Bruder im Geiste - Heidegger trifft Holderlin" erzahlt auf unterhaltsame Weise von einem Philosophen, der sich seinen Dichter nahm. Martin Heidegger, nach wie vor einer der Umstrittenen hierzulande, erklart Holderlin zum "Dichter der Dichter". Dies ist nicht im Sinne einer Rangfolge gemeint, sondern zeichnet die Hellsichtigkeit eines Dichters aus, der sich ins Freie vorwagt. Was er dort schaut und empfangt, kommt auch dem Denker zu, der dafur andere, weniger poetische Worte finden muss. Der Dichter spricht die Sache des Denkers an, (...) der Denker versucht der Sprache des Dichters auf den Grund zu gehen. Beide muhen sich im Sinne eines Auftrags, der vor unvordenklichen Zeiten ergangen sein muss und der uber den irdischen Geschaftsbetrieb hinausweist. Holderlin hat diesen Auftrag als Dichter wahrgenommen; Heidegger ist ihm als Denker nachgekommen, der die Vielfalt des Seienden zurucklasst, um zum Sein aufzubrechen. (shrink)

Otto A. Böhmer erzählt von Leben und Werk des Sören Kierkegaard (1813–1855), der, wie Ernst Bloch einmal anmerkte, einer „der größten Witzemacher im hohen Stil war, die es gegeben hat“. Wer sich heute, aus welchen Gründen auch immer, nicht mehr auf Kierkegaards christliche Grundüberzeugung einlassen möchte, kann dennoch von ihm lernen – denn die Kunst der Selbstfindung hat er auf ein Niveau gebracht, das von heutigen Sinnsuchern kaum mehr erreicht wird. Selbsterfahrung bedeutet für Kierkegaard eine erst behutsame, dann unnachgiebige (...) Seelenerkundung, die sich als vertrauensbildende Maßnahme erweist und zu bewähren hat. Das Ich, das aus dieser Selbsterfahrung hervorgeht, ist demütig und stolz zugleich. es schaut zum Himmel auf und steht mit beiden Beinen auf der Erde. (shrink)

Cunha and Caldieraro (2009) investigated whether sunk-cost effects, which are well documented in hypothetical situations involving monetary investments, also occur in choice situations with purely behavioral investments. Their results suggest that decision makers indeed fall prey to behavioral sunk-cost effects under certain circumstances. I have been unable to replicate their pattern of results in three separate investigations. In these studies, I attempted to recover the effect using two other behavioral effort manipulations in addition to the manipulation used by Cunha and (...) Caldieraro. This failure to replicate the pattern of results calls into question the robustness of the initial findings. (shrink)

Beschreibung des Lebens- und Denkweges des dänischen Philosophen und religiösen Schriftstellers Sören Kierkegaard (1813 - 1855) als den eines Weges auf der Suche nach sich selbst.

Recent research has demonstrated the importance of positive emotions, and especially compassion, for well-being. Via two investigations, we set out to determine if facial expressions of happiness,...

I wish to defend the claim that given the content and structure of any moral theory we are likely to find palatable, there is no way of uniquely breaking down that theory into either consequentialist or deontological elements. Indeed, once we examine the actual structure of any such theory more closely, we see that it can be classified in either way arbitrarily. Hence if we ignore the metaethical pronouncements often made by adherents of the consequentialist-deontological distinction, we are quickly led (...) to the conclusion that this distinction contributes nothing of consequence to an understanding of moral theory. I will try to show that there are basically two reasons for this. First, what we mean by the terms endemic to the consequentialist-deontological distinction have no unique references to particular states of affairs in actual cases of moral decision making. Hence we may justify any such concrete moral decision by reference to typically consequentialist or deontological reasoning indifferently. Second, scrutiny of actual and viable moral theories reveals a much finer-grained structure than the consequentialist-deontological taxonomy can capture. And it is this structure, rather than simple attention to consequences or principles, that determines practical moral decision making. We would thus do better to develop the richer vocabulary of causes and constituents, goals and effects, states and events (mental, social, or physical). So in the end, the consequentialist-deontological distinction is irrelevant at the normative level of actual moral reasoning, whereas at the metaethical level it crudely schematizes two opposing types of dummy theory, neither of which is convincing, upon reflection, to any practicing moral philosopher. (shrink)

By transcendental aesthetic, Kant means “the science of all principles of a priori sensibility” (A 21/B 35). These, he argues, are the laws that properly direct our judgments of taste (B 35 – 36 fn.), i.e. our aesthetic judgments as we ordinarily understand that notion in the context of contemporary art. Thus the first part of the Critique of Pure Reason, entitled the Transcendental Aesthetic, enumerates the necessary presuppositions of, among other things, our ability to make empirical judgments about particular (...) works of art. These presuppositions are sensible rather than intellectual because on Kant’s view, all intellection that considers objects of any kind, whether abstract or concrete, must at base connect to actual, material objects with which we come into direct contact; and this we can do only through sensibility (A 19/B 33). Thus the following discussion explores what Kant claims must be true of us in order to make the sorts of aesthetic judgments we make, rather than any particular class or quality of aesthetic judgments itself. On Kant’s view, what must be true of us in order to make aesthetic judgments is not different from what must be true of us in order to make any other kind of judgment about empirical objects. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate the logical consequences of the common understanding of amateurism in the context of big-time US college athletics, and in so doing, illustrate a method based on linguistic analysis and logic. The initial thrust of the paper centres on the term ?amateur? as presupposed by the late Professor Brand in his attempt to justify the ?business? of NCAA-sponsored Division I sports by decoupling the ?participants from the enterprise?. Next, we examine a more rigorous definition of the (...) term ?amateur? in order to show more clearly the difficulties posed by the current situation in college athletics. Additionally, our use of linguistic analysis exposes a flaw in the NCAA's recent move to amend by-law 12.02 in an attempt to avoid the charge of exploitation. Lastly, we put forth a new proposal for better dealing with the central issues swirling around the NCAA as it strives to formulate sound policy at this ?tectonic? juncture of players, fans, college programmes and academic integrity. (shrink)

By transcendental aesthetic, Kant means “the science of all principles of a priori sensibility” (A 21/B 35). These, he argues, are the laws that properly direct our judgments of taste (B 35 – 36 fn.), i.e. our aesthetic judgments as we ordinarily understand that notion in the context of contemporary art. Thus the first part of the Critique of Pure Reason, entitled the Transcendental Aesthetic, enumerates the necessary presuppositions of, among other things, our ability to make empirical judgments about particular (...) works of art. These presuppositions are sensible rather than intellectual because on Kant's view, all intellection that considers objects of any kind, whether abstract or concrete, must at base connect to actual, material objects with which we come into direct contact; and this we can do only through sensibility (A 19/B 33). Thus the following discussion explores what Kant claims must be true of us in order to make the sorts of aesthetic judgments we make, rather than any particular class or quality of aesthetic judgments itself. On Kant's view, what must be true of us in order to make aesthetic judgments is not different from what must be true of us in order to make any other kind of judgment about empirical objects. This last point is worth emphasizing, in order to correct an interpretation of Kant's account of aesthetic judgment in the Critique of Judgment that wrongly reads Kant as claiming that aesthetic judgments do not have to satisfy the same basic requirements of judgment that any other kind of judgment also must satisfy, such as the synthetic subsumption of such objects under certain necessary and hard-wired concepts of understanding, the internal coherence of such judgments with other, non-aesthetic ones of a more abstract and comprehensive character, the unified consciousness within which such judgments are intelligibly made, and the like. Of course Kant recognizes the special character of aesthetic judgments and unpacks it in the... (shrink)