In this article the most important theistic arguments formulated by virtue of the achievements of contemporary cosmology are presented and critically discussed. In general, these are the so-called aposterioric arguments, i.e. those that descend from commonly accepted scientific facts in cosmology. In view of these facts an attempt is made to show that a theistic explanation is the best one among all the possible ones. Taking into consideration the fundamental essence of cosmological data, two the most important genera of formulated (...) arguments are pointed out. The first one refers to the Big Bang widely affirmed in cosmology. It assumes the shape of the previous argument from the beginning of the time of the Universe. The main difficulty of this argument is the fact of its groundless attribute of the Big Bang with the character of the absolute beginning of time forewent only by nothingness. The second genera of the argumentation refers to the so-called cosmic coincidences affirmed in cosmology. Depending on philosophical interpretations of these coincidences, one may speak about the argumentation from the plan, rationality, mathematicality, teleology, subtlety or con­tingency of the Universe. The cognitive value of these arguments on the one hand depends on the legitimacy of the interpretations of cosmic coincidences and on the other hand it depends on the possibility of demonstrating that the theistic interpretation of philosophically interpreted scientific facts is the best possible explanation. Because there is no easy way to demonstrate the validity and correctness of both ways of ratiocination, therefore the evidential strength of all these arguments evokes many questions. (shrink)

The article presents Albert Einstein\'s standpoint on the issue of mutual relations between science and philosophy. First the metaphilosophical context of that standpoint is shown. It concerns the conception of science and philosophy accepted by the author of the relativity theory. Findings in that field showed that Einstein opted for close connections between science and philosophy and he treated them as both influence of philosophy on science and influence of science on philosophy. In the first case, the influence of philosophy (...) is marked, according to our author, first and foremost in science treated as a process. It manifests its presence mainly in the procedures of discovering new scientific theories, their selection and acceptance. However, it is not present in the procedures of direct justifications of those theories. Einstein also saw the presence of philosophy in science treated as a product. Then philosophy enters scientific theories in the form of general principles and assumptions placed in the so-called exterior base of the theory, whereas, according to Einstein, the presence of philosophical theses in the main body of the scientific theory as their immanent element is not permitted. As far as the influence of science on philosophy is concerned our author states that it has a twofold dimension. The very fact of existence of science and procedures that take place in it as well as changes show their influence on issues taken up by epistemology and philosophy of science. Concrete scientific achievements mark their reference to the problems considered within the confines of broadly understood philosophy of nature. Einstein\'s standpoint clearly lacks deepened logical-methodological analyses concerning the issue of mutual connections between science and philosophy presented here. (shrink)

The article in the systematic and ordered way presents the most important philosophical problems, which are undertaken with regard to their close connections with contemporary (scientific) cosmology. Lately more and more often the issue mentioned above is called philosophy of cosmology. In the first part of that article, with accordance to the broad understanding of that philosophy, methodological problem of cosmology containing both: its external methodology (general and particular) and so-called internal methodology has been presented. The second part of the (...) article contains various philosophical questions which are undertaken in the context of concrete achievements of contemporary scientific cosmology. They include issues from the field of philosophy of nature, philosophy of God, and ontology. (shrink)

The main purpose of the article is to consider the following problem: Is the naturalistic explanation of the cosmic coincidences proposed by the the Wheeler's version of the Many Worlds Hypothesis justified? To give the plausible answer for this question three main topics are presented. The first question concens the main issues of the Wheeler's version of the Hypothesis. They state that the Universe may have a cyclic character, oscillating ad infinitum through a sequence of expanding and contracting phases. At (...) each "bounce" where contraction is exchanged for expansion, the singularity may introduce a permutation in the values of the physical "constants" of Nature and the form of the expansion dynamics. The next point of the article presents the essence of the explanation given by the Wheeler's version. of the Hypothesis. This explanation is based on the very important statement of the probability calculus that the repetition improves the chances of getting at least one rare event in a sequence of trials. The Wheeler's version offers an ifinite sequence of oscillating universes with very differnt features so also our universe allowing life must appear at last in this sequence. The corectness of the proposed explanation is discussed at the third point of the article. It considers the problerm of the scientific and philosofical status of the Hypothesis and also some objections agaist the way of reasoning accepted in the course of explanation. In the context of the presented discussions one might say that proposed explanation of the cosmic coincidences in the frame of the Wheeler's version of the Many Worlds Hypothesis is at least dubious. Therefore, this explanation cannot be used as an argument in the controversy between naturalism and theism. (shrink)

The main purpose of this article is to present the essence and the role of anthropic explanation in cosmology. This explanation was proposed during the time when there was no further possibility of finding the explanation of cosmic coincidences on the ground of contemporary scientific theories. This explanation relies on the recognition of the fact of the existence of a carbon life in the Universe as a factor which explains the Universe’s global characteristics, which are a requisite for appearance of (...) life. The explanatory value of this explanation depends on the character of relations of the connections between the cosmic coincidences and the fact of the existence of life. In the case of the Weak Anthropic Principle this explanation has a character of simple tautology. In the case of the Strong Anthropic Principle, however, it is a philosophical explanation, whose cognitive value depends on both: the correctness of these principles and their logico-mathematical coherence with the cosmic coincidences. (shrink)

