We study the influence of the existence of large cardinals on the existence of wellorderings of power sets of infinite cardinals κ with the property that the collection of all initial segments of the wellordering is definable by a Σ1‐formula with parameter κ. A short argument shows that the existence of a measurable cardinal δ implies that such wellorderings do not exist at δ‐inaccessible cardinals of cofinality not equal to δ and their successors. In contrast, our main result shows that (...) these wellorderings exist at all other uncountable cardinals in the minimal model containing a measurable cardinal. In addition, we show that measurability is the smallest large cardinal property that imposes restrictions on the existence of such wellorderings at uncountable cardinals. Finally, we generalise the above result to the minimal model containing two measurable cardinals. (shrink)

If is a Polish metric space of dimension 0, then by Wadge’s lemma, no more than two Borel subsets of X are incomparable with respect to continuous reducibility. In contrast, our main result shows that for any metric space of positive dimension, there are uncountably many Borel subsets of that are pairwise incomparable with respect to continuous reducibility. In general, the reducibility that is given by the collection of continuous functions on a topological space \\) is called the Wadge quasi-order (...) for \\). As an application of the main result, we show that this quasi-order, restricted to the Borel subsets of a Polish space \\), is a well-quasiorder if and only if \\) has dimension 0. Moreover, we give further examples of applications of the construction of graph colorings that is used in the proofs. (shrink)

We investigate structures recognizable by finite state automata with an input tape of length a limit ordinal. At limits, the set of states which appear unboundedly often before the limit are mapped to a limit state. We describe a method for proving non-automaticity and apply this to determine the optimal bounds for the ranks of linear orders recognized by such automata.

Recently, Gitik, Kanovei and the first author proved that for a classical Prikry forcing extension the family of the intermediate models can be parametrized by $\mathscr{P}(\omega)/\mathrm{finite}$. By modifying the standard Prikry tree forcing we define a Prikry-type forcing which also singularizes a measurable cardinal but which is minimal, i.e., there are \emph{no} intermediate models properly between the ground model and the generic extension. The proof relies on combining the rigidity of the tree structure with indiscernibility arguments resulting from the normality (...) of the associated measures. (shrink)

We prove that various classical tree forcings—for instance Sacks forcing, Mathias forcing, Laver forcing, Miller forcing and Silver forcing—preserve the statement that every real has a sharp and hence analytic determinacy. We then lift this result via methods of inner model theory to obtain level-by-level preservation of projective determinacy (PD). Assuming PD, we further prove that projective generic absoluteness holds and no new equivalence classes are added to thin projective transitive relations by these forcings.

We consider the following problem for various infinite-time machines. If a real is computable relative to a large set of oracles such as a set of full measure or just of positive measure, a comeager set, or a nonmeager Borel set, is it already computable? We show that the answer is independent of ZFC for ordinal Turing machines with and without ordinal parameters and give a positive answer for most other machines. For instance, we consider infinite-time Turing machines, unresetting and (...) resetting infinite-time register machines, and α-Turing machines for countable admissible ordinals α. (shrink)

Let S∞ denote the topological group of permutations of the natural numbers. A closed subgroup G of S∞ is called oligomorphic if for each n, its natural action on n-tuples of natural numbers has onl...

We introduce and study some variants of a notion of canonical set theoretical truth. By this, we mean truth in a transitive proper class model M of ZFC that is uniquely characterized by some $$\in$$ ∈ -formula. We show that there are interesting statements that hold in all such models, but do not follow from ZFC, such as the ground model axiom and the nonexistence of measurable cardinals. We also study a related concept in which we only require M to (...) be fixed up to elementary equivalence. We show that this theory-canonicity also goes beyond provability in ZFC, but it does not rule out measurable cardinals and it does not fix the size of the continuum. (shrink)

