"In describing Hauerwas' work as Christian ethics, one can allow that phrase its full scope of meaning. It is the work of an ethician who is thoroughly conversant with that branch of philosophy and comes to grips with its major issues. He is also firmly committed to the view that, in modifying the substantive 'ethics' with the adjective 'Christian, ' one is designating a distinct reality. . . . Hauerwas invites us to share an understanding of ethics in general and (...) of Christian ethics in particular that is a great deal subtler and more complicated than most currently popular versions of those subjects. For contemporary Christian ethics to accept his invitation will mean letting itself in for some very rigorous and versatile thinking." --America. (shrink)

RésuméCet article explore les liens entre le recours à la véracité de Dieu et les notions de certitude «métaphysique» et «morale» chez Descartes. Pour cela, je montre le rôle qu'elles jouent dans sa preuve de l'existence du monde extérieur, sa position sur l'existence d'autres esprits et celle sur l'«animal-machine». Descartes se sert de la véracité de Dieu dans le premier cas, maispas dans le deuxième ni le troisième. Je suggere que c'est parce que faire à nouveau appel à la véracité (...) de Dieu dans le cas des autres esprits aurait mis en péril sa doctrine de l'animal-machine. Je conclus en me penchant sur des passages de Descartes qui pourraient sembler incompatibles avec l'inter prétation que je fais du rôle important quejoue la certitude morale dans sa philosophic. (shrink)

Die Wissenschaft besteht aus einzelnen Behauptungssätzen, aus Kausalsätzen, aus Naturgesetzen, die in mathematischen Formeln ausgedrückt werden, aus Regeln und Ableitungen; aus Hypothesen, Verifikationsmethoden, Verifikationen, beziehungweise Falsifikationen; aus Konstatierungen über die Verwendung sprachlicher Zeichen. All das wird mit dem gemeinsamen Namen "Wissenschaft" bezeichnet. Wir bemerken, dass hierdurch heterogene Satztypen zusammengefasst wurden und wir wollen nach dem gemeinsamen "Durchschnitt" aller erwähnten Satzarten suchen, damit wir den gemeinsamen Namen rechtfertigen und das Verhältnis dieser Zusammenfassung zu einer andern Zusammenfassung, die man als Religion bezeichnet, (...) untersuchen können. Die Religion umfasst überlieferte Erzählungen (historische Behauptungssätze), Kausalsätze. Wir bemerken hier aber etwas Neues: das Auftreten von Normen (von allgemeinen Befehlssätzen) wie auch von Wertungen, die einen integrierenden Bestandteil der Religion bilden. Es kommen auch Mahnungen und Vorwürfe vor. Es erscheint nun zweckmässig zu sein, das Auftreten der letzterwähnten Satztypen als charakteristisch anzusehn, um die Verschiedenheit der zwei Sphären mit ihrer Hilfe zu formulieren. Die Wissenschaft ist dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass ihre Sätze richtig oder unrichtig, wahr oder falsch sind, dass sie aber nicht fordern und nicht werten. Auch die sogenannten ethischen Sätze, insofern sie wissenschaftliche Sätze sind, verpflichten nicht zu Handlungen, sondern beschreiben und erklären bestimmte Verhaltungsweisen des Menschen. Wir wollen die Neutralität, den indifferenten Charakter als das Kennzeichen aller wissenschaftlichen Sätze betrachten: sie sind nicht normativ, sie tragen uns keine Handlungen auf und werten nicht. Die Wissenschaft ist sozusagen, "jenseits von Gut und Böse". Die Religion besteht dagegen hauptsächlich aus Normen und Wertungen. Ihrem eigentlichen Wesen nach stellt die Religion keine Dichtung, keinen Mythos und ebensowenig eine blosse Ethik dar, sondern sie ist etwas viel primäreres: die Veranlassung und die Reglung der menschlichen Handlungen und die Erzeugung von Hemmungen durch Normen und Wertsysteme. Ueberall dort, wo eine Motivquelle auf einen Teil der Menschen, beziehungsweise auf alle Menschen, von andauerndem Einfluss ist und irgend ein Gegenstand der Welt dazu ernannt wird, an das Bekennen zu dieser Motivquelle zu erinnern, dort liegt Religion vor. Die Religion umfasst auch Normenund Wertsysteme, die Handlungen und Hemmungen veranlassen, welche nicht im Dienste der menschlichen Gesellschaft stehen und dadurch ist sie von der Morallehre verschieden. Der Glaube an die "Wichtigkeit" der Normen und Werte wie an jene Behauptungssätze über die Welt, welche den tiefsten Wünschen und der Sehnsucht des Menschen entgegenkommen, ist die wichtigste religiöse Handlung. (shrink)

Quantification is a topic which brings together linguistics, logic, and philosophy. Quantifiers are the essential tools with which, in language or logic, we refer to quantity of things or amount of stuff. In English they include such expressions as no, some, all, both, many. Peters and Westerstahl present the definitive interdisciplinary exploration of how they work - their syntax, semantics, and inferential role.

