steken omdat het in het hooggebergte nog te koud was en de Julier-pas nog niet sneeuwvrij. Tijdens zijn gedwongen oponthoud in Lenzer Heide noteerde hij deze tekst, aan de hand waarvan we nu een paar elementen van Nietzsches analyse van het Europese nihilisme belichten. (shrink)