This book contains seminal discussions of central issues in the philosophy of language, mathematics, mind, religion and time. Is common language conceptually prior to idiolectics? What is a theory of meaning? Does constructivism provide a satisfactory account of mathematics? What are indefinitely extensible concepts? Can we change the past? These are only some of the very important questions addressed here. Both the papers written by the contributors and Dummett's replies provide a great wealth of stimulating ideas for those who currently (...) do research in the respective areas touched upon without making the reading exceedingly tedious. This feature, common to most of the papers in this book, makes it possible to use the material presented in undergraduate courses at university level. (shrink)

This essay examines the role allocated to ostensive definition in the logical empiricist philosophy of the vienna circle. it explains how this characteristic array of doctrines grew out of reflections on the "tractatus". the various theses are distinguished into general principles, logical aspects, normative aspects and psychological theses. a detailed survey of wittgenstein's later analysis of ostensive definition is undertaken. this is then brought to bear on the doctrines of logical empiricism to show that they are incoherent. the essay concludes (...) by sketching out how much of those fallacious doctrines survive explicitly in contemporary philosophy of language. (shrink)

I take as my text propostion 4.0312 of the Tractatus : The possibility of propositions is based on the principle that objects have signs as their representatives. My fundamental idea is that the ‘logical constants’ are not representatives; that there can be no representatives of the logic of facts. Practically the same words occur in Wittgenstein's Notebook for 25 December 1914, where Miss Anscombe translates them: The possibility of the proposition is, of course, founded on the principle of signs as (...) going proxy for objects. Thus in the proposition something has something else as its proxy. But there is also the common cement. My fundamental thought is that the logical constants are not proxies. That the logic of the fact cannot have anything as its proxy. (shrink)

Approaches to Wittgenstein brings together for the first time the many varied aspects of Wittgenstein's life, philosophy and aesthetic attitudes. It draws from many of his unpublished manuscripts to illuminate his work.

The discovery, in various quarters, of hitherto unknown letters exchanged between Wittgenstein and the chief of his Cambridge friends provides the basis for this new and profoundly revealing collection. Wittgenstein appears in turn shy and affectionate, fierce and censorious, happy to collaborate and sure of his own judgement. Four quarrels and four reconciliations are documented. Wittgenstein's struggles to publish his Tractatus may be followed, as well as his retreat from the world, his being wooed back to philosophy by Keynes and (...) Ramsey, and his plans to leave philosophy. The accompanying editorial notes are based on archival material not previously explored. Taken together, the correspondence provides an intriguing insight into Wittgenstein's life and thought, and will be essential reading for students and scholars. (shrink)

This volume collects the most substantial correspondence and documents relating to Wittgenstein's long association with Cambridge between the years 1911 and his death in 1951, including the letters he exchanged with his most illustrious Cambridge contemporaries Russell, Keynes, Moore, and Ramsey. Now expanded to include 200 previously unpublished letters and documents, including correspondence between Wittgenstein and the economist Piero Sraffa, and between Wittgenstein and his pupils Includes extensive editorial annotations Provides a fascinating and intimate insight into Wittgenstein's life and thought.

Stuart Hampshire’s excellent memoir of Waismann in the Proceedings of the British Academy and Anthony Quinton’s introduction to Philosophical Papers give an affectionate portrait of an unworldly scholar alternately seeking to conform to British ways and then shunning them. The idioms and the pronunciation both slightly wrong his English itself witnessed to a profounder alienation. But it was an alienation much more seated in his character and life than that of most of the refugees that so illuminated British university life (...) in the 30’s and 40’s, of whom some indeed became remarkably assimilated. (shrink)

This volume collects the most substantial correspondence and documents relating to Wittgenstein's long association with Cambridge between the years 1911 and his death in 1951, including the letters he exchanged with his most illustrious Cambridge contemporaries Russell, Keynes, Moore, and Ramsey. Now expanded to include 200 previously unpublished letters and documents, including correspondence between Wittgenstein and the economist Piero Sraffa, and between Wittgenstein and his pupils Includes extensive editorial annotations Provides a fascinating and intimate insight into Wittgenstein's life and thought.

Traces the early years of the philosopher, detailing the roles that his troubled family, his imposing and wealthy father, turn-of-the-century Viennese intellectuals, and his World War I experiences played in the formation of his philosophy.