We study randomness beyond${\rm{\Pi }}_1^1$-randomness and its Martin-Löf type variant, which was introduced in [16] and further studied in [3]. Here we focus on a class strictly between${\rm{\Pi }}_1^1$and${\rm{\Sigma }}_2^1$that is given by the infinite time Turing machines introduced by Hamkins and Kidder. The main results show that the randomness notions associated with this class have several desirable properties, which resemble those of classical random notions such as Martin-Löf randomness and randomness notions defined via effective descriptive set theory such as${\rm{\Pi (...) }}_1^1$-randomness. For instance, mutual randoms do not share information and a version of van Lambalgen’s theorem holds.Towards these results, we prove the following analogue to a theorem of Sacks. If a real is infinite time Turing computable relative to all reals in some given set of reals with positive Lebesgue measure, then it is already infinite time Turing computable. As a technical tool towards this result, we prove facts of independent interest about random forcing over increasing unions of admissible sets, which allow efficient proofs of some classical results about hyperarithmetic sets. (shrink)

For ordinals α beginning a Σ1 gap in equation image, where equation image is closed under number quantification, we give an inner model-theoretic proof that every thin equation image equivalence relation is equation image in a real parameter from the hypothesis equation image.

The class forcing theorem, which asserts that every class forcing notion ${\mathbb {P}}$ admits a forcing relation $\Vdash _{\mathbb {P}}$, that is, a relation satisfying the forcing relation recursion—it follows that statements true in the corresponding forcing extensions are forced and forced statements are true—is equivalent over Gödel–Bernays set theory $\text {GBC}$ to the principle of elementary transfinite recursion $\text {ETR}_{\text {Ord}}$ for class recursions of length $\text {Ord}$. It is also equivalent to the existence of truth predicates for the (...) infinitary languages $\mathcal {L}_{\text {Ord},\omega }$, allowing any class parameter A; to the existence of truth predicates for the language $\mathcal {L}_{\text {Ord},\text {Ord}}$ ; to the existence of $\text {Ord}$ -iterated truth predicates for first-order set theory $\mathcal {L}_{\omega,\omega }$ ; to the assertion that every separative class partial order ${\mathbb {P}}$ has a set-complete class Boolean completion; to a class-join separation principle; and to the principle of determinacy for clopen class games of rank at most $\text {Ord}+1$. Unlike set forcing, if every class forcing notion ${\mathbb {P}}$ has a forcing relation merely for atomic formulas, then every such ${\mathbb {P}}$ has a uniform forcing relation applicable simultaneously to all formulas. Our results situate the class forcing theorem in the rich hierarchy of theories between $\text {GBC}$ and Kelley–Morse set theory $\text {KM}$. (shrink)

We prove a number of results on the determinacy of σ-projective sets of reals, i.e., those belonging to the smallest pointclass containing the open sets and closed under complements, countable unions, and projections. We first prove the equivalence between σ-projective determinacy and the determinacy of certain classes of games of variable length <ω^2 (Theorem 2.4). We then give an elementary proof of the determinacy of σ-projective sets from optimal large-cardinal hypotheses (Theorem 4.4). Finally, we show how to generalize the proof (...) to obtain proofs of the determinacy of σ-projective games of a given countable length and of games with payoff in the smallest σ-algebra containing the projective sets, from corresponding assumptions (Theorem 5.1, Theorem 5.4). (shrink)

We investigate a variety of cut and choose games, their relationship with (generic) large cardinals, and show that they can be used to characterize a number of properties of ideals and of partial orders: certain notions of distributivity, strategic closure, and precipitousness.

Newly edited by Konrad Koerner (University of Ottawa), with an introduction by Clemens Knobloch (Universitat Siegen)The importance of Wegener's Untersuchungen uber die Grundfragen des Sprachlebens can only be compared to that of Karl Buhler's Sprachtheorie. Even now, however, Wegener's work remains virtually unknown to the English speaking world. Wegener's main work was published in 1885. It has its origin in two lectures given in 1883 and 1884 at school teacher meetings held in the Magdeburg area and it still recalls those (...) original occasions and maintains much of the oral style. Part of the volume treats the subject in a systematic and theoretical manner; other sections contain vivid examples and are characterized by a considerable didactic effort. The book is held together by leitmotif-questions, such as 'How do we understand language?' and 'How does language function as a means of everyday communication?'. We witness the experiences of the talented school teacher and the observations of the innovative dialect researcher combined, condensed, and conceptually ordered.In spite of the relatively unsystematic form of presentation, the book remains thoroughly consistent in thought and argument. In the Untersuchungen we have before us the outline of a communicative and functional view of language structure, of the analysis of speech, and of semantics. (shrink)

