This journey shall provide the reader with a simple, though complete, guide to Leibniz’s metaphysics, incidentally preventing him or her from common errors. I will start with unfolding Leibniz’s definition of a simple substance as a free acting individual substance, which, in doing so, constitutes its complete concept. This latter contains everything that happens to the individual substance, a process taking place in God’s mind by forming the possibilities as combinations of his attributes before his decision to create the best (...) world. The totality of possibilities is divided through the compatibility relation into possible worlds. A world is a collection of all compatible individual substances. God creates the best among all possible worlds. The journey will enlighten the reader on Leibniz’s technical distinction between “possible” and “contingent”. In short, “possible” is defined by Leibniz in logical terms, as what is contradiction-free. “Contingent” is something that is, but might have been not. Just the fact that the non-being of contingent things remains possible saves Leibniz from Descartes’ and Spinoza’s determinism. (shrink)

I am glad to be able to use this opportunity to respond to Marcelo Dascal’s detailed review of volume VI,4 of the Academy edition published in the last issue of this journal. I do not do this in order to enter into the dispute between strong and soft reason, an attempt which would invite certain defeat, not least due to the excellent rhetoric displayed by my opponent. I would rather like to illuminate some points in a different way, based on (...) the sources. There is also the possibility that those who could not read my German Introduction or the Latin original documents might retain the impression the reviewer was trying to create. For them, being supplied only with his English translations, it will be difficult to investigate the reviewer’s arguments. On the other hand it will not be easy for me to weaken these arguments in a sufficient way now, one year after their publication. (shrink)

I am glad to be able to use this opportunity to respond to Marcelo Dascal’s detailed review of volume VI,4 of the Academy edition published in the last issue of this journal. I do not do this in order to enter into the dispute between strong and soft reason, an attempt which would invite certain defeat, not least due to the excellent rhetoric displayed by my opponent. I would rather like to illuminate some points in a different way, based on (...) the sources. There is also the possibility that those who could not read my German Introduction or the Latin original documents might retain the impression the reviewer was trying to create. For them, being supplied only with his English translations, it will be difficult to investigate the reviewer’s arguments. On the other hand it will not be easy for me to weaken these arguments in a sufficient way now, one year after their publication. (shrink)

I am glad to be able to use this opportunity to respond to Marcelo Dascal’s detailed review of volume VI,4 of the Academy edition published in the last issue of this journal. I do not do this in order to enter into the dispute between strong and soft reason, an attempt which would invite certain defeat, not least due to the excellent rhetoric displayed by my opponent. I would rather like to illuminate some points in a different way, based on (...) the sources. There is also the possibility that those who could not read my German Introduction or the Latin original documents might retain the impression the reviewer was trying to create. For them, being supplied only with his English translations, it will be difficult to investigate the reviewer’s arguments. On the other hand it will not be easy for me to weaken these arguments in a sufficient way now, one year after their publication. (shrink)

Leibniz’s letter to Magnus Wedderkopf (probably of May 1671) has been misunderstood due to the neglection of Wedderkopf ’s preceding inquiry, which had been available in print in the series I of the Academy edition. The letter is so interesting because Leibniz has already applied in it elements of his arguments which he later uses to solve the theodicy problem.

I am grateful to my friend, Professor Heinrich Schepers, editor of volume VI.4 of Leibniz’s Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, for the time and critical attention he devotes to my lengthy review of this volume, in a detailed reply included in the present issue of this journal. Since I believe that criticism and discussion are the master key to intellectual progress, I consider myself to be extremely lucky that my painstaking work has been the object of criticism by the (...) scholar who is most familiar with the texts published in VI.4. I am also grateful to Professor Glenn Hartz, editor of The Leibniz Review, for granting me the opportunity to publish a rejoinder, generously stretching the deadline for its submission, so that it could appear along with Professor Schepers’ reply. I hope this critical exchange will foster further discussion of the issues it touches upon, particularly the reassessment of the nature of Leibniz’s rationalism, and that Leibniz scholarship will be thereby rewarded. (shrink)

I am grateful to my friend, Professor Heinrich Schepers, editor of volume VI.4 of Leibniz’s Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, for the time and critical attention he devotes to my lengthy review of this volume, in a detailed reply included in the present issue of this journal. Since I believe that criticism and discussion are the master key to intellectual progress, I consider myself to be extremely lucky that my painstaking work has been the object of criticism by the (...) scholar who is most familiar with the texts published in VI.4. I am also grateful to Professor Glenn Hartz, editor of The Leibniz Review, for granting me the opportunity to publish a rejoinder, generously stretching the deadline for its submission, so that it could appear along with Professor Schepers’ reply. I hope this critical exchange will foster further discussion of the issues it touches upon, particularly the reassessment of the nature of Leibniz’s rationalism, and that Leibniz scholarship will be thereby rewarded. (shrink)

Although the principle of informed consent is well established and its importance widely acknowledged, it has met with criticism for decades. Doubts have been raised for a number of different reasons. In particular, empirical data show that people regularly fail to reproduce the information provided to them. Many critics agree, therefore, that the received concept of informed consent is no more than a myth. Strategies to overcome this problem often rest on a flawed concept of informed consent. In this paper, (...) it is suggested that informed consent is a communicative act between two persons. The challenge is to elucidate the norms and constraints for successfully performing such a communicative act. The view developed here has major consequences with regard to the standards for information disclosure as well as for the general scope of informed consent. (shrink)

Examines the diverse cultural influences which have shaped the basic philosophical traditions of India "Indian philosophy was at the heart of Zimmer's interest..