The existence of differences in time, meant to be structure ‹T,<›, where the earlier-later relation < is a linear ordering, dense and without the first and the last element, is a sine qua non condition of changes taking place at any temporal instant. Therefore it is impossible to give a definition of the operator of change ↑ (the intended meaning of the phrase „↑α” is „it is changing now what a states”) in the language Lͭ of Tense Logic calculi containing, (...) besides classical sentential connectives, temporal categories: G, H, F, P. The paper contains the proof of this statement. (shrink)

The Belgian conflict can be compared with a game theoretical model with two groups and a negative sum-game. Within each of the groups there is hierarchisation, role playing and formation ofcoalitions. On the Flemish side the main actor is the CVP, on the Walloon side it is the PS.The main objectives of the communities in the economie field are: temporary boarding employment in depressed industries and, simultaneously, the creation of high tech industries. Policy instruments to attain those goals are : (...) general economie measures ; selective-protective measures ; selective-innovative measures.Why is the sum-game negative or at least suboptimal?1. Mentioned policy instruments are spread over an incoherent set of institutions on the national and regional level, with rules that are partly centralist, partly federalist, partly confederalist. This leads to a complicated, unstable set of game rules in which the financial implications of decisions are shifted from the regional to the national level and vice versa.2. Selective-protective measures are of such large size that they offset and erode the beneficial effects of general policy measures regarding wages, taxes and exchange rate.Federalism or confederalism would and should establish a new set of rules between the two regions and between regional and federal state. Since a return to the ancien régime is politically unfeasible, this is the only logical way out of the present chaotic decision making process. Federalism would, inter alia, shift the financial responsibility of decisions in the field of industrial policy, education, health and public works towards the regions.This political reform requires a new constitution and therefore an agreement between the two communities. The chances for a new «talk» are presently not very high. Among the many reasons, one in particular strikes the eye : the major partner on the Flemish side, namely the Christian Democrats, have a multi-dimensional utility function, which not only is «concealed» for the others, but also undefined and unclear for the party itself. (shrink)

I argue that on Aristotle’s account practical thinking is thinking whose origin (archē) is a desire that has as its object the very thing that one reasons about how to promote. This feature distinguishes practical from productive reasoning since in the latter the desire that initiates it is not (unless incidentally) a desire for the object that one productively reasons about. The feature has several interesting consequences: (a) there is only a contingent relationship between the desire that one practically reasons (...) about how to satisfy and the action one decides on; (b) practical thinking and action cannot be separated from the agent, whereas productive thinking and production can be outsourced to someone else. The view has consequences also for the distinction between action and production. Finally, I illustrate the usefulness and correctness of my account of practical thinking by using it to shed new light on Aristotle’s claim that the virtuous agent must decide on her virtuous actions ‘for themselves’. (shrink)

In the following paper the author presents and analyses J. Maritain’s social theory. The French Thomist attempted to associate the principle of common good (that plays the main role in the Christian social thought) with democracy. Maritain claims that only democracy can be regarded as an acceptable form of government, i.e. the one that satisfies rational and moral requirements (which, according to the Thomists, are the same). Such a statement put forward by the Thomist philosopher emphasises the necessity of asking (...) a number of questions of the human nature, human dignity and human autonomy; it also demonstrate how to introduce the ethical values into the realm of democratic politics, which in its turn is described as axiologically neutral by contemporary political theories. J. Maritain’s views on those issues were taken into consideration by Catholic intellectuals and were announced before the Second Vatican Council. Regarding the time they were widely opened to the contemporary ideas. Consequently, they contributed to the significant development of the current attitude of the Catholic Church to the present political and social problems. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the widely held view that Aristotle's vicious agent is a principled follower of a wrong conception of the good whose soul, just like the soul of the virtuous agent, is marked by harmony between his reason and non-rational desires is an exegetical mistake. Rather, Aristotle holds – consistently and throughout the Nicomachean Ethics – that the vicious agent lacks any real principles of action and that his soul lacks unity and harmony even more than (...) the soul of the uncontrolled agent. (shrink)

The presented paper focuses on the analysis of strategic documents at the level of the European Union concerning the regulation of artificial intelligence as one of the so-called disruptive technologies. In the first part of the article, we outline the basic terminology. Subsequently, we focus on the summarizing and systemizing of the key documents adopted at the EU level in terms of artificial intelligence regulation. The focus of the paper is devoted to issues of personal data protection and cyber security (...) included in these strategic documents. The final part contains recommendations for future research and evaluation of its key features. (shrink)