Quantification is a topic which brings together linguistics, logic, and philosophy. Quantifiers are the essential tools with which, in language or logic, we refer to quantity of things or amount of stuff. In English they include such expressions as no, some, all, both, many. Peters and Westerstahl present the definitive interdisciplinary exploration of how they work - their syntax, semantics, and inferential role.

Development and Evolution surveys and illuminates the key themes of rapidly changing fields and areas of controversy that the redefining the theory and philosophy of biology. It continues Stanley Salthe's investigation of evolutionary theory, begun in his influential book Evolving Hierarchical Systems, while negating the implicit philosophical mechanisms of much of that work. Here Salthe attempts to reinitiate a theory of biology from the perspective of development rather than from that of evolution, recognizing the applicability of general systems thinking (...) to biological and social phenomena and pointing towards a non-Darwinian and even a postmodern biology. (shrink)

This book is a major contribution to the study of the philosophy of action, moral philosophy, and political philosophy. Its central idea is a radically unorthodox theory of rational action. Most contemporary Anglo-American philosophers believe that action is motivated by desire. Professor Benn rejects the doctrine and replaces it with a reformulation of Kant's ethical and political theory, in which rational action can be determined simply by principles, regardless of consequences. The book analyzes the way in which value conflicts can (...) be rationally resolved, the objectivity of value, the concept of moral personality, the principles of non-interference and respect of persons, the ideals of autonomy and community and various aspects of individual rights - focusing on the rights to freedom, welfare, and privacy. (shrink)

Many philosophers believe that there is a fundamental distinction between knowing that something is the case and knowing how to do something. According to Gilbert Ryle, to whom the insight is credited, knowledge-how is an ability, which is in turn a complex of dispositions. Knowledge-that, on the other hand, is not an ability, or anything similar. Rather, knowledge-that is a relation between a thinker and a true proposition.

In the present work are identified the main features of the algebraic structure with respect to the logical operations, of the set of all the quantum mechanical utterances for which can be specified a factual counterpart and factual rules for truth valuation. This structure is found not to be a lattice. It depends crucially on the spacetime features of the operations by which the observer prepares the studied states and performs measurements on them.

In an era when much of what passes for debate is merely moral posturing--traditional family values versus the cultural elite, free speech versus censorship--or reflexive name-calling--the terms "liberal" and "politically correct," are used with as much dismissive scorn by the right as "reactionary" and "fascist" are by the left--Stanley Fish would seem an unlikely lightning rod for controversy. A renowned scholar of Milton, head of the English Department of Duke University, Fish has emerged as a brilliantly original critic of (...) the culture at large, praised and pilloried as a vigorous debunker of the pieties of both the left and right. His mission is not to win the cultural wars that preoccupy the nation's attention, but rather to redefine the terms of battle. In There's No Such Thing as Free Speech, Fish takes aim at the ideological gridlock paralyzing academic and political exchange in the nineties. In his witty, accessible dissections of the swirling controversies over multiculturalism, affirmative action, canon revision, hate speech, and legal reform, he neatly eviscerates both the conservatives' claim to possession of timeless, transcendent values, and the intellectual left's icons of equality, tolerance, and non-discrimination. He argues that while conservative ideologues and liberal stalwarts might disagree vehemently on what is essential to a culture, or to a curriculum, both mistakenly believe that what is essential can be identified apart from the accidental circumstances to which the essential is ritually opposed. In the book's first section, which includes the five essays written for Fish's celebrated debates with Dinesh D'Souza, Fish turns his attention to the neoconservative backlash. In his introduction, Fish writes, "Terms that come to us wearing the label 'apolitical'--'common values', 'fairness', 'merit', 'color blind', 'free speech', 'reason'--are in fact the ideologically charged constructions of a decidedly political agenda. I make the point not in order to level an accusation, but to remove the sting of accusation from the world 'politics' and redefine it as a synonym for what everyone inevitably does." Fish maintains that the debate over political correctness is an artificial one, because it is simply not possible for any party or individual to occupy a position above or beyond politics. Regarding the controversy over the revision of the college curriculum, Fish argues that the point is not to try to insist that inclusion of ethnic and gender studies is not a political decision, but "to point out that any alternative curriculum--say a diet of exclusively Western or European texts--would be no less politically invested." In Part Two, Fish follows the implications of his arguments to a surprising rejection of the optimistic claims of the intellectual left that awareness of the historical roots of our beliefs and biases can allow us, as individuals or as a society, to escape or transcend them. Specifically, he turns to the movement for reform of legal studies, and insists that a dream of a legal culture in which no one's values are slighted or declared peripheral can no more be realized than the dream of a concept of fairness that answers to everyone's notions of equality and jsutice, or a yardstick of merit that is true to everyone's notions of worth and substance. Similarly, he argues that attempts to politicize the study of literature are ultimately misguided, because recharacterizations of literary works have absolutely no impact on the mainstream of political life. He concludes his critique of the academy with "The Unbearable Ugliness of Volvos," an extraordinary look at some of the more puzzing, if not out-and-out masochistic, characteristics of a life in academia. Penetrating, fearless, and brilliantly argued, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech captures the essential Fish. It is must reading for anyone who cares about the outcome of America's cultural wars. (shrink)