Phenotypic Evolution explicitly recognizes organisms as complex genetic-epigenetic systems developing in response to changing internal and external environments. As a key to a better understanding of how phenotypes evolve, the authors have developed a framework that centers on the concept of the Developmental Reaction Norm. This encompasses their views: (1) that organisms are better considered as integrated units than as disconnected parts (allometry and phenotypic integration); (2) that an understanding of ontogeny is vital for evaluating evolution of adult forms (ontogenetic (...) trajectories, epigenetics, and constraints); and (3) that environmental heterogeneity is ubiquitous and must be acknowledged for its pervasive role in phenotypic expression. (shrink)

In the debate about the nature of social cognition we see a shift towards theories that explain social understanding through interaction. This paper discusses autopoietic enactivism and the we-mode approach in the light of such developments. We argue that a problem seems to arise for these theories: an interactionist account of social cognition makes the capacity of shared intentionality a presupposition of social understanding, while the capacity of engaging in scenes of shared intentionality in turn presupposes exactly the kind of (...) social understanding that it is intended to explain. The social capacity in question that is presupposed by these accounts is then analyzed in the second section via a discussion and further development of Searle’s ‘sense of us’ and ‘sense of the other’ as a precondition for social cognition and joint action. After a critical discussion of Schmid’s recent proposal to analyze this in terms of plural pre-reflective selfawareness, we develop an alternative account. Starting from the idea that infants distinguish in perception between physical objects and other agents we distinguish between affordances and social affordances and cash out the notion of a social affordance in terms of “interaction-oriented representations”, parallel to the analysis of object affordances in terms of “action-oriented representations”. By characterizing their respective features we demonstrate how this approach can solve the problem formulated in the first part. (shrink)

This paper presents arguments from empirical research and from philosophical considerations to the effect that phenomenality and content are two distinct and independent features of mental representations, which are both relational. Thus, it is argued, classical arguments that infer phenomenality from content have to be rejected. Likewise, theories that try to explain the phenomenal character of experiences by appeal to specific types of content cannot succeed. Instead, a dynamic view of consciousness has to be adopted that seeks to explain consciousness (...) by certain ways of processing representations. Therefore, only empirical methods that are able to investigate the dynamics of the mind can be used for the “quest for consciousness” proper. Moreover, the central intuitions about consciousness are best explained when phenomenality and content are clearly distinguished. (shrink)

In the past decade, research on the dark triad of personality (Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy) has demonstrated a strong relationship to a number of socially aversive moral judgments such as sacrificial utilitarian decisions in moral dilemmas. This study widens the scope of this research program and investigates the association between dark triad personality traits and anti-natalist views, i.e., views holding that procreation is morally wrong. The results of this study indicate that the dark triad personality traits of Machiavellianism and psychopathy (...) are strongly associated with anti-natalist views. Further, depression is found to be both standing independently in a relationship with anti-natalist views as well as functioning as a mediator in the relationships between Machiavellianism/psychopathy and anti-natalist views. This pattern was replicated in a follow-up study. These findings add to the literature on dark triad personality traits and their relationship to moral judgments, suggesting that personality and mood play a substantive part in variation in anti-natalist views in a lay population. (shrink)