The paper defends three claims about Aristotle’s theory of uncontrolled actions (akrasia) in NE 7.3. First, I argue that the first part of NE 7.3 contains the description of the overall state of mind of the agent while she acts without control. Aristotle’s solution to the problem of uncontrolled action lies in the analogy between the uncontrolled agent and people who are drunk, mad, or asleep. This analogy is interpreted as meaning that the uncontrolled agent, while acting without control, is (...) still in possession of her knowledge but she is unable to use it as knowledge due to the temporary disablement of her reason by appetite. Due to this disablement, the uncontrolled agent is temporarily unable to be motivated to act by her knowledge and acts merely on her appetite. Second, I argue that the second part of NE 7.3 provides an analysis of the particular mental state from which the uncontrolled action issues. Its central passage is a description of the uncontrolled agent’s state of mind before the uncontrolled action and not, as it has been traditionally understood, a description of her state of mind during the uncontrolled action. Third, I argue that, on Aristotle’s view, the transition from the state before the uncontrolled action to the state in which the agent already acts without control does not involve any psychological state that would constitute the agent’s choice to abandon her decision and give in to her desires but proceeds on a purely physiological level. (shrink)

I defend two main theses. First, I argue that Aristotle’s account of voluntary action focuses on the conditions under which one is the cause of one’s actions in virtue of being (qua) the individual one is. Aristotle contrasts voluntary action not only with involuntary action but also with cases in which one acts (or does something) due to one’s nature (for example, in virtue of being a member of a certain species) rather than due to one’s own desires (i.e. qua (...) individual). An action can be attributed to one qua individual in two distinct ways depending on whether one is a rational or a non-rational animal. One is responsible for one’s action in both cases, but only in the former case is one also responsible for being the sort of individual that performs it. Aristotle also distinguishes two ways in which an action can be compelled while still being an action of the agent. In the first case, one is compelled by (physically) external forces or circumstances to act against one’s internal impulse. In the second case, one is compelled to act on (internal) impulses that are fixed by one’s nature against one’s own individual impulse. This latter kind of compelled action is only possible in the case of rational agents. Secondly, I argue that Aristotle’s conception of what it is to be a cause of an action inevitably brings in certain normative features which support evaluative judgments and the practice of praise and blame. On Aristotle’s view, any goal-directed behavior that is properly attributable to an individual is (normally) subject to standards that pertain to behavior of that sort. At the most basic level, these standards establish what counts as a successful realization of the goal that one aims at. Thus even in the case of non-rational animals (or children), one can judge the success of what they are doing and encourage (or discourage) similar behavior by praise or blame. These standards are applicable to one’s conduct simply insofar as one is the controlling origin (or efficient cause) of one’s action qua individual. In the case of rational agents the practice of praise and blame can involve a further normative layer since they can be praised or blamed not only for acting in a certain way so as to encourage or discourage them with a view to the future, but also for being – and having become – individuals of a certain sort. Nevertheless, the applicability of such evaluative judgments and of praise and blame is still warranted by one’s being the controlling origin of one’s actions qua the individual one is (in this case, qua rational individual). (shrink)

I argue that Aristotelian decisions (προαιρέσεις) cannot be conceived of as based solely on wish (βούλησις) and deliberation (βούλευσις), as the standard picture (most influentially argued for in Anscombe's "Thought and Action in Aristotle", in R. Bambrough ed. New Essays on Plato and Aristotle. London: Routledge, 1965) suggests. Although some features of the standard view are correct (such as that decisions have essential connection to deliberation and that wish always plays a crucial role in the formation of a decision), Aristotelian (...) decisions sometimes must include non-rational desires such as appetite. Consequently, any exegetical account of Aristotle’s notion of decision must be able to accommodate this feature. (shrink)

This book consists of the edited proceedings of a debate among Jurgen Habermas, Richard Rorty, and Leszek Kolakowski that was held in Warsaw in May of 1995. It includes also commentary from those in attendance, including extensive remarks by Ernest Gellner. The debate marked the fortieth anniversary of the foundation of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, and focussed primarily on topics related to historicism and cultural relativism.

I argue that, for Aristotle, virtue of character is a state of the non-rational part of the soul that makes one prone to making and acting on decisions in virtue of that part’s standing in the right relation to (correct) reason, namely, a relation that qualifies the agent as a true self-lover. In effect, this central feature of virtue of character is nothing else than love of practical wisdom. As I argue, it not only explains how reason can hold direct (...) authority over non-rational desires but also why Aristotle defines virtue of character as hexis prohairetikē. (shrink)

The paper addresses the following question: why do human beings, on Aristotle’s view, have an innate tendency to badness, that is, to developing desires that go beyond, and often against, their natural needs? Given Aristotle’s teleological assumptions (including the thesis that nature does nothing in vain), such tendency should not be present. I argue that the culprit is to be found in the workings of rationality. In particular, it is the presence of theoretical reason that necessitates the limitless nature of (...) human non-rational desires. (shrink)

deel 1. De zedelijkheid als menselijk fenomeen.

: This paper provides an analysis of the first decade of bioethics development in Slovakia (1990-1999), together with an overview of the most important bioethical issues entering the scene of public debate and scholarly ethical analysis.