The article shows how two domains of Neurath’s broad and multifaceted work are related to each other: the concepts and methods he wanted to implement in political economics, on the one hand, and the methods of visualization that he and his interdisciplinary team developed at the Social and Economic Museum of Vienna, on the other. Some of Neurath’s suggestions in both domains are surprisingly modern even today.

Jan WoleĔski Kazimierz Twardowski and the Development of Philosophy of Science in Poland Kazimierz Twardowski studied with Brentano and followed his style of doing philosophy, in particular, the thesis that the method of philosophy is  ...

Eines der zentralen Anliegen des "Wiener Kreises" ist heute aktueller denn je. Es bestand darin sichtbar zu machen, wie ganz unterschiedliche, weit auseinanderliegende Bereiche wissenschaftlicher Theoriebildung miteinander in Zusammenhang gebracht werden können. Genannt sei hier Otto Neurath, als Motor der ganzen Sache. Die "Encyclopedia of United Science" sollte eine Vorstellung davon vermitteln, wie moderne Wissenschaften ihre Erkenntnisansprüche formulieren und überprüfen. Sie knüpfte ausdrücklich an die Enzyklopädisten der französischen Aufklärung an. Die in diesem Band zusammengefassten Beiträge durchleuchten das Aufklärungskonzept, das der (...) Enzyklopädie der Logischen Empiristen zugrunde liegt. (shrink)

This book provides a new all-round perspective on the life and work of Edgar Zilsel (1891-1944) as a philosopher, historian, and sociologist. He was close to the Vienna Circle and has been hitherto almost exclusively referred to in terms of the so-called “Zilsel thesis” on the origins of modern science. Much beyond this “thesis”, Zilsel’s brilliant work provides original insights on a broad number of topics, ranging from the philosophy of probability and statistics to the concept of “genius”, from the (...) issues of scientific laws and theories to the sociological background of science and philosophy, and to the political analysis of the problems of his time. Praised by Herbert Feigl as an “outstanding brilliant mind”, Zilsel, being as a Social-Democrat of Jewish origins, mostly led a life of hardship marked by emigration and coming to a sudden and tragic end by suicide in 1944. The impossibility of an academic career has hindered the reception of Zilsel’s scientific work for a long time. This volume is a contribution to its late reception, providing new insights especially into his work during his years in Vienna; moreover, it shows the heuristic value of Zilsel’s ideas for future Scholar research – in philosophy, history, and sociology. -/- (ISSN: 0929-6328). (shrink)

Philipp Frank"s book Relativity – a richer truth1 shows something we do not find very often after World War 2: a philosopher of science acting as a public intellectual. Taking part in the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, Philipp Frank intervened in the public debate about the causes of Nazism and how to defend democracy and liberalism against totalitarian ideas and politics. Could philosophy of science contribute to such a struggle? Philipp Frank thought it could, he even thought that (...) Philosophy of Science should play a crucial role in it. It"s obvious that this position should be of some interest for philosophers in Austria and Europe today. Of course, any serious analysis of Frank"s position would have to take the whole historical constellation into account. Between the beginning of the conference in 1940 and the publication of the book in 1951 the historical situation had dramatically changed. And therefore one has to distinguish several political dimensions in Frank"s arguments. Let me just make a short remark on the plurality of political perspectives Frank"s discourse opened up. Philipp Frank defined the role science should play in democracy not only in contrast to the role of science as it was conceived by totalitarian governments. Of course he criticised the Nazis" and Soviets" �philosophies of science� several times. But he also made very clear that in the 40ies and 50ies not even the majority of scholars and university teachers in the US supported the specific view of science which Frank thought was so important to the advancement of democracy. His rather critical comments on the teaching of science in the post war / cold war period show what he thought the really important political impact of science was. As far as I can see, these comments did not loose their significance. (shrink)

Otto Neurath (1882-1945) was a highly unorthodox thinker both in philosophy and economics. The contributions to this sparkling new book conclude that Neurath touched on many of the most critical problems of economic theory during its formative years as a modern discipline. His economics provide insights into the foundational problems of modern economics and should encourage contemporary economic theorists to critically reflect their own hidden presumptions.