We discuss various implications of some radical anti-representationalist views of cognition and what they have to offer with regard to the naturalization of intentionality and the explanation of cognitive phenomena. Our focus is on recent arguments from proponents of enactive views of cognition to the effect that basic cognition is intentional but not representational and that cognition is co-extensive with life. We focus on lower rather than higher forms of cognition, namely the question regarding the intentional and representational nature of (...) cognition found in organisms simpler than human beings, because enactivists do not deny that more sophisticated cognitive phenomena are representational and involve content. After introducing the debate on the naturalization of intentionality, we briefly review different varieties of enactivism and introduce their central claims. In Sect. 4 we turn to radical enactivism in order to focus on the arguments for a thoroughly non-representational, enactive account of perception and basic cognition. In particular, we discuss three major issues: First, what is supposed to replace the representational analysis of perception in a radical-enactive explanation of perception? How does the enactive explanation of perception compare to the best scientific work on the neuroscience of perception? Second, what is—on an enactive account—the function of neural processing in the brain for the generation of perception if not to produce representations? This question is especially pressing since one implication of autopoietic enactivism is that even the simplest organisms, i.e. single-celled organisms, have cognitive capacities. Since they lack brains and nervous systems, enactivists must specify the unique contribution of the brain and nervous system in those animals who have them. In Sect. 5, we evaluate the advantages of an autopoietic–enactive approach to the naturalization of intentionality and end with a suggestion how cognition may relate to intentionality and representation. (shrink)

This article re-examines Ned Block‘s ( 1997 , 2007 ) conceptual distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. His argument that we can have phenomenally conscious representations without being able to cognitively access them is criticized as not being supported by evidence. Instead, an alternative interpretation of the relevant empirical data is offered which leaves the link between phenomenology and accessibility intact. Moreover, it is shown that Block’s claim that phenomenology and accessibility have different neural substrates is highly problematic in (...) light of empirical evidence. Finally, his claim that there can be phenomenology without cognitive accessibility is at odds with his endorsement of the 'same-order-theory' of consciousness. (shrink)

Abstract The subjectivity of conscious experience is a central feature of our mental life that puzzles philosophers of mind. Conscious mental representations are presented to me as mine, others remain unconscious. How can we make sense of the difference between them? Some representationalists (e.g. Tye) attempt to explain it in terms of non-conceptual intentional content, i.e. content for which one need not possess the relevant concept required in order to describe it. Hanna claims that Kant purports to explain the subjectivity (...) of conscious experience in this way. This paper examines this claim in some detail in the context of a more general criticism of this kind of attempt to explain subjectivity and proposes a different reading of Kant that also leads to an alternative account of subjectivity independent from content. (shrink)

In addition to considerable debate in the recent evolutionary literature about the limits of the Modern Synthesis of the 1930s and 1940s, there has also been theoretical and empirical interest in a variety of new and not so new concepts such as phenotypic plasticity, genetic assimilation and phenotypic accommodation. Here we consider examples of the arguments and counter- arguments that have shaped this discussion. We suggest that much of the controversy hinges on several misunderstandings, including unwarranted fears of a general (...) attempt at overthrowing the Modern Synthesis paradigm, and some fundamental conceptual confusion about the proper roles of phenotypic plasticity and natural selection within evolutionary theory. (shrink)

A response to Via about the existence (or not) and role of plasticity genes in evolution.

This book seeks to reintroduce the notion of custom in economics by providing a link between market processes, which are much analysed, and customary elements, which have been neglected by economists or at best seen as routines that have been adopted because they were competitively successful. Schlicht draws on philosophy and psychology in addition to economics.

Many philosophers hold that phenomenally conscious experiences involve a sense of mineness, since experiences like pain or hunger are immediately presented as mine. What can be said about this mineness, and does acceptance of this feature commit us to the existence of a subject or self? If yes, how should we characterize this subject? This paper considers the possibility that, to the extent that we accept this feature, it provides us with a minimal notion of a subject of experience, and (...) that the phenomenological subject of experience, as it is represented in conscious experience, is the organism. While many philosophers agree that the metaphysical subject of experience is the animal, this claim is much less widespread, maybe even counterintuitive. The argument for this claim alludes to the structure of phenomenal consciousness and to recent work in cognitive science concerning the embodied character of consciousness and cognition. To illustrate the problems of current controversies, not only several recent rejections of a subject of experience are critically discussed, but also Hume’s famous rejection of a subject is criticized making use of epistemological aspects from Kant’s philosophy of mind. The final section situates the present discussion in the context of recently popular predictive coding accounts of perception and perceptual experience. (shrink)

1. Signification de la métaphysique.--2. Significations de l'être.

Dumézil’s trifunctional theory applied to the only grail plot in Chrétien de Troyes’ Conte du Graal proves to be neither faithful nor worthy of credit. Philological, historical, cultural, cognitive and narratological arguments raise critical objections and question its artificial character. In fact, the incidental episode of the grail functions as a narrative drawer in a plot belonging to the global tale ATU 910B (Good precepts) relating to the part of the work regarding Perceval.