Wittgenstein was not only an inspirational figure for Schlick but also contributed to scientific philosophy as Neurath demanded. His verificationism is one instance of this, but it is also shown in his treatment of probability (where his ideas were developed further by Waismann). Wittgenstein revived Bolzano's logical interpretation of probability, anticipating Carnap and many moderns. He construed laws of nature as hypotheses that we had to assume. It is the general form of these hypotheses (what he later called a worldview) (...) and not (pace von Wright) relative frequency that provides the basis for judgements of probability. (shrink)

This volume collects the most substantial correspondence and documents relating to Wittgenstein's long association with Cambridge between the years 1911 and his death in 1951, including the letters he exchanged with his most illustrious Cambridge contemporaries Russell, Keynes, Moore, and Ramsey. Now expanded to include 200 previously unpublished letters and documents, including correspondence between Wittgenstein and the economist Piero Sraffa, and between Wittgenstein and his pupils Includes extensive editorial annotations Provides a fascinating and intimate insight into Wittgenstein's life and thought.

Wittgenstein was not only an inspirational figure for Schlick but also contributed to scientific philosophy as Neurath demanded. His verificationism is one instance of this, but it is also shown in his treatment of probability (where his ideas were developed further by Waismann). Wittgenstein revived Bolzano's logical interpretation of probability, anticipating Carnap and many moderns. He construed laws of nature as hypotheses that we had to assume. It is the general form of these hypotheses (what he later called a worldview) (...) and not (pace von Wright) relative frequency that provides the basis for judgements of probability. (shrink)

Wittgenstein was not only an inspirational figure for Schlick but also contributed to scientific philosophy as Neurath demanded. His verificationism is one instance of this, but it is also shown in his treatment of probability (where his ideas were developed further by Waismann). Wittgenstein revived Bolzano's logical interpretation of probability, anticipating Carnap and many moderns. He construed laws of nature as hypotheses that we had to assume. It is the general form of these hypotheses (what he later called a worldview) (...) and not (pace von Wright) relative frequency that provides the basis for judgements of probability. (shrink)

Ludwig Wittgenstein is universally recognized as one of the most original and influential philosophers of his age and as a personality of great magnetism and power. Not all who recognize his importance admire him or approve of it; his life and work are both surrounded by controversy. In this welcome reissue of his classic biographical study, complete with a brand-new Preface, Brian McGuinness traces the early years of this fascinating figure and examines the formative influences which shaped his (...) extraordinary life. (shrink)

(2006). First thoughts: An unpublished letter from Gilbert Ryle to H. J. Paton∗. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 747-756.

L’un des paradoxes de l’observation sociale et de la biographie est de voir à quel point les individus les plus originaux manifestent en temps de crise des réactions identiques à celles des moins cultivés et des plus conventionnels. En août 1914, Wittgenstein s’engagea sous les drapeaux, partageant l’enthousiasme et la dévotion qui s’étendait sur l’Autriche tout comme sur l’Allemagne..

I take as my text propostion 4.0312 of the Tractatus:The possibility of propositions is based on the principle that objects have signs as their representatives.My fundamental idea is that the ‘logical constants’ are not representatives; that there can be no representatives of the logic of facts.Practically the same words occur in Wittgenstein's Notebook for 25 December 1914, where Miss Anscombe translates them:The possibility of the proposition is, of course, founded on the principle of signs as going proxy for objects.Thus in (...) the proposition something has something else as its proxy. But there is also the common cement.My fundamental thought is that the logical constants are not proxies. That the logic of the fact cannot have anything as its proxy. (shrink)

As late as 1948, when he was making his report to the Literae Humaniores Faculty Board on the work he had done as University Lecturer since 1945, Friedrich Waismann listed three text books that he had ready for publication and one book—as it might be “real book”—which he referred to as “Philosophy and Grammar”. That was his fi nal title for a work he had been preparing since 1929 and which was originally to be called “Logik Sprache Philosophie”. In 1948 (...) that work will have consisted physically in a heavily corrected set of galley proofs, printed for Routledge and Kegan Paul . The print was set up in the unhappy year of 1939, the copy reaching the publisher on 25 July of that year. (shrink)

Wittgenstein was not only an inspirational figure for Schlick but also contributed to scientific philosophy as Neurath demanded. His verificationism is one instance of this, but it is also shown in his treatment of probability (where his ideas were developed further by Waismann). Wittgenstein revived Bolzano's logical interpretation of probability, anticipating Carnap and many moderns. He construed laws of nature as hypotheses that we had to assume. It is the general form of these hypotheses (what he later called a worldview) (...) and not (pace von Wright) relative frequency that provides the basis for judgements of probability. (shrink)

Susan Edwards-McKie interviews Professor Dr B. F. McGuinness on the occasion of his 90th birthday.