De pessimistische zinnen, waarvan vele op het eerste gezicht klaar en begrijpelijk schijnen, blijken bij nadere beschouwing zinlooze woordenreeksen. De schrijver onderscheidt in zijn logische onderzoekingen drie stadia. In het eerste stadium -- dat van het naïeve begrijpen -- komen ons de pessimistische zinnen, vooral wanneer we in een slechte stemming zijn, zeer vertrouwd voor; in het volgende stadium -- dat der logische analyse -- ontpoppen zij zich als zinlooze woordverbindingen, terwijl in het derde stadium een verklaring wordt gezocht voor (...) het tegenstrijdig karakter der beide voorafgaande stadia. Schächter komt, na toepassing der logische analyse op eenige pessimistische zinnen, tot de conclusie, dat de uiterlijke vorm dezer zinnen misleidend is. Deze zinnen wekken namelijk den indruk, alsof de vertwijfeling, die door hen wordt uitgedrukt, op een gegeven toestand betrekking heeft. Zulk een pessimisme zou echter niet "echt" zijn, wijl daarbij toch stilzwijgend wordt verondersteld, dat een andere, mogelijke -- helaas niet werkelijke -- toestand begeerenswaardig zou zijn. Zoo is de verachting van alle aardsche goederen alleen bij die menschen echt, die rijk aan genotmogelijkheden zijn. Het pessimisme van arme menschen beteekent in den grond der zaak een bekrachtiging van de waardeering voor aardsche goederen. Van een symptomatisch gezichtspunt uit beschouwd, worden pessimistische uitingen niet als uitspraken aangezien, zooals de formuleeringen der omgangstaal en der wetenschap, die de een of andere zakelijke situatie beschrijven, maar als symptomen van bepaalde stemmıngen. Onze taal bestaat uit verschillende "lagen", tusschen welke "overeenkomsten" bestaan. Zoo kan men onderscheiden tusschen een -- met betrekking tot de "waardeeringen" -- neutrale taallaag en een laag, waarin alle dingen en verschijnselen met waardeeringsmaatstaven worden gemeten. Zoowel binnen de waardeeringsvrije, neutrale taal als binnen de waardeeringstaal onderscheidt Schächter een grammaticale en een toegepaste taal. Bij de analyse der taal stooten we op een laag, waarin alle gebeurtenissen uitsluitend van het gezichtspunt van den mensch uit worden beschouwd, waarin bij voorbeeld de zon geschapen is met het doel, den mensch goede diensten te bewijzen. Opvattingen als deze hebben tot het vaststellen van bepaalde regels geleid, die in onze taal, of liever in een van haar lagen, nog steeds gelden. Er zijn zinswendingen, die in de eene taallaag verboden, maar in een andere volkomen toelaatbaar zijn. Iedere taallaag heeft haar eigen regels, haar eigen logica. Binnen bepaalde taallagen hebben de pessimistische uitingen "zin". Het zijn de lagen, waarin vragen en zinnen worden "verstaan". Buiten deze lagen zijn de pessimistische formuleeringen zinloos. (shrink)