La naissance du CRI à Grenoble doit être replacée dans le contexte intellectuel de la nouvelle critique des années 1960. Les trois courants dominants du matérialisme historique, de la psychanalyse freudienne et du structuralisme ont alors été dépassés par le CRI au profit d’un « nouvel esprit anthropologique » qui privilégiait la réalité sensible des images au détriment des idéologies réductrices. Les intellectuels des villes ont perdu le lien charnel avec une civilisation rurale et un mode de vie ayant façonné (...) notre langue, nos croyances et nos fêtes, ainsi que des artisanats séculaires. Le médiéviste peut encore retrouver le lien avec cette mémoire du temps. Mais s’il n’a pas conservé une âme païenne et un esprit paysan, il est condamné à la posture post-moderne. Penser la culture occidentale en contournant ou ignorant le Moyen Âge n’est qu’une imposture. Un exemple de longue vie des images montre l’importance des relais culturels qui relativise toute théorie préconçue des archétypes. The birth of the CRI in Grenoble is replaced in the intellectual context of new criticism of the 1960s. The three mainstream have been overtaken by the CRI in favour of a “new anthropological spirit” that emphasizes the sensible reality of images at the expense of reducing ideologies. The modern scholars of the cities have lost the carnal connection with a rural civilization and a way of life that have shaped our language, our ancient beliefs and feasts and also centuries-old handicrafts. The medievalist can find the link with this memory of time. But if he has lost a pagan soul and a spirit of peasant, he is sentenced to a post-modern posture. Thinking Western culture in bypassing or ignoring the middle ages appears like a mere sham. An example of long-life images stresses the importance of cultural relays against all preconceived theory of the archetypes. (shrink)

The dominant position in current debates on the mind-body problem is some version of physicalism, according to which the mind is reducible to the brain and mental phenomena are ultimately explainable in physical terms. But there seems to be an explanatory gap between physicalistic descriptions of neuronal processes and the subjectivity of conscious experience. Some dualists conclude that, therefore, consciousness must be ontologically distinct from any physical properties or entities. This article introduces and argues for a different perspective on these (...) issues, namely, an epistemological dualism - a nonreductive position which is neither a version of physicalism nor an ontological dualism. It is argued that Kant holds this epistemological dualism implicitly as a consequence of his critical epistemology. On the one hand, he stresses the explanatory gap between the mental and the physical. On the basis of his theory of subjectivity set out in the Transcendental Deduction, Kant provides an explanation for why the gap cannot be closed empirically, as the physicalist promises. On the other hand, in his criticism of Descartes’ dualism in the Paralogismschapter, Kant argues that an ontological conclusion on the basis of this epistemological gap is unjustified even though physicalism is explanatory inadequate to account for consciousness. Thus, this epistemological dualism can be seen as an original third way between physicalist reductionism and ontological dualism. (shrink)

The papers in this special issue make important contributions to a longstanding debate about how we should conceive of and explain mental phenomena. In other words, they make a case about the best philosophical paradigm for cognitive science. The two main competing approaches, hotly debated for several decades, are representationalism and enactivism. However, recent developments in disciplines such as machine learning and computational neuroscience have fostered a proliferation of intermediate approaches, leading to the emergence of completely new positions, in particular (...) the Predictive Processing approach. Here, we will consider the different approaches discussed in this volume. (shrink)

Comparing knowledge with belief can go wrong in two dimensions: If the authors employ a wider notion of knowledge, then they do not compare like with like because they assume a narrow notion of belief. If they employ only a narrow notion of knowledge, then their claim is not supported by the evidence. Finally, we sketch a superior teleological view.

Ariès traces Western man's attitudes toward mortality from the early medieval conception of death as the familiar collective destiny of the human race to the modern tendency, so pronounced in industrial societies, to hide death as if it were an embarrassing family secret.