Why concern oneself with Otto Neurath’s economic thought in its historical context? Could anything be more out of fashion than a theory proposing a centrally managed planned economy? Than the views of a theorist whose ideas on in-kind economic planning drove the notion of economic planning to its utmost extreme ? Indeed, Neurath’s ideas appeared too radical and utopian even for the social democrats of the 1920s. So why give even a second thought to them today? Would it not be (...) better to follow the advice a colleague gave me in the 1980s and to pass over Neurath’s “youthful sins” silently so as not to tarnish the reputation that – finally, after a lengthy delay – has been accredited to Neurath for his impressive philosophical achievements within the framework of logical empiricism?In the years since the 1980s, however, Neurath’s economic writings have attracted much more interest than anyone would previously have suspected. Today we are aware of the fact that Neurath formulated ideas at an unexpectedly early stage that are currently relevant in ecological economy, social choice theory and developmental economy. And that his reflections vis-à-vis “associational socialism” could provide interesting impulses for a new theory of socialism. Viewed from this perspective, Neurath’s status is secure as a precursor of theoretical developments and debates that are in full swing today. But is that enough? After all, if the role of the precursor is an endearing one, isn’t it also quite thankless? For even in the areas in which Neurath can be regarded as a precursor, the relevant questions are posed today with far greater precision and with reference to current facts – so why should anyone concern oneself with a precursor whose fundamental assumptions differ so greatly from those of the overwhelming majority of economists working today? (shrink)

The Selected Works of Arne Naess, ed. by Harold Glasser and Alan Drengson in cooperation with the author, Dordrecht: Springer 2005. 10 volumes. On January 12, 2009 Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess passed away at the age of 96. He was still actively involved in putting together the edition of the Selected Writings of Arne Naess . He worte an introduction to the writings which is printed at the beginning of each volume together with the extensive introduction by the editor Harold (...) Glasser. At first sight this seems strangely repetitive and superfluous but on closer scrutiny it certainly makes sense. In view of the large breadth of philosophical themes that are presented in the volumes it is quite likely that the readers interested in the writings will come from different areas. A number of these writings make high demands on the reader who is expected to be relatively versed in logical analysis and in the work and thought of Spinoza, Kierkegaard, Gandhi, Husserl, Carnap or even Sextus Empiricus. The reader who is interested in one of these heterogenous fields is encouraged by both introductory texts to reflect on a specific theme against the backdrop of the philosophers’s entire oeuvre – and that’s a good thing. (shrink)

Eine plarmiäßig gestaltete Naturalwütschaft setzt an die Stelle der abstrakten Eiiüieit des Geldes und des Marktes eine konkrete Einheitlichkeit, die das Ergebnis von Beratungen und Entscheidungen ist. Da diese Eiiüieitlichkeit nicht auf ein Prinzip (das Geld) zurückgeführt werden kann, wüd in üir das "naturale Wesen aller Leistungen" einerseits und die Abhängigkeit der Wirtschaftsordnung von Machtverhältnissen andrerseits sichtbar. Ebenso soll die Eirüieitswissenschaft an die Stelle der abstrakten Eirüieit des phüosophischen Systems eine lebendige Verknüpfung des historisch gegebenen wissenschaftlichen Wissens setzen und es (...) so als Ergebnis "schöpferischer Tat" sichtbar und verfügbar machen. (shrink)

Eine plarmiäßig gestaltete Naturalwütschaft setzt an die Stelle der abstrakten Eiiüieit des Geldes und des Marktes eine konkrete Einheitlichkeit, die das Ergebnis von Beratungen und Entscheidungen ist. Da diese Eiiüieitlichkeit nicht auf ein Prinzip (das Geld) zurückgeführt werden kann, wüd in üir das "naturale Wesen aller Leistungen" einerseits und die Abhängigkeit der Wirtschaftsordnung von Machtverhältnissen andrerseits sichtbar. Ebenso soll die Eirüieitswissenschaft an die Stelle der abstrakten Eirüieit des phüosophischen Systems eine lebendige Verknüpfung des historisch gegebenen wissenschaftlichen Wissens setzen und es (...) so als Ergebnis "schöpferischer Tat" sichtbar und verfügbar machen. (shrink)