This book is the first English version of Prolegomena zu einer kritischen Grammatik, published by Julius Springer, Vienna, 1935, as Volume 10 of the Vienna Circle's series Schriften zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung. The prefatory remarks of both editor and author acknowledge the influence ofWittgenstein in a general way. However, in aim and approach, the work differs from Wittgenstein's Philosophische Grammatik. This is indeed based on material going back to 1932, some of which Schachter must have known. On the other hand, (...) the present Prolegomena not only explains the general, philosophical principles to be followed, but in the light of these proceeds to cover the entire range of conventional grammar, showing where that is uncritical. Whether Wittgenstein in his turn knew of Schachter's work has never been explored. Schachter's object is universal grammar. As is natural, the examples in the original are largely drawn from German grammar, with occasional minor excursions into other languages. For English readers, what matters are the general problems of grammar: there is no point in tying these to the linguistic peculiarities of German, let alone a local variety of it. One who can grasp German at that level might as well read the original. The translation is therefore twofold: the text as a whole has been rendered into English, and the entire apparatus of examples has been replaced, as far as this can be done, by illustrations from English grammar, chosen so as to bring out the same kinds of problem as in the original. (shrink)

Explores the meaning of death, how people of different times, regions, and religions have coped with it, and the progress and effects of the war waged against it by researchers, physicians, and surgeons.

A new integrated view on the probabilistic organization of quantum mechanics is constructed. It is then proved that for superposition state vectors the theoretical quantum mechanical distribution for the momentum observable is devoid of operational definition, and hence cannot be the source of conditions of compatibility to be imposed upon a researched joint probability concept. A compatible joint probability concept is outlined.

In previous works we have established that the spacetime probabilistic organization of the quantum theory is determined by the spacetime characteristics of the operations by which the observer produces the objects to be studied (“states” of microsystems) and obtains qualifications of these. Guided by this first conclusion, we have then built a “general syntax of relativized conceptualization” where any description is explicitly and systematically referred to the two basic epistemic operations by which the conceptor introduces the object to be qualified (...) and then obtains qualifications of it. Inside this syntax there emerges a general typology of the relativized descriptions. Here we show that with respect to this typology the type of the predictive quantum mechanical descriptions acquires a precise definition. It appears that the quantum mechanical formalism has captured and has expressed directly in a mathematical language the most complex form in which can occur a first descriptional phase that lies universally at the bottom of any chain of conceptualization. The main features of the Hilbert-Dirac algorithms are decoded in terms of the general syntax of relativized conceptualization. This renders explicit the semantical contents of the quantum mechanical representations relating each one of these to its mathematical quantum mechanical expression. Basic insufficiencies are thus identified and, correlatively, false problems as well as answers to these, or guides toward answers. Globally the results obtained provide a basis for future attempts at a general mathematical representation of the processes of conceptualization. “Il pourrait, en effet, être dangereux pour l'avenir de la Physique qu'elle se contente trop facilement de purs formalismes, d'images floues et d'explications toutes verbales s'exprimant par des mots à signification imprécise”—Louis de Broglie,Certitudes et Incertitudes de la Science (Albin Michel, Paris, 1965). (shrink)