In this article I examine how psychologists, amateurs and actors in the police and in juridical fields positioned themselves in the 1920s and 1930s on the scientific nature of graphology. Graphology, the study of the character from handwriting, was linked with the hope of providing reliable methods for the investigation of psychological states and dispositions. The essay argues that on an epistemic level two different models have been represented to support the scientific nature of graphology: for one thing resorting to (...) the special individual skill, the “genius” of a graphologist; or rather depersonalized techniques predominantly based on statistics. Amateur graphologists used both of these forms.On a methodological level, I argue that in order to historicize the human sciences in general, and psychology in particular, it is useful to examine the translation processes that turn everyday interpretative practices into scientific legitimate investigative procedures. In order to investigate precisely this translation process, it is useful to look at what Thomas Gieryn calls “boundary work” at the border between scientific and non-scientific interpretation practices, for which graphology is used here as an example. It is particularly illuminating to examine how representatives of the official sciences distinguish themselves from presumed “charlatans”, which is why the article focuses on court cases and the demarcation strategies used by the police against fraudulent amateur graphologists.ZusammenfassungIn dem Aufsatz wird untersucht, in welcher Weise sich Psycholog*innen, Amateur*innen und Akteur*innen der Polizei und des Rechtswesens in den 1920er und 1930er Jahren zur Wissenschaftlichkeit der Graphologie positioniert haben. Mit der Graphologie, der Lehre von der Deutung der Handschrift als Ausdruck des Charakters, war die Hoffnung verbunden worden, zuverlässige Methoden zur Untersuchung psychischer Zustände und Dispositionen zur Verfügung zu haben. In dem Aufsatz wird argumentiert, dass auf epistemischer Ebene zwei verschiedene Modelle vertreten worden sind, um die Wissenschaftlichkeit der Graphologie zu untermauern: zum einen der Rekurs auf eine spezielle persönliche Eignung, das „Genie“, des Graphologen, zum anderen entpersonalisierte, zumeist statistisch gestützte Techniken. Die Amateurgraphologen haben sich auf beide Formen bezogen.Auf methodologischer Ebene argumentiere ich, dass es zur Historisierung der Wissenschaften von der Psyche im Allgemeinen und der Psychologie im Besonderen nützlich sein kann, den Übersetzungsprozess zu untersuchen, der aus alltäglichen Deutungspraktiken wissenschaftlich legitim erscheinende Untersuchungsverfahren macht. Um genau diesen Übersetzungsprozesses zu untersuchen wird das „boundary work“ an der Grenze von wissenschaftlichen und nicht-wissenschaftlichen Deutungspraktiken am Beispiel der Graphologie betrachtet. Dabei erweist sich als besonders aufschlussreich zu untersuchen, wie sich Vertreter*innen offizieller Wissenschaften von den mutmaßlichen „Scharlatanen“ abgrenzten. Der zentrale Quellentypus, auf dem der Artikel beruht, sind deshalb Gerichtsprozesse gegen Amateurgraphologen, denen Betrug vorgeworfen wurde, in denen explizit gemacht werden musste, was die Wissenschaftlichkeit von Graphologie ausmachte. (shrink)

The nature of learning processes as well as evolutionary considerations suggest that aesthetic judgement is of central importance in the formation of custom. Learning and extrapolation rely on evaluations of non-instrumental features like simplicity, analogy, straightforwardness, and clarity. Further, learning is particularly effective if it is driven by an active desire to uncover new regularities, rather than merely gathering information in a passive way.From an evolutionary perspective, learning has evolved as an adaptation to fast and transitory environmental changes which cannot (...) be effectively traced by the slow and long-term evolutionary processes which take place on the genetic level. The evolutionary raison d’être of learning is to enable the individual to incessantly search for upcoming new regularities, and to act appropriately on them. As learning depends on aesthetic judgement, the evolutionary selection for learning implies an evolutionary molding of an aesthetic sense, and a preference for patterns and patterned action which ultimately leads to the formation of custom and social learning. The paper presents, thus, an evolutionary underpinning for the behavioral tendencies underlying my theory of custom. (shrink)