Der Band "Die europäische Wissenschaftsphilosophie und das Wiener Erbe" beschäftigt sich mit der Wissenschaftsphilosophie europäischer Prägung und ihren spezifischen Eigenschaften und enthält Beiträge aus theoretischer wie auch aus historischer Perspektive. Dabei werden auch die genuin Wiener Wurzeln und Einflüsse der Wissenschaftsphilosophie behandelt. Wenn man den europäischen Gesichtspunkt um die Geschichte und den gegenwärtigen Stand der Wissenschaftsphilosophie nach der transatlantischen Interaktion und Transformation, die „Rückkehr“ nach Europa nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg erweitert, so stellt sich die Frage danach, ob es auch in (...) der heutigen Wissenschaftsphilosophie europäische Charakteristika gibt. Auch die Rolle und Funktion des Wiener Kreises des Logischen Empirismus wie auch sein Einfluss auf die gegenwärtige Wissenschaftsphilosophie wird hier behandelt. Dementsprechend wird das Thema sowohl systematisch-formal als auch genetisch-historisch behandelt. (shrink)

In this paper I would like to discuss some normative aspects of Otto Neurath’s concept of scientific knowledge. I will take some reflections of Pierre Bourdieu, a sociologist known for his harsh criticism of “philosophers” as a point of reference. I have decided to employ his “non-philosophical” perspective because of its convergence with the very tradition to which the Institute Vienna Circle has aligned itself. That tradition derived the form and power of its beginnings from the unbiased attitude, the impartiality (...) of its intellectual and scientific standpoint. This impartial attitude was all but naive I wish to claim; it was the result of a conscious effort to liberate the philosophical vision from the sediments of a history of perception and thought that had reached its end in the 19th century.1 Of course, that that history had come to its end was felt by many scientists, philosophers and artists at the beginning of this century. What distinguished the Vienna Circle was that its members reacted with new insights into the nature of knowledge, indeed with the attempt to develop the impartiality of the scientific point of view. What had been in the foreground up to that time receded into the background for those versed in modern formal logic and empirical science. The disciplinary boundaries, most notably those between the natural sciences and the humanities became blurred. What we know became so complex and rich that traditional forms of classification were revealed as inadequate. For Neurath “Unified Science” was the name for future forms of classification and “encyclopedia” the name for the “orchestration” of the individual sciences. What remained of “philosophy” focussed on the logical analysis of language and — long neglected — the historical and practical aspects of science. Taking these general developments as my background here I want to defend the thesis that working on the “impartiality” of the scientist’s point of view can be seen as a contribution to and work on the normative dimensions of knowledge. In the case of the Vienna Circle and Otto Neurath such a contribution has nothing to do with developing a scientific conception of ethics or rationality.2 Rather it represents an attempt to analyze the scientific approach to reality and to reinforce the social effects of this approach by making it more precise. Viewed in this context Neurath’s project of a “scientific world conception” coincides with some perspectives whose topicality cannot be overestimated, Pierre Bourdieu’s epistemological reflections on sociology among them. (shrink)

Initially it seems surprising that Edgar Zilsel’s work has found as little response among philosophers as it has. After all, his contributions to the Vienna Circle’s debates about probability and protocol statements were published in Erkenntnis. Already his doctoral dissertation dealt with a central problem of modern philosophy of science—the status of statistical laws in physics—and revealed a remarkably knowledgeable mathematician, physicist and philosopher. Yet the way in which Zilsel raised the issues, namely via Leibniz, Spinoza and Kant, was not (...) easy to accept for many of the later logical empiricists. Zilsel stuck with what in his dissertation he had called the “problem of application” and held that it needed to be solved even once the framework of logical empiricism had been accepted. By contrast, Richard von Mises and Otto Neurath considered it a pseudo-problem. Zilsel’s views are difficult to categorise and nowadays even difficult to understand. Just as Mises and Neurath were puzzled by the problem of application, so contemporary readers are likely to be puzzled by Zilsel’s search for “historical laws”. What were they supposed to be and why did Zilsel think it so important to discover them? (shrink)