Bell's theorem is believed to establish that the quantum mechanical predictions do not generally admit a causal representation compatible with Einsten's principle of separability, thereby proving incompatibility between quantum mechanics and relativity. This interpretation is contested via two convergent approaches which lead to a sharp distinction between quantum nonseparability and violation of Einstein's theory of relativity.In a first approach we explicate from the quantum mechanical formalism a concept of “reflected dependence.” Founded on this concept, we produce a causal representation of (...) the quantum mechanical probability measure involved in Bell's proof, which is clearly separable in Einstein's sense, i.e., it does not involve supraluminal velocities, and nevertheless is “nonlocal” in Bell's sense. So Bell locality and Einstein separability aredistinct qualifications, and Bell nonlocality (or Bell nonseparability) and Einstein separability arenot incompatible. It is then proved explicitly that with respect to the mentioned representation Bell's derivation does not hold. So Bell's derivation does notestablish thatany Einstein-separable representation is incompatible with quantum mechanics. This first—negative—conclusion is asyntactic fact.The characteristics of the representation and of the reasoning involved in the mentioned counterexample to the usual interpretation of Bell's theorem suggest that the representation used—notwithstanding its ability to bring forth the specified syntactic fact—isnot factually true. Factual truth and syntactic properties also have to be radically distinguished in their turn. So, in a second approach, starting from de Broglie's initial relativistic model of a microsystem, a deeper, factually acceptable representation is constructed. The analyses leading to this second representation show that quantum mechanics does indeed involve basically a certain sort of nonseparability, called here de Broglie-Bohr quantum nonseparability. But the de Broglie-Bohr quantum nonseparability is shown to stem directly from the relativistic character of the considerations which led Louis de Broglie to the fundamental relation p = h/λ,thereby being essentially consistent with relativity. As to Einstein separability, it appears to be a still insufficiently specified conceptof which a future, improved specification, will probably be explicitly harmonizable with the de Broglie-Bohr quantum nonseparability.The ensemble of the conclusions obtained here brings forth a new concept of causality, a concept offolded, zigzag, reflexive causality, with respect to which the type of causality conceived of up to now appears as aparticular case of outstretched, one-way causality. The reflexive causality is found compatible with the results of Aspect's experiment, and it suggests new experiments.Considered globally, the conclusions obtained in the present work might convert the conceptual situation created by Bell's proof into a process of unification of quantum mechanics and relativity. (shrink)

A general representation of the processesof conceptualization, founded upon adescriptional mould drawn from fundamentalquantum mechanics, is outlined. The approach iscalled the method of relativizedconceptualization. This stresses that therepresentation is not researched as a ``neutralstatement of facts'' but, from the start on, asa method subjected to definitedescriptional aims, namely an a prioriexclusion of the emergence of false problems orparadoxes and of any gliding into relativism.The method is characterized by an explicit andsystematic relativization of each descriptionalstep, to all the descriptional elementsinvolved in (...) this step, namely: the epistemicaction by which the object-entity is generated,the object-entity itself, and the epistemicaction by which the object-entity is qualified.Successive steps which complexify progressivelya given initial description, form an unlimitedchain of cells of conceptualization wherethe very first cell, necessarily, is rooted in as yet strictly unconceptualizedphysical factuality while the subsequent cellsconsist of increasingly abstract descriptionsthat are connected hierarchically. The chainsinteract at nodes where they branch, thusgenerating an indefinitely evolving,complexifying web of relativizedconceptualization, free of ambiguities, andwhere each element stays under control.The method contains the positedassertion of a realism of which a definite sortof minimality follows then inside themethod. This generates a clear distinctionbetween illusory qualifications of``how-a-physical-entity-is-in-itself'', and models of this physical entity. Thereby aworked out connection with philosophicalthinking is incorporated in the method. (shrink)

The purpose of this book is to initiate a new discipline, namely a formalized epistemological method drawn from the cognitive strategies practised in the most effective among the modern scientific disciplines, as well as from general philosophical thinking. Indeed, what is lacking in order to improve our knowledge and our domination of the modes which nowadays are available for the generation and communication of knowledge, thoroughly and rapidly and with precision and detail? It is a systematic explication of the epistemological (...) essence encrypted in the specialized languages and algorithms of the major modern scientific approaches, a systematic cross-referencing of the explicated results, and a final elaboration of a new coherent whole. Quantum mechanics, like a diver, can take us down to the level of the very first actions of our conceptualization of reality. And starting from there, it can induce an explicit understanding of certain fundamental features of the new scientific thinking. A formalized epistemology should not be mistaken for a crossdisciplinary or a multidisciplinary project. The latter projects are designed to offer to nonspecialists access to information, to results obtained inside specialized disciplines, as well as a certain understanding of these results; whereas a formalized epistemology should equip anyone with a framework for conceptualizing himself in whatever domain and direction he or she might choose. A formalized epistemology should not be mistaken either for an approach belonging to the modern cognitive sciences. These try to establish as neutrally as possible descriptions of how the human body-and-mind work spontaneously when knowledge is generated; whereas a method of conceptualization should establish what conceptual-operational deliberate procedures have to be applied in order to represent and to achieve processes of generation of knowledge optimized accordingly to any definite aims. This book addresses philosophers of science, physicists, mathematicians, logicians, computer scientists, researchers in cognitive sciences, and biologists, as well as any intellectual who is interested in scientific and philosophical thinking. (shrink)

The exact bearing of an important theorem proved by Wigner is established. The study brings out the fact that marginal conditions as well as mean conditions of a form currently required in joint probability attempts are in fact inadequate for the determination of a relevant concept of a joint probability. New vistas are thereby opened up.

