Published in the year 2004, Philosophy and the Social Sciences is a valuable contribution to the field of Sociology.

An appeal to the inexplicable has always been a favourite tactic of the Supernaturalist; and even today those Supernaturalists that remain seem to derive some comfort from it. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, for example, the orthodox Protestant apologetic in this country laid great stress on the ‘inexplicable’ events allegedly associated with Christ's life as anthenticating the truths of revelation. A more general thesis has been put forward as often, and even more often assumed: that the occurrence of inexplicable (...) events demonstrates the reality of a ‘spiritual’ realm. And in current literature we can find it claimed that the hegemony of science or the tenability of materialism is threatened by those inexplicabilities which are now known as the phenomena of ESP. (shrink)

Environment and Philosophy provides an accessible introduction to the radical challenges that environmentalism pose to concepts that have become almost second nature in the modern world. Written in an accessible way for those without a background in philosophy, this text examines ways of thinking about ourselves, nature and our relationship with nature.

For Leibniz, it was a requirement upon the `fundamentally real' to have a `principle of unity'. What does this mean?One general point is that Substance cannot be understood as pure extension. But there is a particular point about cohesion: a real thing had to have some means by which its parts were stuck together. But Leibniz' insistence on `unity' is also an insistence on indivisibility. Under this head there is first the point that there appears to be a contradiction between (...) extension and being incapable of being cut in two. Second, Leibniz uses the notion of `indivisibility' to mark the following distinction among things made up of parts: those which cannot be split without being destroyed; and the rest . To be `indivisible' is to be of the first type. Leibniz' insistence that the truly real must be `indivisible' is then his insistence that the truly real, if it is made up of parts, must be a thing with `integrity', i.e. not an aggregate.What does Leibniz think of as the connection between what is truly real and the possession of `integrity'? He took from Scholasticism the doctrine that action is necessarily attributed to a substance having `integrity', contructing what was in effect a theory of action with two parts: only self-subsistent substances can act; and an action is an origination of change. Leibniz thus insists that self-subsistent substances must be indivisible, in the sense that they cannot be mere aggregates. Aggregates cannot act, and self-subsistence in effect is the capacity for action. This is the most fundamental reason Leibniz had for insisting that the truly real must have a `principle of unity'.It is misleading to speak of Leibniz reintroducing the Scholastic form-and-matter conception of substance for the following reasons: the Scholastic `form' precisely lacked a `principle of action'; and during the period when it is suggested that Leibniz' conception was essentially Scholastic he was defending the view that what his `form' informed was not matter at all but what he called a `metaphysical point'. (shrink)

It has been claimed that in a single line of development the science of taxonomy stretches from Aristotle to the present day and that the Aristotelian 'essence' lies at the heart of much later thought about grouping. I try to establish some basic features of Aristotle's conception of 'essence', and then consider in more detail the conception of essence that entered into 18th century thought about classification, with a view to establishing discontinuities. 18th century thought, I note, has two kinds (...) of essence, real and nominal, and I consider the view that a 'natural' classification in that context should be understood as one which is based on real essences. In place of this thesis, I advocate the view that the hidden foundation of 18th century systematics is a very restrictive articulation of the visual field which gives sense to the possibility of grouping according to the sum total of observable similarities and differences: and that it is this possibility that a 'natural' classification was conceived of as realising. (shrink)

The rationale for the common rejection of classical societal functionalism is that it entails treating a society as an intelligent purposer, capable of directing its own internal organization in furtherance of survival. But a more acceptable alternative account of the origins of a society's functional organization is conceivable: the individual unconsciously recognizes the needs of his group and directs his behaviour so that they are met. The plausibility of this explanation hangs on whether selection between groups occurs to any significant (...) extent, however, and it is therefore on this question that the plausibility of classical societal functionalism itself depends. (shrink)

In "Time to Stop" (Analysis, 29,2, December 1968) Vernon Pratt argues that on a relativistic view of time the universe could not become static. He does not distinguish "it might be true at some time later than t that such-and-such is not the case" from "it might not be true that such-and-such is the case at some time later than t," and this distinction undermines his argument.

In this paper, we show how the problem of accounting for the semanticsof temporal preposition phrases (tPPs) leads us to some surprisinginsights into the semantics of temporal expressions ingeneral. Specifically, we argue that a systematic treatment of EnglishtPPs is greatly facilitated if we endow our meaning assignments with context variables, a device which allows a tPP to restrict domainsof quantification arising elsewhere in a sentence. We observe that theuse of context variables implies that tPPs can modify expressions intwo ways, and (...) we use this observation to predict the behaviour of tPPswhose complements are themselves modified by other tPPs. (shrink)

The current international healthcare focus on ensuring the perspectives and needs of individual persons, families or communities are met has led to the core tenet of person‐centred care for all. The nurse–patient relationship is central to the provision of care, and enhancing this relationship to ensure trust and respect supports optimal care outcomes for those accessing healthcare services. Engaging authentically is one of the recognised key approaches in person‐centred practice, and this scoping review of the literature aims to gain an (...) understanding of the role this process plays in developing effective relationships between nurses and the people they care for. A systematic search of databases and grey literature was undertaken, and twenty‐one research papers met the inclusion criteria. A thematic analysis revealed four themes: ‘getting to know the patient as a person’, ‘the complexity of relationship building—it takes time’, ‘the nurse: characteristics and behaviours that support the nurse–patient relationship’ and ‘the patient voice’. Nurses and patients both benefit from effective relationships, feeling valued and experiencing greater satisfaction with care. Key elements of engaging authentically were revealed as a nurse–patient relational process through this literature review; however, further research is needed to gain a greater understanding of this concept. (shrink)

marilyn fischer's book Jane Addams's Evolutionary Theorizing sets a new standard for reading the central works of American philosophy. By situating Addams's Democracy and Social Ethics in the context of late nineteenth-century evolutionary theory, the text takes on meanings different from some that have become canonical. Context, in this case, is not simply historical context, but also the intellectual context in which Addams's work was written and read. Fischer argues that the meanings of terms such as "evolution," "democracy," "sympathy," and (...) "social ethics" cannot be taken at today's face value, but rather must be understood in light of the ideas and theories with which they were associated in Addams's day—what... (shrink)

We extend the language of the classical syllogisms with the sentence-forms “At most 1 p is a q” and “More than 1 p is a q”. We show that the resulting logic does not admit a finite set of syllogism-like rules whose associated derivation relation is sound and complete, even when reductio ad absurdum is allowed.

In his 1905 work on the logical foundations of geometry, Royce proposed a logic based on the “obverse” or O-relation that could provide a means of understanding any system of order. Royce explains that this relation, which he calls the O-relation, “in logical terms,... is the relation in which (if we were talking of the possible chances [choices] open to one who had to decide upon a course of action) any set of exhaustive but, in their entirety, inconsistent choices would (...) stand to one another” (Royce, 1951, 385). This focus on the process of making choices turns on the idea that the action of making a choice produces an asymmetrical relation and so a key part of Royce’s project was to demonstrate the.. (shrink)

We consider the two‐variable fragment of first‐order logic with counting, subject to the stipulation that a single distinguished binary predicate be interpreted as an equivalence. We show that the satisfiability and finite satisfiability problems for this logic are both NExpTime‐complete. We further show that the corresponding problems for two‐variable first‐order logic with counting and two equivalences are both undecidable.