The present book aims at clarifying which of Neurath’s ideas remain of relevance today and how these are interrelated. The method chosen is to elucidate their biographical and general historical background and to put them into the framework of the academic and political controversies of their time. This contextual approach yields results that are not just of antiquarian interest. It also enables the reconstruction of the theoretical thrust and continuing practical relevance of a thinker whose ideas were obscured by the (...) catastrophes of the twentieth century. Neurath wanted to demonstrate by his own work in economics that scientific thinking always offers a number of different alternatives and that one must proceed towards applications in full awareness of this fact. In this respect, Neurath’s thought is unusually demanding.With perplexity in political and intellectual life becoming ever more widespread as the twenty-first century progresses, it strikes us as very useful to step back and reconstruct a type of thinking in the social sciences that goes back to the discussion on the big conflicts of the twentieth century but which does not accept as inescapable the intellectual alternatives seemingly cemented in these conflicts.The book is structured so that it first addresses the question why the study of Neurath’s contributions to economics in the context of his time is a worthwhile endeavour today. After all, the overwhelming majority of today’s economists regard his contributions as out-dated and largely irrelevant for the continuing development of their discipline. (shrink)

Der Logische Empirismus hat in der intellektuellen Welt Frankreichs fast keine Spuren hinterlassen, obwohl die Gruppe sich bei zwei Kongressen 1935 und 1937 der intellektuellen Ôffentlichkeit in Paris prasentierte. Otto Neurath, prominentes Mitglied des «Wiener Kreises », bereitete die Auftritte der Logischen Empiristen in Paris vor. In seiner umfangreichen Korrespondenz manifestieren sich zahlreiche Spannungen sowohl innerhalb der Gruppe ais auch mit ihren Kooperationspartnem in Paris. Der Physiker Philipp Frank war mit der wissenschaftlichen Landschaft in Frankreich viel besser vertraut ais Neurath. (...) Er hat Neurath schon damais darauf aufmerksam gemacht, dass die Rolle Louis Rougiers ais « Botschafter » des Empirismus für die Rezeption in Frankreich problematisch sein konnte. Er driingte Neurath, die Verbindung mit anderen Wissenschaftlem und Philosophen, vor allem mit Henri Berr und dem Centre de synthèse zu verstlirken. (shrink)

Die Wissenschaftsphilosophie des frühen 20. Jahrhunderts ist reichhaltiger und differenzierter in ihren Standpunkten als lange vermutet. Die Autoren zeigen das anhand der nur teilweise erforschten Interaktion zwischen den Wissenschaftsphilosophen des deutschen und französischen Sprachraums. Das Buch liefert neue Erkenntnisse zur Rolle der Philosophiekongresse in Prag 1934 und Paris 1937 sowie zur Bedeutung einzelner Akteure wie Marcel Boll, der die Rezeption des Logischen Empirismus in Frankreich beförderte. Die Spuren, die Ernst Mach, aber auch der weniger bekannte deutsche Physiologe und Hirnforscher Ewald (...) Hering in der französischen Wissenschaftsphilosophie hinterliessen, verfolgen die Autoren bis hin zu den Ideen Jean Piagets. Im Mittelpunkt des Buchs stehen Philosophen aus Frankreich, Deutschland und Österreich und ihre Leistung, die Wissenschaften nicht nur erkenntnistheoretisch und logisch durchleuchtet, sondern auch erkannt zu haben, dass ihre theoretische Struktur nur dann vollständig erfasst werden kann, wenn ihre praktische Dimension mit einbezogen wird. Dafür steht Henri Poincaré, der die tragende Rolle der Konventionen für die Theoriebildung in der Mathematik herausstellte. Sichtbar wird der Bezug zur Praxis auch in Moritz Schlicks Überlegungen zu einer auf Empirie basierenden Ethik oder in der Arbeit Otto Neuraths, der eine aus den modernen Wissenschaften gewonnene Konzeption menschlichen Erkennens für das Projekt der gesellschaftlichen Aufklärung fruchtbar machen wollte. (shrink)

What is an image? How can we describe the experience of looking at images, and how do they become meaningful to us? In what sense are images like or unlike propositions? Participants of the 33rd International Wittgenstein Symposium--philosophers as well as historians of art, science, and literature--provide many stimulating answers. Some of the contributions are dedicated to Wittgenstein’s thoughts on images while others testify to the important role notions coined or inspired by Wittgenstein--“seeing as”, “picture games” and the dichotomy of (...) “saying and showing”--play in the field of picture theory today. This first volume of the Proceedings of the 2010 conference addresses readers interested in the history and theory of images, and in the philosophy of Wittgenstein. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2015 Heft: 203 Seiten: 53-78.