In connection with my previous paper “Locality, Reflection, and Wave-Particle Duality” [Found. Phys. 17, 813 (1987)], in this paper I distinguish explicitly, in the locality problem, between assertions, deductively established results, interpretations, intuitions, and facts. This clarifies the structure of the problem.

Background -- Overview of legal sources -- Summary of recent prosecutions and investigations -- Applications of law and professional and trade association standards to physician relationships with industry -- Legal and ethical aspects of specific physician's industry financial relationships -- Approaching and adopting effective compliance plans.

This handsome new edition of Stanley Cavell's landmark text, first published 20 years ago, provides a new preface that discusses the reception and influence of his work, which occupies a unique niche between philosophy and literary studies.

What is film? Why are movies important? Why do we care about them in the way we do? How do we think of the connections between the projected image and what it is actually an image of? Most movie-goers assume that they are entitled to make jugments and come to conclusions about the movies they see--to evaluate how "good" they are, or what they "mean." But what do they base, or what should they base, their judgments on? In this thought-provoking (...) new book, Stanley Cavell, a professor of philosophy and aesthetics at Harvard who has long taken a lively interest in movies, looks closely at these and other questions concerning America's most popular art and the perceptions we make of, by, and through it. His answers are surprising and important--not only to our understanding of film and of ourselves, but to our expectations of life and art. Mr. Cavell's explorations of some of Hollywood's stars, directors, and most famous films--as well as his fresh look at Godard, Bergman, and other great European directors--will be of lasting interest to movie-viewers and intelligent people of all ages. (shrink)

A new probabilistic-informational concept, earlier constructed by Mugur-Schächter, is further developed. Associated with Jaynes's principle, this concept permits one to define a measure for the distance between the state of a system evolving under stable constraints and the equilibrium with these constraints. An illustration is given for a gas evolving in a thermostated box. It appears that the free energy of the gas estimates the distance to equilibrium, the estimation being defined in abstract informational-probabilistic terms.

The theory of transference and the centrality of transference interpretation have been hallmarks of psychoanalysis since its inception. But the time has come to subject traditional theory and practice to careful, critical scrutiny in the light of contemporary science. So holds Joseph Schachter, whose _Transference: Shibboleth or Albatross?_ undertakes this timely and thought-provoking task. After identifying the weaknesses and inconsistencies in Freud's original premises about transference, Schachter demonstrates how contemporary developmental research across a variety of domains effectively overturns (...) any theory that posits a linear deterministic relationship between early childhood and adult psychic functioning, including the adult patient's treatment behavior toward the analyst. No less trenchantly, he shows how contemporary chaos theory complements developmental research by making the very endeavor of historical reconstruction - of backward prediction - suspect on logical grounds. Nor, Schacter continues, does the clinical evidence normally adduced in support of transference theory provide the firm bedrock of data that most analysts suppose to exist. What one finds, he holds, are endlessly reiterated claims of identifying determining historical antecedents sustained only by descriptions of current behaviors through a gloss of theory. Less a polemic than a call to order, _Transference: Shibboleth or Albatross?_ is cogently argued and straightforwardly written. It is destined to be a thorn in the side of analysts who resist change and a spur to those who seek to bring analytic theory into closer alignment with contemporary science in the interest of improves treatment efficacy. (shrink)

In these three lectures, Cavell situates Emerson at an intersection of three crossroads: a place where both philosophy and literature pass; where the two traditions of English and German philosophy shun one another; where the cultures of America and Europe unsettle one another. "Cavell’s ’readings’ of Wittgenstein and Heidegger and Emerson and other thinkers surely deepen our understanding of them, but they do much more: they offer a vision of what life can be and what culture can mean.... These profound (...) lectures are a wonderful place to make [Cavell’s] acquaintance."—Hilary Putnam. (shrink)

There exists reasoning popularly characterized as "prejudiced" that may nevertheless be both sound and prudential, and this reasoning involves the application of exactly the same inductive correlational strategies applied without moral objection in non -human cases. While such reasoning may be rationally unobjectionable, it may yet be morally objectionable because its methods inherently entail a risk of unfairness to others. This raises the interesting philosophical possibility that arguments may be a ppraised and found wanting on other than rational grounds, that (...) arguments may be subject to moral defects in addition to defects of rationality. (shrink)