Ten years ago, one of us proposed a dynamic hierarchical model of intentions that brought together philosophical work on intentions and empirical work on motor representations and motor control (Pacherie, 2008). The model distinguished among Distal intentions, Proximal intentions, and Motor intentions operating at different levels of action control (hence the name DPM model). This model specified the representational and functional profiles of each type of intention, as well their local and global dynamics, and the ways in which they interact. (...) A core insight of the model was that action control is the result of integrated, coordinated activity across these levels of intention. Since the proposal of the model, empirical and theoretical works in philosophy and cognitive science have emerged that would seem to support and expand on this central insight. In particular, an updated understanding of the nature of sensorimotor processing and motor representations, as well as of how the different levels of intention and control interface and interact, allows for the further specification and precisification of the original DPM model. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the narrative aspect of Seneca’s idea of self-transformation. It compares Seneca’s viewpoint with some modern notions of the narrative self to highlight some parallels and significant differences between the ancient and modern conceptions and it establishes the reading of some parts of De Brev. Vit. in the context of other passages as concerned with the narrative self. The paper argues, amongst other points, that in Ep. 83.1–3, Seneca extends the practice of meditatio (ethically directed self-examination) by (...) incorporating the construction of a narrative self into this process, in dual roles, as examiner and examined. It concludes that Seneca expected us to avail ourselves of a similar self-assessment based on a dialogue with philosophical texts. (shrink)

Elisabeth Porter's guide to the development of feminist thought on ethics & moral agency surveys feminist debates on the nature of feminist ethics, intimate relationships, professional ethics, politics, sexual politics, abortion and reproductive choices.

Most of us create and use a panoply of non-sentential representations throughout our ordinary lives: we regularly use maps to navigate, charts to keep track of complex patterns of data, and diagrams to visualize logical and causal relations among states of affairs. But philosophers typically pay little attention to such representations, focusing almost exclusively on language instead. In particular, when theorizing about the mind, many philosophers assume that there is a very tight mapping between language and thought. Some analyze utterances (...) as the outer vocalizations of inner thoughts (e.g. Grice 1957, Devitt 2005), while others treat thought as a form of inner speech (e.g. Sellars 1956/1997, Carruthers 2002). But even philosophers who take no stand on the relative priority of language and thought still tend to individuate mental states in terms of the sentences we use to ascribe them. Indeed, Dummett (1993) claims that it is constitutive of analytic philosophy that it approaches the mind by way of language. In many ways, this linguistic model is salutary. Our thoughts are often intimately intertwined with their linguistic expression, and public language does provide a comparatively tractable proxy for, and a window into, the messier realm of thought. However, an exclusive focus on thought as it is expressed in language threatens to leave other sorts of thought unexplained, or even to blind us to their possibility. In particular, many cognitive ethologists and psychologists find it useful to talk about humans, chimpanzees, birds, rats, and even bees as employing cognitive maps. We need to make sense of this way of talking about minds as well as more familiar sentential descriptions. In what follows, I investigate the theoretical and practical possibility of non-sentential thought. Ultimately, I am most interested in the contours of distinctively human thought: what forms does human thought take, and how do those different forms interact? How does human thought compare with that of other animals? In this essay, however, I focus on a narrower and more basic theoretical question: could thought occur in maps? Many philosophers are convinced that in some important sense, thought per se must be language-like.. (shrink)

I take up three puzzles about our emotional and evaluative responses to fiction. First, how can we even have emotional responses to characters and events that we know not to exist, if emotions are as intimately connected to belief and action as they seem to be? One solution to this puzzle claims that we merely imagine having such emotional responses. But this raises the puzzle of why we would ever refuse to follow an author’s instructions to imagine such responses, since (...) we happily imagine many other implausible things. A natural response to this second puzzle is that our responses to fiction are real, and so can’t just be conjured up in response to an author’s demands. However, this simple response is inadequate, because we often respond differently to people and events in fiction than we would if we encountered them in real life. Solving these three puzzles in a consistent way requires the notion of a “perspective” on a fictional world. I sketch an account of this intuitive but frustratingly amorphous notion: perspectives are tools for organizing our thinking, which can in turn alter our emotional and evaluative responses. Cultivating a perspective can be illuminating, entertaining, or corrupting — or all three at once. (shrink)